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LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 




I 



























STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 


EDITED BY THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

Volume CXI] [Number 2 

Whole Number 249 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 


BY 

EDWARD BERMAN, Ph.D. 

w 

Instructor in Economics, University of Illinois 



•Ntro JJork 

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

SALE AGENTS 

New York : Longmans, Green & Co. 
London: P. S. King & Son, Ltd. 

1924 




VU153&1- 



n . 


Copyright, 1924 

BY 

EDWARD BERMAN 


\ ff I A 10 

M 


MY PARENTS 

TO WHOSE KINDNESS, SYMPATHY AND GENEROSITY 
I OWE MORE THAN I CAN EVER REPAY 
THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED 



INTRODUCTION 


The industrial unrest of the greater part of the nineteenth 
century manifested itself in occasional strikes', but these 
usually involved the workers in a single craft, situated in a 
single locality. Trade unions were largely localized and 
labor struggles were fought over limited areas. But, as the 
second half of the century progressed, national unions be¬ 
came more and more common, and with them came an en¬ 
largement of the scale of strikes, affecting, for example, 
many of the employees of a large railroad system, or the 
miners in a whole district. Thus the problem of strikes, 
which had hitherto been for the most part local, became dis¬ 
trict and even national. 

With the coming of the twentieth century the struggles of 
labor became still more inclusive in the number of their par¬ 
ticipants and in the number of people whom they affected. 
Strikes of railroad workers or of miners on a district or a 
nation-wide scale now threatened hardship and inconvenience 
to great numbers of people, who were likely to find them¬ 
selves without fuel or the other necessaries of life. Further¬ 
more, they sometimes occasioned violence and disorder 
which could not be ignored. The problem, having thus be¬ 
come to a large extent a national one, required treatment 
by an agency having national influence and nation-wide 
powers. 

Accordingly, toward the end of the last century and more 
and more frequently in the present one, the President of the 
United States is found using his influence and powers to pre¬ 
vent the suffering and discomfort which are caused by great 
255] 7 


8 


INTRODUCTION 


[256 

strikes, and to suppress the disturbances which sometimes 
come in their wake. The great prestige of his office and the 
freedom and scope of its powers, have caused him to be es¬ 
pecially well qualified for the difficult task of bringing in¬ 
dustrial contestants to a peaceful settlement of the issues be¬ 
tween them. 

It is the purpose of this study to describe the activities of 
the President in connection with labor disputes, particularly 
those activities having to do with averting or ending strikes 1 ,* 
to estimate their effectiveness and fairness; and, finally, to 
suggest the presidential program best suited to the prompt, 
effective, and just treatment of the problems which arise in 
connection with nation-wide strikes. 

To this end the activities of each executive, in whose 
administration the problems here treated have arisen, are 
discussed chronologically, commencing with President Cleve¬ 
land and the Pullman Strike of 1894. Though the prin¬ 
cipal purpose is to consider those activitiesi by means of 
which the executive has attempted to avert or to end a par¬ 
ticular strike, it will be necessary, for the sake of thorough¬ 
ness and in order to trace the development of method, to 
consider some instances in which the part played by the 
President had another motive. For example, the use of 
troops, though generally having little to do with preventing 
or ending a strike, must be briefly considered because it has 
sometimes had that effect, and because it is one of the im¬ 
portant activities of the executive in connection with labor 
disputes. 

It should also be noted that there is no intention of dis¬ 
cussing the part played by the President in connection with 
the broader problem of industrial unrest. The purpose 
here is to deal with his activities at the time of particular 
strikes, rather than with) his efforts to promote industrial 
peace in general by aiding in the passage of mediation and 
arbitration laws or by calling industrial conferences, etc. 


INTRODUCTION 


9 


257] 

The information on which the present study is based has 
to a large extent come from official government documents. 
Wherever possible the reports of boards of arbitration or in¬ 
vestigation have been relied upon as the most dependable and 
impartial authorities. When no such boards were appointed, 
information has been obtained from the reports of congres¬ 
sional committees investigating strikes, or from published 
testimony given before such committees. Reports of ad¬ 
ministrative officials, such as the Secretary of Labor and the 
Secretary of War, those of the U. S. Board of Mediation 
and Conciliation, and the publications of the U. S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, particularly the Monthly Labor Review, 
have also been consulted. Much information concerning 
specific demands of strikers and occurrences during strikes 
has come from journals published by labor unions, or by em¬ 
ployers’ associations. Finally newspapers, especially the 
New York Times, have been of inestimable value for the 
purpose of obtaining evidence as to dates, events, speeches 
of the President, and other matters: not always available 
from official sources. 




















TABLE OF CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Introduction. 7 

CHAPTER I 

President Cleveland, 1893-1897 

1. The Pullman strike of 1894. 13 

/ 

CHAPTER II 

President McKinley, 1897-1901 

1. The Coeur d’Alene Disturbance, 1899. 36 

CHAPTER III 

President Roosevelt, 1901-1909 

1. The Anthracite Strike of 1902.-. 46 

2. The Miners’ Strike in Arizona, 1903. 59 

3. The Colorado Strike of 1903-1904. 60 

4. The Coal Strikes of 1906 . 62 

5. The Goldfield Miners’ Strike, 1907. 64 

6. The Threatened Wage Reduction on the Louisville and Nash¬ 

ville Railroad, 1908. 70 

CHAPTER IV 
President Wilson, 1913-1917 

1. The Threatened Strike of Conductors and Trainmen on the 

Eastern Railways, 1913. 73 

2. The Colorado Strike of 1913-1914. 76 

3. The Threatened Strike of Engineers and Firemen on the West¬ 

ern Railways, 1914.100 

4. The Eastern Ohio Coal Strike, 1914-1915.105 

5. The Threatened Railway Strike of 1916 and the Adamson Act. 106 

259 ] 11 
















12 


CONTENTS 


[260 

PAGE 

CHAPTER V 

President Wilson, War-time Activities 

1. The President’s Mediation Commission.126 

2. Miners’ Wages and Strike Penalties.129 

3. Railway Labor Disputes.130 

4. The Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board.13 2 

5. The National War Labor Board. 137 

a. The Western Union Case.142 

b. The Bridgeport Case.146 

c. The Smith & Wesson Case.148 

d. The New York Harbor Strike, January, 1919.150 

6. Conclusion.151 

CHAPTER VI 
President Wilson, 1919-1921 

1. The Shopmen’s Strike of 1919.154 

2. The Sympathetic Railway Strike in the Southwest, 1919 ... 164 

3. The Steel Strike of 1919.166 

4. The Bituminous Coal Strike of 1919.177 

5. The Railway Labor Troubles of 1920.193 

6. The Anthracite Wage Dispute of 1920.199 

7. The Illinois Bituminous Strike of 1920.204 

Appendix: Use of Federal Troops in Labor Disputes, 1917-1921 207 

CHAPTER VII 
President Harding, 1921-1923 

1. The West Virginia Mine Disturbances of 1921.210 

2. The Threatened Railway Strike of 1921.213 

3. The Coal Strikes of 1922.214 

4. The Railway Shopmen’s Strike of 1922.226 

CHAPTER VIII 

Conclusion .248 

Bibliography.275 

Index.281 

























CHAPTER I 


President Cleveland, 1893-1897 

I. THE PULLMAN STRIKE OF 1 894 

The significance of the Pullman Strike lies not alone in 
the fact that it tied up the operation of the railways in more 
than half of the country, since strikes in the two decades 
preceding had had a similar effect. Its chief significance 
lies in the fact that the President, by obtaining an injunction 
to end the strike, inaugurated a precedent which was of se¬ 
rious import to labor, and the effects of which have made 
themselves more and more apparent ever since. 

The cause of this industrial disturbance was comparatively 
unimportant. Pleading the decline in business due to the 
depression of 1893, the Pullman Palace Car Company put 
into effect a cut in wages in the fall of that year. The com¬ 
pany, at its plant in Pullman, a suburb of Chicago, not only 
manufactured cars, but also kept in repair those cars which 
it leased to the railroads. The latter work was done ac¬ 
cording to contracts with the roads, prices for the work 
having been fixed in advance of 1893. In the manufactur¬ 
ing department, however, the company’s business decreased 
considerably. But it based its wage reduction on conditions 
in this department and applied it to the contracting depart¬ 
ment as well. This action, added to the feeling on the part 
of the employees that their wages were too low to enable 
them to live decently, was the most important cause for dis¬ 
satisfaction. Moreover, though the company had reduced 
the wages of its employees, it had not reduced the rents 
261] 13 


I4 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [262 

which they had to! pay to the company for the use of its 
houses. Employees complained further that there were 
numerous unfair and oppressive shop conditions. 1 

In March, 1894, 'being dissatisfied with the situation de¬ 
scribed, large numbers of the employees of the company 
sought organization, and joined the American Railway 
Union. This body had been organized as an industrial 
union in Chicago in June, 1893, with the purpose of in¬ 
cluding all the workers connected with the railways, and had 
grown at the expense of the older railway brotherhoods, to 
the conservative trade-union methods of which it was op¬ 
posed. 2 On May 7 and May 9 a committee of Pullman em¬ 
ployees from all departments waited upon the management 
and urged that wages be restored to the level of the previous 
year. The company refused to grant any concession, claim¬ 
ing that business conditions did not justify a change. The 
committee was promised that none of its members would be 
discharged for coming to the management. On the next 
day, however, three of the committeemen were discharged 
for alleged lack of work. 3 That evening the local unions 
met and voted to strike at once. 4 On May 11 2500 men quit, 
leaving only about 600 at work. This number being insuf¬ 
ficient to operate the plant, the company closed it down and 
did not reopen it until nearly three months later. 5 

From June 9 to June 26 the American Railway Union 
held its regular convention in Chicago. The strike at Pull¬ 
man was frequently discussed and the delegates heard re- 

1 Report of the U. S. Strike Commission, Senate Executive Document 
No. 7, 3rd Sess., 53rd Cong., pp. xxxiii-xxxvi. 

2 Ibid., pp. xxiii, xxv. 

3 The manager of the company, T. H. Wickes, asserted that they were 
not laid off because they were committeemen. Ibid., p. 587. 

4 Ibid., pp. xxxvii-xxxviii. 

'Ibid., p. 586. 


263] PRESIDENT CLEVELAND , jtfpj-jtfpy 15 

ports from the strikers themselves. On June 15 the Union 
proposed to the Pullman Company, which had already re¬ 
fused arbitration on the ground that there was nothing to 
arbitrate, that the question of arbitration itself be sub¬ 
mitted to a commission to decide if the issues were or were 
not arbitrable. The company, however, declined to receive 
any communication from the Union. On June 21 the con¬ 
vention, under instructions from the local unions, voted 
unanimously that members of the American Railway Union 
should stop handling Pullman cars on the railroads on June 
26 unless the Pullman Company would consent to arbitra¬ 
tion by that time. On the 22nd it sent another proposal 
for arbitration to the company, which again refused to re¬ 
ceive it. 1 

On the same day the General Managers Association, an 
organization representing 24 railroads entering Chicago, 
whose purpose it was to handle managerial and labor prob¬ 
lems as a unit, adopted the following resolution: 

That we hereby declare it to be the lawful right and duty of 
said railway companies to protest against said boycotts; to 
resist the same in the interests of their existing contracts, and 
for the benefit of the travelling public, and that we will unitedly 
act to that end. 2 

The Association, beginning June 26, when the boycott 
started, directed and controlled the contest for the railways. 

The readiness of the American Railway Union to act was 
perhaps due not only to its sympathy for the fellow union¬ 
ists in Pullman, but also to the disturbed and apprehensive 
condition of the railroad employees because of wage reduc¬ 
tions on the different lines, the practice of blacklisting, and 
the growth of the General Managers Association, which they 

1 Report of the U. S. Strike Commission, op. cit., p. xxxix. 

2 Ibid., p. xlii. 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [264 

considered a menace to labor. 1 The boycott in a few days 
spread all over the central and western United States, and 
when it became apparent that the railways would refuse to 
detach Pullman cars, it developed into a strike, the employees 
refusing to work unless the trains were made up without the 
Pullmans. 

On June 28, two days after the strike began, informa¬ 
tion came to the Postoffice Department at Washington that 
at several points on the Southern Pacific system the mails 
were completely obstructed, and that strikers refused to per¬ 
mit trains to which Pullman cars were attached to move over 
the lines. On receiving this information Attorney General 
Olney sent the following telegram to the United States 
district attorneys in California: 

See that the passage of regular trains, carrying U. S. mails 
in the usual and ordinary way, as contemplated by the act of 
Congress and directed by the Postmaster General, is not ob¬ 
structed. Procure warrants or any other available process 
from U. S. courts against any and all persons engaged in such 
obstruction, and direct the marshal to execute the same by 
such number of deputies or such posse as may be necessary. 

On the same day and on the following days similar com¬ 
plaints came to Washington from all parts of the West, 
sometimes accompanied by charges of the forcible seizure 
of trains and other violence. In all cases where it appeared 
that there was interference with the passage of the mails the 
Attorney General sent messages similar to the above to the 
U. S. district attorneys. On June 30 the district attorney 
at Chicago reported that mail trains had been stopped the 
night before in the suburbs of that city by a band of strikers, 
that an engine had been cut off and disabled, that it was 


1 Report of the U. S. Strike Commission, op. cit., p. xxxix. 


26 s] PRESIDENT CLEVELAND, iy 

growing more and more likely that all trains would have to 
be stopped, and he recommended that the U. S. Marshal at 
Chicago be empowered to employ special deputies who should 
be placed on the trains to protect the mails. Mr. Olney at 
once authorized the marshal to employ all the additional 
deputies necessary. 1 

At the same time the Attorney General appointed Edwin 
Walker, well known as a railroad attorney and, at the time, 
counsel for the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul, 2 to be 
special attorney in charge of conducting the government’s 
case against the strikers in the courts. In a letter to Mr. 
Walker, the Attorney General wirote, 4 4 It has seemed to me 
that if the rights of the United States were vigorously as¬ 
serted in Chicago, the origin and center of the demonstra¬ 
tion, the result would be to make it a failure everywhere 
else and to prevent its spread over the entire country.” He 
also recommended that Mr. Walker and U. S. Attorney 
Milchrist obtain an injunction against the strikers in the 
federal courts, pointing out that instead of relying entirely 
on warrants for arrest issued under the criminal statutes, an 
injunction based on the general principles of law and on the 
Anti-trust Act of 1890 would be more effective in ending 
the strike. 8 

It should be noted that the lawless' elements in the city 
were augmented at this time by many criminals and adven¬ 
turers attracted to it by the Columbian Exposition. The 
strike gave these elements a chance to burn, plunder, and 
commit all sorts of crimes. Although the railway managers 
and some of the government officials prosecuting the strikers 

1 Cleveland, The Government in the Chicago Strike of 1894, Princeton, 
1913, pp. 10, 11, 14. 

2 Book of Chicagoans, 1905, p. 590. 

• Appendix to the Report of the Attorney general, 1896, Correspond¬ 
ence in the Chicago Strike, pp. 59 , 60, 61; Cleveland, op. cit., p. 15. 


!g LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [266 

maintained that the violence and obstruction to traffic was 
the fault of the latter, it has been conceded by more im¬ 
partial authorities that the strikers were but a very small 
part of the mobs, and that a comparatively small number of 
those on strike were involved in lawless acts. The mobs 
were composed generally of hoodlums and recruits from the 
criminal classes. 1 

The U. S. Marshal at Chicago, who on July 1 reported 
that he had sworn in 400 deputies' and that many more 
would be required to protect mail trains, made numerous 
arrests of strikers and others on warrants charging criminal 
obstruction to the passage of the mails. But the govern¬ 
ment attorneys at Chicago, agreeing with the Attorney 
General as to the insufficiency of this procedure, determined 
to obtain an injunction. In conference with several at¬ 
torneys for the railroads, they drew up a bill in equity, 2 
based on the law prohibiting obstruction to the mails and on 
the Sherman Act, empowering U. S. Attorneys to seek an 
injunction in the circuit courts to restrain violation of the 
act, and declaring illegal all conspiracies in restraint of in¬ 
terstate trade and commerce. 3 

On July 2 Judges Wood and Grosscup answered the re¬ 
quest of Attorneys Walker and Milchxist by issuing the 
most 'sweeping injunction order ever handed down by a 
federal court up to that time. Eugene V. Debs, the presi¬ 
dent of the American Railway Union, the other officers of 
the Union, and “ all other persons whomsoever ” were 
ordered absolutely to desist and refrain “ from in any way 
or manner interfering with, hindering, obstructing, or stop¬ 
ping ” any of the business of the railroads entering Chicago, 

1 Rep. of the Strike Com. pp. xliii, xliv, xlv. 

2 Appendix to (Rep. of Att’y Gen., 1896, op. cit., Letter from Walker to 
Olney, p. 63. 

3 U. S. Compiled Statutes, 1918, sec. 8563 (9), sec. 8820, 8823. 


267] PRESIDENT CLEVELAND, ig 

or any trains carrying U. S. mails or engaged in interstate 
commerce, or from interfering with or injuring the property 
of said railroads, or from trespassing on such property for 
the purpose of said obstruction, or from injuring signals, 
switches, etc., or “ from compelling or inducing or attempt¬ 
ing to compel or induce, by threats, intimidation, persuasion, 
force or violence, any of the employees of any of the said 
railways to refuse or fail to perform any of their duties as 
employees ” in carrying mail or in interstate commerce, or 
“ from compelling or inducing or attempting to compel or 
induce, by threats, intimidation, force, or violence any of the 
employees ” to leave the service of the railroads or from 
entering their service, or “ from doing any act whatever in 
furtherance of any conspiracy or combination to restrain 
either of said railway companies or receivers in the free and 
unhindered control and handling of interstate commerce 
over the lines of said railroads, and of transportation of per¬ 
sons and freight between or among the states; and from 
ordering, directing, aiding, assisting, or abetting in any 
manner whatever any person or persons to commit any or 
either of the acts aforesaid.” 1 

Thereafter, when he thought it necessary, the Attorney 
General had his attorneys obtain similar injunctions in many 
districts throughout the West and the Central West . 2 In 
most cases the injunctions were granted on the same grounds 
as at Chicago, but in some of the western states the fact that 
the railroads were by law military and post roads of the 
United States, and that some were also in the hands of re¬ 
ceivers appointed by federal courts gave further bases for 
the injunctions. 

1 In re Debs, 64 Fed. Rep. 724. 

2 See Appendix, 1896, op. cit., passim ; also the Report of the Att’y 
Gen., 1894, P- xxxiv. 


20 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [268 

Needless to say, if the injunctions could be enforced, the 
strike, and all violence arising out of it, as well as the 
Obstruction of the mails and interstate commerce, would at 
once come to an end. A reading of the injunction shows 
that it could be interpreted to prevent any act whatever, 
peaceful or otherwise, done in connection with the strike. 
But to grant an injunction has always proved easier than 
to enforce one. At the time that the Chicago injunction was 
issued on July 2, Attorney Walker informed the govern¬ 
ment that he thought it would require troops to enforce it 
and to protect the mails. On the same day U. S. Marshal 
Arnold attempted to read the injunction to a mob at Blue 
Island, a suburb of Chicago, but was hooted down and was 
not permitted to continue. He reported to the Attorney 
General, described the violence of the mobs, and said he 
believed only U. S. troops could handle the situation. At¬ 
torneys Walker and Milchrist, and Judge Grosscup, who 
had granted the injunction, concurred in his request for 
troops. 1 

On July 3, after consultation between the President, mem¬ 
bers of the cabinet, and General Miles, who had been called 
from his headquarters near Chicago, the following message 
was sent to the officer in charge of federal troops stationed 
near that city: 

It having become impracticable, in the judgment of the Presi¬ 
dent, to enforce by ordinary course of judicial proceedings the 
laws of the United States, you will direct Colonel Crofton to 
move his entire command at once to the city of Chicago, leav¬ 
ing the necessary guard at Fort Sheridan, there to execute the 
orders and processes of the U. S. courts, to prevent the ob¬ 
struction of the U. S. mails, and generally to enforce the 
faithful execution of the laws of the United States. He will 


1 Appendix, 1896, op. cit., pp. 62, 63. 


21 


269] PRESIDENT CLEVELAND, 

confer with the U. S. marshal, the U. S. district attorney, and 
Edwin Walker, special counsel. Acknowledge receipt and re¬ 
port action promptly. 

By order of the President. 

J. M. Schofield, Major General. 1 

The troops arrived in Chicago on July 4 and for the next 
few days were kept busy putting down the violence of the 
mobs and aiding the marshals in serving injunction writs 
and other court processes. 2 Orders similar to the above 
were sent to many commanders in the West, and federal 
troops were used in numerous instances for the same pur¬ 
poses as in the neighborhood of Chicago. In some cases 
they were sent at the request of state governors; in other 
cases because a particular railroad on which the strike had 
taken effect, was in the hands of a. federal court acting as 
receiver, and troops were called to enforce the orders of the 
court. Elsewhere the roads had been designated by law as 
roads for military and naval service. The extension of the 
strike to such roads and the consequent absence of com¬ 
munication between military posts was considered sufficient 
reason for using troops to see that the trains were run. 
After the first week of July violence became less common, 
and by the middle of the month peace had been restored to 
practically all of the disturbed areas. Troops were finally 
withdrawn from 'Chicago on July 20. s 

There occurred, shortly after the troops arrived in 
Chicago, an interesting but acrimonious controversy be¬ 
tween Governor Altgeld, of Illinois, and President Cleveland. 
The Governor, who did not send the state militia into 
Chicago until July 6, protested against the President’s action 

1 Rep. of the Strike Com., p. 340; N. Y. Tribune, July 4, 1894. 

2 Cleveland, The Government in the Chicago Strike of 1894, pp. 27-30. 

3 Wilson, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances., Sen. Doc., vol. xix, 
2nd Sess., 67th Cong., pp. 195-202. 


22 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [270 

in sending in federal troops, denying both the necessity for 
them, and the President’s right to send them in unless the 
Governor or the state legislature applied for them. Several 
messages were exchanged by the two executives, and the 
correspondence ended when the President sent the f ollowing 
on July 6: 

While I am still persuaded that I have neither transcended 
my authority nor duty in the emergency that confronts us, 
it seems to me in this hour of danger and public distress, dis¬ 
cussion may well give way to active efforts on the part of all 
in authority to restore obedience to law, and to protect life and 
property. 1 

It seems probable from available reports of events in 
Chicago during the first week of July, that troops were 
needed at the time the President sent them. Under the 
statutes the President’s technical right to send them does not 
seem open to question. It is true that an act of Feb. 28, 
1795 (Revised Statutes, Section 5297), gives the President 
power to send troops in case of an insurrection against a 
state government only when the state legislature, or, if it 
cannot be convened, the governor requests that they be sent. 
But Section 5298 (Act of July 29, 1861) empowers the 
President to use troops whenever it is impracticable to en¬ 
force, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the 
laws of the United States. Other statutes, ( R . S. 1989, 
R. S. 5299) give him the right to use troops to enforce the 
processes of the federal courts, to enforce the execution of 
all laws guaranteeing civil rights, and to prevent conspiracies 
which deprive anyone of rights guaranteed by the Constitu¬ 
tion and the laws. On the assumption that the strike ob- 

1 Cleveland, The Government in the Chicago Strike of 1894, p. 44. 
For the correspondence between Cleveland and Altgeld, see the book 
here cited and Governor Altgeld’s annual message of 1895. 


271] PRESIDENT CLEVELAND, j[8p8-l8p/ 23 

structed the mail, prevented communication on military 
roads, and involved violence restricting civil rights, the use 
of troops to enforce the laws regarding these subjects was 
justified. Furthermore, once injunctions were issued, troops 
could be used under the law to enf orce them. 

Criticism of the government’s use of troops in the Pull¬ 
man Strike must be made, if at all, on other grounds. The 
federal authorities should, as a matter of courtesy, have 
asked Governor Altgeld for state troops as soon as they 
thought some military force was needed. This was never 
done. Secondly, the underlying assumption of the adminis¬ 
tration was that the strike as such violated the law, an as¬ 
sumption which does not seem justified by the facts. The 
use of troops was partly based on this assumption and their 
use, therefore, from that point of view, does not seem to 
have been entirely warranted. Furthermore, the troops about 
Chicago were practically under the control of Edwin Walker, 
a railway attorney. The injustice of their use does not 
arise from their own activities, for no serious complaint 
of their methods arose, but it does come from the govern¬ 
ment’s basic assumption, and from the appointment of Mr. 
Walker as the legal representative of the administration. 

The Chicago injunction was served on President Debs and 
other union officers a few days after it was issued. Its 
use, and the presence of troops to enforce it, as well as to 
help the marshal and his deputies in enforcing the laws, was 
not, however, considered sufficient action on the part of the 
government to end the strike. On July 2 Attorney Walker, 
in a letter to the Attorney General, recommended that in¬ 
dictments against Mr. Debs and others be sought from the 
Federal Grand Jury. “ The result of a trial under the in¬ 
dictments,” he wrote, “ will be of little importance, and 
there may be no necessity of such trial. The very fact, how¬ 
ever, that the government has called a grand jury for the 


24 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [272 

purpose of investigating these offences, and the return of 
the indictments which in my opinion are sure to follow, will 
have a greater restraining effect on Debs and his followers 
than our proceeding by injunction.” 1 This method of pro¬ 
cedure received the approval of the Attorney General, and 
on July 10 the Federal Grand Jury at Chicago returned 
indictments against the officers of the American Railway 
Union charging complicity in obstructing the mails and in¬ 
terstate commerce. 2 

In his charge to the Grand Jury Judge Grosscup referred 
to the law of conspiracy, and declared that if the jury should 
find that a body of men had combined together for the pur¬ 
pose of hindering or obstructing the mails; or restraining 
interstate commerce, whether temporarily or permanently, 
by forcible methods, or by quitting employment, and pre¬ 
venting others, by threats, intimidation, or violence, from 
taking their places, it would constitute a criminal con¬ 
spiracy. 3 

On the same day Mr. Debs and other officers were ar¬ 
rested by the U. S. Marshal, and were released on bail of 
$10,000. 4 A week later, on July 17, the government at¬ 
torneys filed information with the federal court against them 
for contempt of court because of disobedience of the injunc¬ 
tion of July 2. The strike leader and three others volun¬ 
tarily appeared before the court, which set a hearing on the 
contempt charges for the following week and fixed bail at 
$3000. They refused, however, to give bail, and were com¬ 
mitted to jail. 5 On July 19 the Federal Grand Jury re¬ 
turned over twenty indictments! again charging Mr. Debs and 

1 Appendix to the iRep. of the Att’y 'Gen., 1896., p. 64. 

•Cleveland, op. cit., p. 34. 

3 In re Grand Jury, 62 Fed. Rep., 828, 831. 

*N. Y. Tribune, July 11, 1894. 

6 Appendix, op. cit., p. 87. 


273] PRESIDENT CLEVELAND, 25 

others with conspiracy against the mails and interstate com¬ 
merce. Seven days later the U. S. 'Circuit Court charged 
with hearing the contempt cases postponed them until later 
in the year. 1 

Meanwhile the strike had been completely defeated. On 
July 13 the government’s counsel reported that it was prac¬ 
tically broken. Attempts were made throughout the hirst 
half of July to get the Pullman Company and the General 
Managers Association to make a settlement of some kind. 
On July 6 the Chicago Board of Aldermen asked the As¬ 
sociation to talk the strike over, but the latter refused. A 
few days later they made an attempt to get Mr. Pullman 
to submit to arbitration the question as to whether or not 
there was anything to arbitrate, but met with the same re¬ 
fusal. About July 12 Mayor Pingree of Detroit and Mayor 
Hopkins of Chicago made similar unsuccessful attempts. 2 

On the 13th the American Railway Union, through 
Mayor Hopkins, sent a proposal for settlement to the Gen¬ 
eral Managers Association. “ Let it be stated,” the letter 
said, “ that they do not impose any condition of settlement 
except that they be returned to their f ormer position's. They 
do not ask the recognition of their organization or of any 
organization.” This proposal the managers refused even to 
receive. 3 It is not difficult to understand the position of the 
employers. As soon as they saw that the government was 
using all its powers to fight the strikers, victory for them was 
assured. To agree to a settlement of any kind short of abso¬ 
lute defeat of the strikers was entirely unnecessary. Fur¬ 
thermore, by the 10th or nth of July there really was 
“ nothing to arbitrate.” One doesn’t arbitrate with a thor¬ 
oughly beaten opponent. 

1 Appendix, op. cit., pp. 90-93. 

s Rep. of the Strike Com., pp. 350-351* 

• Ibid., p. 58. 


26 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [274 

On July 12 a committee representing organized labor saw 
President Cleveland and asked him to appoint a commission 
under the law of 1888 to investigate the railroad strike. 
The President replied that he would do so, but that all 
.strikes must first be called off and all violence cease. The 
next day he assured callers that the commission would have 
nothing to do with arbitration. 1 Evidently the President 
also saw “ nothing to arbitrate.” 

The Act of October 1, 1888, 2 provided for the arbitration 
of labor disputes in the field of transportation. Each side 
was to agree to arbitration and was to appoint one member 
of a board. The two thus chosen were to name a third 
member. This board had the right to subpoena witnesses 
and its award was to be published, but otherwise the pro¬ 
cedure was of a voluntary nature throughout. The provis¬ 
ions just described were never put to use. But the act 
also provided that the President of the United States, in 
case of railway labor disputes, might appoint a commission 
of inquiry which was to have full powers; of investigation 
into the causes and conditions of the controversy and the 
means of adjusting it, and was to make its report to the 
President. In accordance with his promise such a com¬ 
mission was appointed by Mr. Cleveland on July 26. Its 
members were Carroll D. Wright, Commissioner of Labor, 
John D. Keman of New York, and N. E. Worthington of 
Illinois. a It held hearings in August and September. It 
was, of course, appointed too late to have a hand in settling 
the strike, but it made a report on November 14, 1894., 4 

1 N. Y. Tribune, July 13 and 14. 

2 25 Stat. 501. 

3 The act required that the Commissioner of Labor should head the 
commission and that one of its other two members should be a resident 
of the state in which the dispute occurred. 

4 Rep. of the Strike Commission, pp. xv-xvii. 


275] PRESIDENT CLEVELAND, 1893-1897 27 

which, together with the testimony taken by it, is perhaps 
the most valuable source of information in regard to the 
strike. 

In the meantime, on August 2, the same day on which the 
Pullman plant reopened, a convention of the American Rail¬ 
way Union voted to recommend to the local unions that the 
strike be called off at once. This was done when the dele¬ 
gates returned to their homes, and the strike formally ended 
on all the roads. 1 

On the 14th of December the federal court found Mr. 
Debs and a number of his associates guilty of contempt f or 
disobeying the injunction and sentenced them to jail for 
terms varying from three to six months. Judge Wood 
f ound that the defendants, by continuing to direct the strike 
after July 2, were engaged in a conspiracy to hinder and 
obstruct interstate commerce and the passage of the mails in 
a way to constitute a public nuisance, thus violating the re¬ 
straining order. 2 Some time afterwards the trial of the 
leaders on the indictments returned by the Grand Jury was 
begun, but the government attorneys had the case dismissed. 3 

On January 14, 1895, the strike leaders in jail for con¬ 
tempt of court appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court for 
writs of error and of habeas corpus. The first writ was 
denied, but the Supreme Court heard arguments' on the writ 
of habeas corpus. In a decision handed down on May 27, 
1895, Justice Brewer rendering the opinion, the petition was 
denied. 4 The direct question was one as to whether the 
lower court had jurisdiction, but the opinion contained a 
lengthy discussion, obiter dicta , defending the action of the 

1 Rep. of the Strike Commission, p. 151. 

2 In re Debs, 64 Fed. Rep. 724, 739. 

3 Report of the Commission on Industrial Relations, vol. xi, Washing¬ 
ton, 1916. p, 10771. 

4 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900. 


28 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [276 

government in it si suit for the injunction, of the court in 
granting it, and upholding vigorously the injunction process 
and the right of the court to punish for contempt when its 
order iis disobeyed. 1 

The President, during the summer of 1894 and for many 
years after, received much commendation from citizens all 
over the country for the decisive and unhesitating part he 
played in ending the strike. That he ended it no one can 
doubt who reads the facts. That his action was determined 
and unhesitating seems equally clear; for in three or four 
days he had put into effect all the powers necessary to bring 
an end to the strike. After that the issue was at no time 
in doubt. The strike Was doomed to early defeat. Un¬ 
doubtedly the principal purpose of the President was to pre¬ 
vent the hardships and inconvenience to the public which the 
strike certainly involved, and to put down the violence 
which it brought in its wake. His purpose seems most com¬ 
mendable. But it may be questioned whether the methods 
used in accomplishing his purpose were fair. 

The strike was probably unjustified, and considered from 
the point of view of the railway employees, foolish. It was 
doomed to failure from the first, because it necessarily an¬ 
tagonized public opinion. This does not refer to the 
original strike at Pullman. The evidence show’s conclu¬ 
sively that that strike was justifiable. But for the American 

1 The court proceedings discussed here were not the only ones in¬ 
volved in the strike. A great many strikers all over the country were 
arrested and sentenced to prison for varying terms on charges of con¬ 
tempt of court for disobeying the various injunctions, for violations 
of federal laws concerning the obstruction of the mails, etc. For 
decisions in the more important of these cases, see In re Phelan, 62 
Fed. Rep. 803; In re Grand Jury, 62 Fed. Rep. 840; U. S. v. Cassidy, 
67 Fed. Rep. 698; 5 . Calif. R. R. Co. v. Rutherford, 62 Fed. Rep. 796, 
in which strikers were directly enjoined from leaving their jobs; U. S. 
v. Elliott, 62 Fed. Rep. 801; and U. S. v. Aglcr, 62 Fed. Rep. 824. 


277] PRESIDENT CLEVELAND, 29 

Railway Union to make the Pullman issue, concerning asi 
it did only about 3000 workers, nation-wide in scope and to 
inaugurate a great sympathetic strike affecting adversely a 
large proportion of the people of the United States; seems 
reckless and unthinking in the extreme. Furthermore, with a 
business depression of great severity and considerable un¬ 
employment existing at the same time, it was very unwise 
from the point of view of tactics. 

Despite all this it should be noted that there was no f ederal 
law forbidding a sympathetic strike, nor was there one the 
intent of which was to forbid a railroad strike. The union 
was within its rights under the law, as it was then under¬ 
stood, in declaring a strike, and in its struggle with the Gen¬ 
eral Managers Association it was entitled to some measure 
of consideration from a federal government which was sup¬ 
posed to represent the interests of all the people. 

Reference has been made to the appointment of Edwin 
Walker by the Attorney General to take charge of the gov¬ 
ernment’s campaign against the strikers. It was perhaps 
necessary that a good lawyer acquainted with conditions in 
Chicago be put in charge of affairs. But it should have 
appeared equally necessary to the administration that the 
person appointed to such a position should, as far as pos¬ 
sible, be one whose appointment could not lay the govern¬ 
ment open to the charge of interfering in the strike for the 
purpose of helping the General Managers' Association de¬ 
feat the strikers. The record of Edwin Walker as a lawyer 
should have prevented the government from appointing him 
as its representative in Chicago. 

From 1865 to 1883 he had been General Solicitor for the 
Chicago and Great Eastern, which in 1870 was; amalgamated 
with the Pennsylvania system. From 1869 to 1884 he had 
been General Counsel for the Chicago, Danville and Vin¬ 
cennes. From 1870 to 1896 he was the Illinois counsel for 


30 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [278 

the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul. 1 To appoint a man 
with such a career, regardless of his ability, at a time when 
he was still acting as counsel for one of the roads which 
were fighting the strikers cannot be regarded as other than 
an act deserving of severe criticism. Furthermore, Edwin 
Walker took a very active part in disposing of the troops 
and deputy marshals to the different railroads. When, 
therefore, the strikers charged that the government per¬ 
mitted itself to wage the battle of the General Managers 
Association, largely under the direction of that organization, 
it must be admitted that they had some basis for their charge. 

Another basis for the same charge lay in the method of 
appointing and controlling the deputy marshals. On June 
30 the Attorney General had authorized U. S. Marshal 
Arnold to employ enough deputies to prevent obstruction of 
the mails. 2 Concerning these men the U. S. Strike Com¬ 
mission reported that, out of about 5000 who were appointed, 
about 3600 were selected by and appointed at the request of 
the General Managers Association and of the railroads. 
Said the commission, “ They were armed and paid by the 
railroad companies, and acted in the double capacity of rail¬ 
road employees and United States officers. While operating 
the railroads they assumed and exercised unrestricted United 
States authority when so ordered by their employers or 
whenever they regarded it as necessary. They were not 
under the control of any Government official while exerci¬ 
sing authority.” As the commission said, “ This is placing 
officers of the Government under the control of a combina¬ 
tion of railroads. It is a bad precedent, that might well lead 
to serious consequences.” 3 

iBook of Chicagoans, 1905, p. 590; Who's Who, 1910, 1911. 

2 Appendix to the report of the Attorney General, 1896, p. 60. 

3 Rep. of the Strike Com., p. xliv; p. 270, Testimony of J. M. Egan, 
General Manager for the Managers Association; p. 341, Testimony of 
J. C. Donnelly, Chief Deputy. 


279] PRESIDENT CLEVELAND, itfpj-jtfpy 31 

Furthermore, in addition to these men, 1400 or more men 
were chosen on the streets ‘by the U. S. Marshal and his 
chief deputy. Many of them were worthless, men who 
were frequently reported drunk, who often exercised very 
poor judgment, and who were often arrested while on 
duty by the Chicago police for indiscriminate shooting, 
and in several cases for highway robbery. 1 Their appoint¬ 
ment was even protested by Attorney Walker, who on July 
9 wired to Attorney General Olney, “ At risk of being 
thought meddlesome I suggest that the marshal is appoint¬ 
ing a mob of deputies that are worse than useless.” The 
next day Mr. Olney himself protested against their appoint¬ 
ment. 2 

But nowhere does one find either Mr. Olney or Mr. 
Walker protesting against such a miscarriage of the author¬ 
ity of the United States as the selection, arming, and pay¬ 
ing of the U. S. deputy marshals by the railroads in Chicago. 
And it seems strange that a protest from high authority 
against the employment of such disreputable men as those 
described in the preceding paragraph should have been de¬ 
layed until more than a week after the appointment of dep¬ 
uties was authorized, until the strike had been practically 
defeated and the violence for the most part was at an end. 
The responsibility for such negligence in supervising the 
action of subordinates lies squarely on the shoulders of the 
administration. 

The government attorneys secured many indictments 
against the strikers, and many of them were arrested for 
violating the Sherman Act, Which makes illegal a conspiracy 
in restraint of interstate trade or commerce. Everyone who 
knows the history of that act is aware that the sole intent 

1 Rep. of the Com., pp. 341, 353, 368, 37 °* 

2 Appendix, op. cit., pp. 76, 78. 


32 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [280 

of its framers, and of practically every member of Congress 
who gave the matter thought, was; to find some means of 
restricting the pernicious activities of the trusts. But the 
first effective use to which the act was ever put by the At¬ 
torney General was to end a strike of railway laborers. The 
law with equal justice might have been used to end the ex¬ 
istence of the General Managers. Association, a combination 
directly concerned with uniting all the Chicago railroads en¬ 
gaged in interstate commerce, so that their labor and man¬ 
aging policies might be made as nearly uniform as possible. 
The same organization might have been indicted, as the 
strikers were, for conspiring to Obstruct the mails. In the 
contracts which the government made with the railways con¬ 
cerning the carrying of the mails, it was not provided that 
mail trains should also carry Pullman cars. It would have 
been reasonable from the legal point of view, it seems, to 
have compelled the railroads to carry the mails on trains to 
which no Pullman cars were attached. For the roads well 
understood tl tat the railway employees would not object to 
running such trains. 

At a meeting held in Chicago on July 2 the managers de¬ 
cided to withdraw passenger trains and not to accept freight, 
for the purpose of forcing the government to interfere. 
They called this adopting “ coercive measures ” and publicly 
announced their program. 1 To an impartial student of the 
strike it would seem that the administration would have been 
as well justified in proceeding against the railways as it was 
in proceeding against the strikers on the charges of violating 1 
the Sherman Act and conspiring to obstruct the mails. 

Of all the government’s activities during the strike, its 
use of the injunction against the leaders of the American 
Railway Union undoubtedly caused the most discussion 


1 N. Y. Tribune, July 3, 1894. 


281] PRESIDENT CLEVELAND, iSpj-itfpf 33 

throughout the country, especially in legal circles. It is per¬ 
tinent at this point to consider the wisdom, the justifiability, 
and the efficacy of its use in the Chicago troubles. It has 
already been observed that Congress had never passed a law* 
forbidding railway strikes. The injunctions obtained by 
Messrs. Milchrist and Walker and by other government at¬ 
torneys did that very thing. The injunctions were ad¬ 
dressed to everyone, the strike leaders “ and all other per¬ 
sons,” “ all other persons Whomsoever/’ etc. It is apparent 
that the prohibition of one or more acts, a prohibition which 
can be enforced at law, and which is addressed to all per¬ 
sons whomsoever, ii's a law. The lawmaking power in our 
government is not given to the courts, but is supposed to be 
reserved to the legislature. 1 But in the Pullman case the 
Attorney General decided that the strike was undesirable and 
thereupon induced the federal courts to make every act of the 
strikers, whether peaceable or not, which was connected with 
the strike, unlawful. It seems reasonable to maintain that 
such a power ought to be left in the hands of the people, 
represented in the legislature, and ought not to be exercised 
by any federal judge, appointed for life, and with prac¬ 
tically no responsibility to the people. 

To summarize, the use of the injunction in the Pullman 
strike was undesirable (1) because it violated rights which 
American citizens have always regarded as guaranteed to 
them by the Constitution, 2 (2) because it enabled an ap¬ 
pointed official to make the law for the people of the United 
States, (3) because the impossibility of its general enforce¬ 
ment subjected the courts to the likelihood of contempt and 
ridicule, (4) because it aroused the hostility of labor to- 

1 See C. N. Gregory, 11 Harvard Law Review 487; W. H. Dunbar, 
13 Law Quarterly Review 374; C. C. Allen, 28 American Law Review, 
828. 

2 Cf. supra., pp. 18, 19. 


34 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [282 

wards the government, (5) because it gave the stamp of ap¬ 
proval by the government to a process which has since become 
a most important ally of employers in restricting the right of 
workers to carry on activities ordinarily supposed to be 
their unquestioned privilege, and (6) because it was obtained 
in several instances at the request of and after conferences 
with the railway managers, thus laying the administration 
open to the charge of being under the direction of the rail¬ 
ways. 

Was there anything the President might have done, other 
than those things which have been described, to prevent 
hardship to the people, which was perhaps what he honestly 1 
desired most of all to accomplish? Mr. Cleveland made no 
move to settle the Pullman strike itself, nor to bring the two 
parties to an amicable settlement before the general strike 
began. For nearly three weeks before the boycott was de¬ 
clared the newspapers contained references to the fact that 
the American Railway Union was seriously considering 
action. He must have known also that the Pullman Com¬ 
pany had refused arbitration and that this refusal was the 
immediate cause of the difficulty. The President, of course, 
had no power in law to compel arbitration, but numerous in¬ 
stances in later years are evidence of the power behind the 
request of the President of the United States that the par¬ 
ties try to reach a settlement before breaking off relations. 35 
Under the Act of 1888 the President, however, did have the 
power to appoint a commission of inquiry for the purpose 
of investigating railway strikes and suggesting a method of 
adjustment. But Mr. Cleveland wrote no letter, the exist¬ 
ence of whidh is known, asking any party concerned to 

1 Mr. Cleveland, a Democrat, could not have pleaded the strict con¬ 
structionist excuse that he had no power to ask the parties to arbitrate 
at the same time that he made use of the injunction for a purpose 
never dreamed of in earlier times. 


283] PRESIDENT CLEVELAND , iSpj-jtfpy 35 

arbitrate, to delay, or to concede anything to avoid the strike. 
And he waited until July 26 to name the commission he 
was empowered to appoint, and which, had it been ap¬ 
pointed five or six weeks earlier, might have been successful 
in avoiding the strike altogether. 

Instead, he delayed action until the strike and all its re¬ 
grettable effects were upon the nation, and then he proceeded 
to end it in such a way that not only the wage earners of 
the country but many other citizens felt that the government 
had resigned a large share of its authority to the railroads 
for their unrestricted and arbitrary use in defeating the 
strikers. 


CHAPTER II 


President McKinley, 1897-1901 

I. THE COEUR D’ALENE DISTURBANCE, 1899 

The single important instance in which President Mc¬ 
Kinley used the executive power in a labor dispute was in 
the case of a strike of lead and silver miners in the Coeur 
d’Alene district of Idaho in 1899. The district 'had for a 
number of years been the scene of struggles between the 
miners, members of the Western Federation of Miners, and 
the mining companies. In 18915 the mines in Wardner, 
Idaho, which had before that time employed both union and 
non-union men, decided not to employ members of the union 
thereafter, and also put into effect wages below the cus¬ 
tomary scale. For the next few years working conditions 
continued the same, with considerable dissatisfaction among 
the men, especially among those in the district who belonged 
■to the union. 1 

In April, 1899, attempts made to organize the Bunker 
Hill mine led to the company’s dismissal of a number of 
union men. On April 23 the Wardner union met and ap¬ 
pointed a committee, which waited on the company and de¬ 
manded an increase in wages and recognition of the union. 
The committee was informed that the company would not 
grant recognition. At a second meeting of the union a 
strike was declared. The entire body of members then 

1 Report of the Industrial Commission, vol. xii, Washington, 1901, pp. 
lxxxv-vi. 

36 


[284 


285 ] PRESIDENT McKINLEY, ^py-ipoi 37 

marched to the Bunker Hill mine and urged the non-union 
men to join the organization. The mine superintendent 
thereupon announced an increase in wages and declared that 
men joining the union would be discharged. For the next 
few days the union members made further efforts to get the 
men to join them. But by the 26th or the 27th it was ap¬ 
parent that the strike had failed, and the company resumed 
operation. 1 

On April 28 members of the miners’ unions from the 
towns of Gem, Burke, and Mullan made preparations to 
travel in a body to Wardner, for the purpose of assisting 
their fellow unionists. On the 29th they commandeered a 
Northern Pacific train and forced the engineer to run it past 
its regular route on to Wardner. At Gem some of the 
miners broke open the powder house of the Helena & Frisco 
mine and seized eighty boxes of dynamite. Witnesses of 
what happened believed that the majority of men who went 
to Wardner did not expect any violence and did not want it. 
But it is quite certain that a small group were bent on de¬ 
struction, and they had carefully laid their plans. 2 

There were by that time probably 500 or more in the band, 
and about 150 of them were masked. A number of the 
masked members took the dynamite f rom the train and ex¬ 
ploded ft on the company’s property. All of the buildings 
but one were destroyed, causing a loss of nearly $250,000. 
At the same time two men were killed by shots coming from 1 
some individuals in the mob. After the explosion the men 
went back to the train and rode away. 3 

Immediately after hearing of the riot Governor Steunen- 
berg of Idaho, who was then ill, gave State Auditor Sinclair 

1 Report of the Industrial Commission, op. cit., p. lxxxvii. 

2 Ibid., p. lxxxviii. 

3 Ibid., p. xc. 


38 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [286 

power to proceed to the seat of the trouble and take what¬ 
ever measures were necessary to convict the parties to the 
crime. Mr. Sinclair, finding that the county authorities 
had not taken any measures to apprehend the guilty, recom¬ 
mended that the Governor declare martial law in the district, 
on the ground that a state of insurrection prevailed. 1 On 
the evening of the 29th the Governor applied to President 
McKinley for federal troops. He pointed out that the legis¬ 
lature was not in session, that it was impossible to convene 
it to ask for troops, and that since all the available Idaho 
National Guard was in the Philippines, federal troops were 
necessary to suppress the insurrection in Shoshone County, I 
General Merriam was at once instructed by the War Depart¬ 
ment to interview the Governor and to call whatever troops 
were necessary. 2 Troops were ordered into the district on 
May 1 and May 2. 3 On May 3 Governor Steunenberg de¬ 
clared the county to be in a state of insurrection and re¬ 
bellion, and announced that martial law was in effect. 4 

Immediately on the arrival of the troops; the state author¬ 
ities, with the aid of the soldiers, proceeded to arrest the 
miners all over the district. Six or seven hundred men 
were thus arrested without warrant by state officers, who 
were protected by federal troops, and the prisoners were 
turned over to the latter to guard. Hundreds of these men 
were held for months in a hastily constructed “ bull pen ”, 
with no opportunity for trial and no charges preferred 
against them. Many of them were discharged from time 

1 Report of the Industrial Commission, op. cit., p. xci. 

2 Report of the House Committee on Military Affairs on the Coeur 
d'Alene Labor Troubles, 1st Sess., 516th Cong., House Report 1999, pp. 
7-8. 

3 Report of Brigadier General Merriam, 1st Sess., 56th Cong., Senate 
Document 24, p. 2. 

i Rep. House Com., op. cit., p. 9. 


39 


287] PRESIDENT McKINLEY, rfpy-iQOI 

to time because no grounds f or holding them could be f ound 
by the authorities. At the end of July nearly 200 prisoners 
were still held under guard by federal troops. 1 

On May 8 State Auditor Sinclair, acting as personal re¬ 
presentative of the Governor, issued a proclamation to the 
following effect: that any mine owners in Shoshone County 
employing members of the criminal organizations (i. e., the 
miners’ unions) which had caused property to be destroyed 
and murders to be committed, would have their mines closed; 
that all parties applying for underground work would be re¬ 
quired to obtain permits from the state authorities author¬ 
izing them to work; that parties applying for such permits 
must be prepared “ first, to deny all participation in the 
riots of April 29, 1899, in Shoshone County, and second, to 
deny or renounce membership in any society which has 
incited, encouraged, or approved of said riots or other viola¬ 
tion of public law; ” and that mine owners must refuse em¬ 
ployment to any miner not having a duly signed permit. 2 

The proclamation ended as follows : 

“ Examined and approved: 

H. C. Merriam, 

Brigadier General, United States Army.” 

The permits that each applicant for work had to obtain 
required that the following statement be signed: 

I did not participate, actively or otherwise, in the riots which 
took place at Wardner on the 29th of April, 1899. Believing 
that the crimes committed at Wardner on said date were ac¬ 
tively incited, encouraged, and perpetrated through and by 
means of the influence and direction of the miners’ unions of 
the Coeur d’Alenes, I hereby express my unqualified disap¬ 
proval of said acts, and hereby renounce and forever adjure 

1 Rep. Ind. Com.,, op. cit., pp. xciii-xcv., Rep. Gen. Merriam, p. 13. 

2 Rep. Ind. Com., op. cit., p. 390. 


40 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [288 

all allegiance to the said miners’ unions .... and I solemnly 
pledge myself to obey the law and not to again seek member¬ 
ship in any society which will encourage, or tolerate any 
violation of law. 1 

The proclamation and the permit were prepared by Judge 
Lindley, attorney for the Bunker Hill Company, and State 
Auditor Sinclair, and were approved by General Merriam. 2 
Dr. France, the representative of the state authorities to 
whom or to whose deputies miners had to make application 
for permits to work, was at the time employed by the mine 
owners as company doctor. 3 

The permit system was put into effect despite an Idaho 
state law, approved March 6, 1893, which made it unlawful 
for any employer to enter into oral or written agreement re¬ 
quiring the promise of an employee not to become a member 
of a labor organization. 4 Mr. Sinclair, explaining the per¬ 
mit system before the Industrial Commission in July, 1899, 
said that the proclamation was submitted to General Mer¬ 
riam “as a matter of courtesy, to give the application 
dignity, and to receive assurance, in case there was an at¬ 
tempt made to obstruct its enforcement, that [the Auditor] 
could call on the troops .... for protection.” 5 

On May 29 the Adjutant General of the Army informed 
General Merriam that President McKinley had received res¬ 
olutions from the Western Federation of Miners charging* 
that owners of mines in the Coeur d’Alene might not em¬ 
ploy a miner unless he first made an affidavit that he was a 
non-union man, and that the troops, were being used to en- 

1 Rep. Ind. Com., op. cit., p. 391. 

* Ibid., p. 471. 

% Ibid., p. 391. 

4 Ibid., p. 391. 

5 House Com. Rep., op. cit., p. 113. 


4i 


289] PRESIDENT McKINLEY, j^p/.jpoi 

force this order. The President desired a statement of the 
facts. The next day General Merriam replied that no af¬ 
fidavits were required, and described the permit system. On 
May 31 Secretary of War Alger sent the f ollowing order to 
the general: 

You will instruct Major Smith, commanding at Wallace, that 
he is to use the United States troops to aid the state authority 
simply to suppress rioting and to maintain peace and order. 
Those were your original instructions. The Army must have 
nothing whatever to do with enforcing rules for the govern¬ 
ment of miners or miners’ unions. That is a matter for the 
local authorities to deal with. 1 

In his annual report made July 31, 1899, General Merriam 
denied ever having received the “ original instructions ” re¬ 
ferred to in Secretary Alger’s telegram. He asked for a 
copy of them but did not receive it. 2 

From time to time various charges were made concerning 
the cruel and abusive treatment of the prisoners guarded by 
the federal troops, the unsanitary condition of the prison in 
which they were confined, and their continued detention by 
the troops with no charges preferred against them, no trial, 
and no opportunity to consult with counsel. 3 There is 
evidence of severe discipline of practically all the prisoners 
then held, in September, 1899, when a number of them were 
found digging a tunnel in order to escape. 4 Aside from 
this the charges concerning cruel and abusive treatment do 
not seem to have been justified. It is true that conditions 
were not altogether sanitary, but the evidence shows that 
the federal authorities did their best to improve them. It 

1 Rep. Ind. Com., op. cit., p. 393. 

* Rep. Brig, Gen. Merriam., op. cit., p. 13. 

* See Senate Document 25, 1st Sess., 56th Cong. 

4 House Com. Rep v op. cit., p. 91. 


42 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [290 

was not true that the prisoners were not permitted to con¬ 
sult with counsel. Complaint on this point was; justifiable, 
however, because only one attorney was permitted to see 
all the prisoners held. 

On September 28 Elihu Root, who had succeeded R. A. 
Alger as Secretary of War, asked Governor Steunenberg 
whether the insurrection had been suppressed, so that federal 
troops might be withdrawn. In case this was not desir¬ 
able the Secretary was “ much disinclined to have the troops 
of the United States continued longer in the attitude of re¬ 
taining in custody the citizens of a state who [had] re¬ 
mained so long without being tried, and [he felt] bound to 
urge that, if it [were] not convenient to bring the prisoners 
to speedy trial, [the Governor would] substitute civil guards 
as their custodians and relieve the troops of the United States 
from further performance of that duty.” 1 

The Governor replied on October 10, asserting that the 
troops were still necessary, that he feared violence if they 
were withdrawn, and promising that the state authorities 
would guard the sixty-five remaining prisoners beginning 
November i. 2 On October 20 the federal troops ceased 
guarding the prisoners, but they remained in the district f or 
some months longer before being finally withdrawn. 3 

The activities of the troops in the Coeur d’Alenes gave 
rise to much criticism of President McKinley. As is usual 
in such cases, much of it was engendered by political hos¬ 
tility, but there was ground enough for honest criticism of 
the administration for its part in the affair. The admin¬ 
istration is to be criticized for acts of omission rather than 
for acts of commission. When the President sent troops 

1 House Com. Rep., op. cit., p. 17. 

'Ibid., pp. 18-25. 

3 Wilson, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances, p. 215. 


291] PRESIDENT McKINLEY, I 8 p?-ip 0 I 43 

into the district he was entirely responsible for what they 
did, and he should not have neglected to watch over and reg¬ 
ulate their action and withdraw them as soon as the state 
was able to reassume control. 

There was no good excuse f or allowing the troops to be 
so entirely under the control of the state authorities. The 
Army Regulations of 1895, Paragraph 490, direct that in 
“the enforcement of the laws troops are employed .... 
and act under the orders of the President as commander-in- 
chief. They cannot be directed to act under the orders of 
any civil officer.” Nevertheless, State Auditor Sinclair was, 
in effect, commander-in-chief of the United States troops in 
the Coeur d’Alenes. The officers in charge of the soldiers 
seem to have placed themselves entirely under his orders, 
lent their support to the numerous arrests made, guarded the 
prisoners, given the prestige of the United States army to 
the permit system, and in various other ways acted rather as 
state militia than as part of the regular United States forces. 
To a certain extent this may have been necessary, but cer¬ 
tainly such complete surrender of federal authority was 
neither wise nor fair, considering the anti-union policies 
adopted by the state authorities. 

Under the federal laws 1 the President is empowered to 
use the United States forces in case of insurrection in a state, 
on the application of the legislature of a state, or if the 
legislature cannot be convened, at the request of the gover¬ 
nor. In the present instance Governor Steunenberg pointed 
out that the Idaho law required notice of several weeks be¬ 
fore the legislature could be convened. In the emergency 
there was no time for this, and troops were accordingly sent 
at the Governor’s request. But the troops remained in the 
Coeur d’Alenes for many months, and no attempt was made 


1 Revised Statutes , Section 5297. 


44 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [292' 

either by the Governor or by the President to have the Idaho 
legislature ask that the troops be retained, or assume control 
of affairs in the district. It is an open question whether 
the people of Idaho, as represented in the legislature, wished 
the troops to continue their stay. It was the duty of the 
President to find out the desire of the legislature, since that 
was evidently the purpose of the federal law, but no step in 
this direction was taken, and the troops remained to carry 
out the will of those in control of the executive department 
of the state. 

One of the most important grounds for criticism was the 
continued use of soldiers of the United States for the pur¬ 
pose of aiding in the arrest of hundreds of men without 
warrant and of holding them as prisoners without charges 
or trial. No move was made by the administration to end 
this system until six months after it had been put into effect. 
State authorities claimed the system was necessary and 
justified under martial law in order to prevent those guilty 
of the crimes from escaping. But that does not appear suf¬ 
ficient reason, especially in view of the fact that after April 
29 no violence or disturbance of any kind occurred, though 
martial law continued in force for many months thereafter. 

The thing most to be condemned in the affair was the act 
of General Merriam in lending the support and prestige of 
the army to such an obvious anti-union plan as the permit 
system. It was the claim of the state authorities that the 
permits were necessary in order to drive the lawless elements 
out of the district. Under the system it was assumed that 
every member of the union was a criminal and deserved no 
employment. Thus some 1500 men who refused to re¬ 
nounce their union membership were, with their families, 
driven from the district, although they had been neither in¬ 
dicted nor convicted of any offense. 1 It was not until three 

1 House Coin. Rep., op. cit., p. 132. 


293] president McKinley , ^-1901 45 

weeks after the system had been put into operation that the 
President made any attempt to forbid the use of the federal 
troops in support of it. 

From a study of the Coeur d’Alenes affair one is brought 
to the conclusion that it was serious negligence on the part 
of the President to have sent the troops in without specific 
directions as to their activities, and to have permitted them 
to be used for purposes not warranted by the ends of justice. 
The history of later administrations shows that Mr. Mc¬ 
Kinley’s successors profited by his mistakes, and attempted 
to prevent the use of troops for any purposes other than to 
end violence and to maintain peace. They were more 
prompt to investigate conditions, more careful that the 
activities of the troops be limited to legitimate purposes, and 
more insistent that the army should not be used as the tool 
of some faction within a state. 1 

1 For good statements of the cases for and against the President in 
the Coeur d’Alenes affair, see the majority and minority reports of the 
House Committee on Military Affairs, House (Report 1999, *st Sess., 
56th Cong., already cited here. 


CHAPTER III 


President Roosevelt, 1901 -1909 

I. THE ANTHRACITE STRIKE OF I9O2 

The first important instance on record in which a Presi¬ 
dent of the United States took an active part in attempting to 
mediate a labor controversy was that which culminated in 
the appointment O'f the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission 
in October, 1902. 

In the latter part of 1899 and in the spring of 1900 the 
United Mine Workers of America, which, since 1897, had 
become a factor of great importance among the workers in 
the bituminous coal fields, sent organizers into the anthra¬ 
cite districts of Pennsylvania. 1 In the early summer of 
1900 only about 8000 anthracite workers belonged to the 
union. At a convention held in July of that year a re¬ 
quest was drawn up and sent to the operators asking them 
to meet the union representatives' in order to formulate a 
wage scale. This request was refused, and on September 
17 large numbers of men went on strike. In two weeks, ac¬ 
cording to the estimate of the union’s leader, 90 per cent of 
the 144,000 workers were idle. For a while the operators 
refused all overtures for a settlement. The presidential elec¬ 
tion of 1900 was approaching, however, and Mark Hanna, 
then Chairman of the National Republican Committee, fear¬ 
ing the possibly injurious influence of a coal famine on the 

1 Sydenstricker, Collective Bargaining in the Anthracite Coal Industry , 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 191, Washington, 1916, p. 18. 

46 [294 


PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, 


19OI-1909 


295] 


47 


candidacy of President McKinley, tried to end the strike. 
Probably as a result of his efforts the anthracite operators, 
on October 3, posted a notice of a 10 per cent increase in 
wages. 1 

This concession of the operators proved unacceptable to 
the miners. No promise had been given that the increase in 
wages would remain in effect for any definite period. 
Various other demands which had figured in the strike had 
been left unnoticed. On October 20 another notice was 
posted by the operators, offering to increase wages 10 per 
cent, to reduce the price of powder, to pay wages semi¬ 
monthly in cash, and to adjust some of the other grievances. 
The executive committee of the miners accepted these con¬ 
cessions and advised the miners to return to work. This 
they did on October 29. It will be seen that the union re¬ 
ceived no actual recognition. But the result of the strike 
was a considerable increase in membership. 2 

Several times in February, 1901, John Mitchell, the pres¬ 
ident of the United Mine Workers, sent messages; to the 
operators requesting a joint conference to consider wages and 
conditions in the anthracite fields for the following year. 
These requests met with refusal. 3 Finally a conference was 
arranged in April, at which President Thomas of the Erie 


1 Mitchell, Organized Labor, Philadelphia, 1903;, pp. 365-366. Over a 
year and a half later George F. Baer, president of the Philadelphia & 
Reading Coal & Iron Co., and a leader of the anthracite operators, told! 
Commissioner of Labor Carroll D. Wright, who was then investigating 
the 1902 strike at the request of the President, that Mr. McKinley had 
sent someone to him personally to assure him that Ohio and Indiana 
were in danger of being lost to the Republicans in the election of 1900 
if some adjustment were not made to end the strike. See Wright, 
Report to the President on the Anthracite Coal Strike. Bureau of 
Labor, Bulletin 43, November, 1902, p. 1204. 

2 Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 365 , 366, 367. 

3 Report of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission, Washington, 1903* 
P- 31 . 


4 8 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [296 

Railroad, Senator Hanna, President Mitchell, and the dis¬ 
trict presidents of the anthracite unions were present. At 
this time an understanding was reached that the conditions 
of 1900 should be continued until April, 1902. 1 

With the approach of April, 1902, the officials of the 
union, on February 14, addressed letters to the presidents of 
the various anthracite companies asking them to attend a 
joint conference between miners and operators to be held 
March 12 for the purpose of reaching a wage agreement for 
the coming year. 2 All of the operators refused to attend 
the conference. President Baer, of the Philadelphia & 
Reading said, “ This company does not favor the plan of 
having its relations with the miners disturbed every year.” 
He claimed that having two masters in business meant hav¬ 
ing lack of discipline in mining, and he objected to a confer¬ 
ence with persons not interested in and ignorant of anthracite 
mining. Furthermore, he objected to a uniform wage for 
all mines, conditions at different mines being different. The 
answers of the other operators were in a similar vein. 3 

In the middle of March -the operators posted the following 
notice: 

The rates of wages now in effect will be continued until April 1 
1, 1903, and thereafter, subject to 60 days’ notice. Local dif¬ 
ferences will, as heretofore, be adjusted with our employees at 
the respective collieries. 4 

At about the same time the anthracite miners, in conven¬ 
tion, formulated demands asking for a 20 per cent increase 
in wages for piece workers, a corresponding increase for men 
paid by the day in the form of a reduction in hours of work 

1 Mitchell, op. cit., p. 370. 

* Ibid., p. 370. 

8 Wright, Bulletin 43, op. cit., pp. 1176-1178. 

4 Ibid., p. 1184. 


297] PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, jpoz-jpop 49 

from ten to eight with the same pay as theretofore received 
for ten hours, that men previously paid per car should re¬ 
ceive payment according to the legal ton, and that these 
terms should be incorporated in an agreement made with the 
union. On March 22 the convention sent telegrams to the 
anthracite presidents again asking them to meet with the 
union representatives to discuss the miners’ grievances. 
During the month the National Civic Federation also tried 
to arrange conferences, but the operators refused to attend. 
Meanwhile the miners’ officials had been given power to call 
a strike. For the sake of avoiding a suspension the men 
offered to compromise by proposing a 10 per cent increase 
in wages and a nine-hour day. The operators, however, re¬ 
fused to grant any concessions. 

On May 8 the union officers sent another telegram to the 
anthracite presidents offering to submit the miners’ demands 
to an arbitration commission of five persons to be selected 
by the Industrial Branch of the National Civic Federation, 
or else to a commission to consist of Archbishop Ireland, 
Bishop Potter, and one other to be selected by these two. 
This offer was also unanimously refused. President Baer, 
in reply, declared that “ anthracite mining is a business, and 
not a religious, sentimental, or academic proposition. ... I 
could not if I would delegate this business management to 
even so highly respectable a body as the Civic Federation, nor 
can I call to my aid as experts in the mixed problem of busi¬ 
ness and philanthropy, the eminent prelates you have 
named.” 

Finally the district executive committees of the union, 
meeting at Scranton on May 9, called for a temporary sus¬ 
pension of mining to start May 12. On May 15 a conven¬ 
tion of delegates instructed to vote on the question decided 
to make the strike permanent. 1 Almost the entire body of 

1 Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 370-373- 


5 0 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [298 

anthracite miners, nearly 150,000 men, remained on strike 
during the five months or more of its continuance. 

On June 7 President Roosevelt directed Commissioner 
Wright to investigate the causes of the strike and make rec¬ 
ommendations concerning it. For the next few weeks the 
commissioner heard the statements of each side and on June 
20 he reported to the President. 1 He made suggestions for 
a settlement as follows: (1) the organization of an anthra¬ 
cite coal miners’ union, independent of the United Mine 
Workers but perhaps affiliated with it, and to be financially 
responsible for its contracts; (2) concession of the nine 
hour day as an experiment, in order to test its influence on 
production, with a guarantee of permanency if production 
were not materially reduced; (3) the new union and the 
operators to form a joint committee on conciliation to con¬ 
sider grievances. Several other recommendations of less 
importance were also made. 2 

As the summer wore on and the fall approached no sign 
of a termination of the strike appeared. But as cold weather 
came nearer the public began to demand that something be 
done. The Governor of Massachusetts and the Mayor of 
New York both notified President Roosevelt “ that if the 
coal famine continued, the misery throughout the Northeast, 
and especially in the great cities, would become appalling, 
and the consequent public disorder so great that frightful 
consequences might follow.” Describing the situation fur¬ 
ther in his Autobiography, the President continues, “ It is 
not too much to say that the situation which confronted Penn¬ 
sylvania, New York, and New England, and to a less, de- 

1 The legal authority for the investigation was contained in the organic 
law of the Bureau of Labor, which authorized the commissioner to 
make special reports on labor conditions to the President or Congress 
on the request of either. 

a Wright, Bulletin 43, op. cit., pp. 1166-1167. 


PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, 


IpOI-IpOp 


51 


299] 

gree the states of the Middle West, in October, 1902, was 
quite as serious as if they had been threatened by the in¬ 
vasion of a hostile army of overwhelming force.” 1 

On September 27 President Roosevelt wrote as follows to 
Mark Hanna, who had tried unsuccessfully for months to 
bring about a settlement of the strike: 

What gives me greatest concern at the moment is the coal 
famine. Of course we have nothing whatever to do with this ' 
coal strike and no earthly responsibility for it. But the public 
at large will tend to visit on our heads responsibility for the 
shortage of coal, precisely as Kansas and Nebraska visited 
upon our heads their failure to raise good crops in the arid 
belt eight, ten, or a dozen years ago. I do not see what I can 
do, and I know the coal operators are especially distrustful 
of anything which they regard as in the nature of political in¬ 
terference. But I do most earnestly feel that from every 
consideration of public policy and good morals they should 
make some slight concession. 2 

Despite the hesitation evidenced in this letter the Presi¬ 
dent soon decided on action to end the strike. At his in¬ 
vitation representatives of the operators and of the miners 
met him on October 3, in response to his request that they 
come together “ upon the common plane of the necessities 
of the public.” When the conference opened, President 
Mitchell of the miners proposed that all the matters in dis¬ 
pute be submitted to the arbitration of a tribunal selected by 
the President. 3 In his Autobiography Mr. Roosevelt speaks 
of the operators as follows: “ [They] came down in a most 
insolent frame of mind, refused to talk of arbitration or 
other accomodation of any kind, and used language that was 

1 Roosevelt, Autobiography, New York, 1921, p. 465. 

■Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, His Life and Work, New York, 1912, 
p. 397 . 

•Mitchell, op. cit., p. 387. 


52 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [300 

insulting to the miners and offensive to me.” 1 President 
Baer, speaking for the operators, though refusing the pro¬ 
posal for arbitration, promised that if the workers returned 
to work and if the employer and employees at any particular 
colliery could not reach an agreement on a grievance, it 
should go to the judge of the Court of Common Pleas for 
that district in Pennsylvania in which the colliery was situ¬ 
ated. 2 He insisted that all that was necessary was for the 
state to keep order, using the militia as police, while the 
operators ran the mines. Each side asked the President 
to proceed against the other for violation of the interstate 
commerce laws. 3 The conference was a failure as far as 
any immediate result was concerned. 

Four days later, acting through Commissioner Wright, 
Mr. Roosevelt requested that President Mitchell use his ef¬ 
forts to get the men to return to work. He gave assurance 
that after mining was resumed a commission would be ap¬ 
pointed to investigate conditions in the anthracite field. The 
President promised, when the report of the commission 
and its recommendations were received, to do everything in 
his power to induce the operators to accept its findings. 
After consideration Mr. Mitchell refused to accept this pro¬ 
posal on the ground that the operators had already de¬ 
clined arbitration and, since the President had no legal 
power to enforce the award of such a commission, acceptance 
would mean surrender by the miners. 4 

In the meantime the operators had lost considerable of the 
support of public opinion for their refusal to arbitrate. J. 
Pierpont Morgan, who much earlier in the strike had made 

1 Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 4 66. 

* N. Y. Tribune, Oct. 4, 1902. 

a Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 466. 

4 Mitchell, op. cit., p. 467. 


3 oi ] PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, I 90 I . I 9 o 9 ^ 

ineffectual attempts to have the operators make some con¬ 
cession, was aware of the untenable nature of the operators' 
position. Having considerable influence with the latter 
through financial control over the anthracite roads, he ap¬ 
pears, about October 7, to have determined to get the opera¬ 
tors to make some move to end the strike. Furthermore, on 
the nth, Secretary of War Root, at the request of the 
President, had a long conference with Mr. Morgan in New 
York. He presented the President's point of view so suc¬ 
cessfully that he persuaded the financier to join him in 
drafting an agreement for arbitration. 1 Mr. Morgan ob¬ 
tained the approval of the operators for this agreement, with 
the one modification upon which they insisted, that the mem¬ 
bers of the commission of arbitration be appointed from cer¬ 
tain groups which they named. 2 

On October 13, presumably at the request of the operators, 
Mr. Morgan visited President Roosevelt and proposed that 
he appoint an arbitration commission to be constituted as 
follows : one officer of the engineer corps of the army or 
navy, one man with experience in mining, one man of prom¬ 
inence eminent as a sociologist, one Federal Judge of the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and one mining engineer. 3. 

The President forwarded this proposal to Mr. Mitchell, 
who suggested that, since capital was to be represented, labor 
should also have a representative. In addition he also asked 
for the appointment of some Catholic ecclesiastic on the 
ground that this would strengthen the proposition with the 
miners, many of whom were Catholics. The operators re¬ 
fused to grant either of these points, but were not so em¬ 
phatic about refusing the appointment of a clergyman as 

1 Review of Reviews, vol. xxvi, pp. 516, 522, 552-555. 

* Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and his Times, New York, 1920, p. 212, 
Letter of Elihu Root. 

•'Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 4 ^ 7 > AT. Y. Tribune, Oct. 14, 1902. 


54 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [302 

that of a labor representative. The union officials put the 
matter into President Roosevelt’s hands for settlement. 1 

A final conference between the operators and the President 
took place on October 15. The former were persistent in 
contending for a commission appointed according to their 
own proposition. Suddenly, after two hours of argument, 
Mr. Roosevelt discovered “ that they did not mind [his] ap¬ 
pointing any man, labor man or not, so long as he was not 
appointed as a labor man, or as a representative of labor.” 2 
He announced at once that he had accepted the terms laid 
down by the operators. With this understanding he ap¬ 
pointed the labor man he had had in mind all the time, Mr. 
E, E. Clark, head of the Order of Railway Conductors, call¬ 
ing him an “ eminent sociologist.” On his own authority 
he put a sixth man on the commission, Bishop Spalding, a 
Catholic ecclesiastic of Peoria, Illinois. 

The operators had expected that Carroll D. Wright would 
be appointed as a sociologist. Instead the President named 
him recorder of the commission, and added him as a seventh 
member when the commission got fairly started. In pub¬ 
lishing the list of commissioners the President added, after 
naming Mr. Clark, “ as a sociologist, the President assum¬ 
ing that for the purpose of such a commission, the term so¬ 
ciologist means a man who has thought and studied deeply 
on social questions and has practically applied his know¬ 
ledge.” 3 The other men appointed were Brigadier General 

1 Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 467. 

’Roosevelt, in his letter to Senator Lodge, of October 17, 1902, said, 
“ It took me about two hours before I at last grasped the fact that the 
mighty brains of these captains of industry had formulated the theory 
that they would rather have anarchy than tweedledum, but if I would 
use the word tweedledee they would hail it as meaning peace.” Bishop, 
op. cit., p. 214. 

* Roosevelt, op. cit., pp. 468-469. 


PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, 


IpOI-IpOp 


303 ] 


55 


J. M. Wilson, E. W. Parker, Judge George Gray, and 
Thomas H. Watkins. 

A delegate convention of the anthracite miners was called 
for October 20. On the next day it voted to end the strike, 
that work be resumed on October 23, and that all disputed 
questions be submitted to arbitration by the commission. 1 
Thus the strike, one of the most serious in the country’s his¬ 
tory, was ended after a duration of more than five months. 

From October 27, when the first hearing was held, to 
February 9, 1903, the commission investigated conditions at 
first hand and heard the testimony of both sides. Its final 
report, containing the award and recommendations, was 
presented to the President on March 18. Briefly sum¬ 
marized, the award, which remained the basis for continuing 
peace and prosperity in the anthracite field for many years, 
was as follows: 

1. Wages were increased 10 per cent, retroactive to No- 
ember 1, 1902. 

2. 'Coal was to be paid for according to the then existing 
method. 

3. Each of the three anthracite districts was to nominate 
two men, one representing the operators, the other elected 
by the miners. The six men thus appointed were to act as 
a board of conciliation to hear all disputes which could not 
be settled locally. Its award was to be final and binding. 
Provision was to be made for arbitration by an umpire in 
case of disagreement by the board. 

4. Check weighmen or check docking bosses, or both, were 
to be employed wherever a majority of the contract miners 
requested it. 

5. A sliding scale of wages, following increases or de¬ 
creases in the price of coal in New York, within certain 
limits, was to ’be adopted. 

1 Report of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission, p. 12. 


56 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [304 

6. There was to 'be no discrimination by either side be¬ 
cause of membership or non-membership in the union. 

7. The award was to continue in force until March 31, 
1906. 1 

In considering the part that President Roosevelt played in 
settling the strike it should be borne in mind that there ex¬ 
isted no precedent for him to follow. He had no authority 
of a legal nature, and only his own prestige and the country's 
unquestioned eagerness to be assured of the winter’s coal 
were his supports in prevailing on the operators to agree to 
arbitration. As he himself put it, “ There was no duty 
whatever laid upon me by the Constitution in the matter, 
and I had in theory no power to act directly uniless the Gov¬ 
ernor of Pennsylvania, or the legislature, if it were in ses¬ 
sion, should notify me that Pennsylvania could not keep 
order, and request me as commander in chief of the army of 
the United States to intervene and keep order.” 2 But the 
Governor handled the little violence there was with state 
militia and did not call for federal troops. Furthermore, 
had he done so, and had his request been promptly met, that 
in itself would probably not have had any great influence in 
ending the strike and producing coal for an anxious public. 
The precedent which President Cleveland had set in obtain¬ 
ing an injunction to end a railroad strike could hardly serve 
in a case like this. 

It may be asked, “ Would it not have been wiser for the 
President to have kept his hands off, since he had no legal 
authority to intervene?” But to have done nothing under 
such conditions as threatened with the approach of winter 
would undoubtedly have occasioned very serious hardship 
and suffering. Furthermore President Roosevelt had a 

l Rep. of the Commission , p. 80. 

’Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 466. 




305] PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ‘ jpoi-JpOp 5 7 

theory of executive action which was quite inconsistent with 
a “ hands-off” policy. He did not believe that a President 
was limited in his acts by what the Constitution or Congress 
specifically empowered him to do. He felt that he was 
limited only to the extent that he might not do the things 
which the law of the land specifically forbade. 1 A President 
with strict constructionist views of the executive powers 
might consistently have kept his hands off. But, in this 
instance, it would seem to have been fortunate that such a 
president was not in office, despite the copious criticism to 
which Mr. Roosevelt’s intervention gave rise among his 
political opponents. 

It appears clear that the President’s primary motive in this 
case was to prevent a coal famine. Was his method of 
mediation fair to both sides? Did it aim at bringing about 
a settlement that was just to both sides? To attempt an 
answer to such questions is perhaps superfluous, for each 
individual would probably answer according to his usual 
sympathies in industrial struggles. It is doubtful whether 
the consideration of fairness and justice was uppermost with 
the President. The important principle in his method was 
that of expediency, moderated to a certain extent by his 
own standard of fairness, and his probable dislike of the 
operators for their stubbornness. But that expediency was 
the guiding principle seems evident when his proposal to 
President Mitchell, through Commissioner Wright, is con¬ 
sidered. He asked the miners to give up the strike on the 
basis of the possibility that the operators would agree to put 
into operation the award of the proposed commission, though 
he must have realized as well as the miners that it was im¬ 
probable that the operators would do this. 

One more fact may be given as evidence that he had de¬ 
termined to use whatever method was necessary to end the 

1 Roosevelt, op. cit, p. 388. 


5 g LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [306 

strike. While the President was trying to get a settlement, 
he was formulating other plans of a very drastic nature. 
He had determined that as a last resort he would get the 
Governor of Pennsylvania to ask him to keep order. Then 
he would put the army under the command of a first-rate 
general with instructions to keep absolute order and to pre¬ 
vent any interference by the strikers or others with those 
who wanted to work. He would also instruct the general 
to dispossess the operators and run the mines as a receiver. 
Meanwhile he would appoint a commission to investigate 
the issues and make an award. He had already asked ex- 
President Cleveland to serve on such a commission, not, 
however, mentioning any other detail of his plan to him. 
Mr. Cleveland had agreed to accept such an appointment. 1 * 
The President expected to appoint a commission which 
would command such confidence that public opinion would 
support its award, and he, with the U. S. Army in control, 
could issue whatever orders were necessary to carry it into 
effect. 

President Roosevelt had actually made most of the nec¬ 
essary arrangements for putting the plan into effect, had 
arranged matters so that the Governor of Pennsylvana would 
call for troops when he suggested it, and had gone over 
the whole plan with Major General Schofield, upon whom 
he had determined as commander, and who alone, besides the 
President, knew what the plan was. But a voluntary settle¬ 
ment made the whole arrangement unnecessary. 2 It is quite 
evident, when one considers such a plan, that he was deter¬ 
mined to have coal mined, and it is needless to add that his 
critics would have had much more to say about executive 
usurpation of authority had he put it into effect. 

1 For the letters between Cleveland and Roosevelt in regard to this 
matter see Bishop, op. cit., pp. 204, 205, 209, 210, 213. 

1 Roosevelt, op. cit., pp. 473-475. 


PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, 


307] 


1901-1909 59 


In addition to his desire to spare the country the effects 
of a prolonged coal famine there was perhaps another reason 
for the President’s wish to end the strike. This is apparent 
when one considers his letter to Senator Hanna, previously 
quoted. Evidently the President was thinking not orily of 
his duty to protect the country from hardship, but he also 
had in mind the results of such hardship on the political 
prestige and reputation of his administration; for the cam¬ 
paign of 1904 was approaching and no one doubted his 
willingness to be a candidate for the presidency. 


2 . THE MINERS’ STRIKE IN ARIZONA, I9O3 

Early in June, 1903, miners in Morenci, Arizona, went 
on strike because of the recently passed territorial eight 
hour law. The passage of the law involved the question of 
a reduction in pay. The miners asked their previous ten 
hours’ pay for the new eight-hour day. Their request was 
refused by the mine operators and the strike resulted. 1 On 
June 10, because of the violence which had developed in 
the district, the Acting Governor of the Territory sent in 
territorial troops. At the same time he asked the President 
to send federal forces to the district. 2 

The President thus describes his action in a letter pub¬ 
lished in his Autobiography: 3 


The miners struck, violence followed, and the Arizona Ter¬ 
ritorial authorities notified me they could not grapple with the 
situation. Within 20 minutes of the receipt of the telegram 
orders were issued to the nearest available troops, and 24 
hours afterwards General Baldwin and his troops were on the 
ground and 24 hours later every vestige of disorder had dis¬ 
appeared. 

1 Reports of the War Department, 1903, vol. 3, p. 3 1 - 

% N. Y . Tribune, July 11, 1903. 

* P. 494 . 


6o LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [308 

On arriving, the troops found that the district was quiet, 
the territorial forces having the situation well in hand. On 
the 18th of June the federal soldiers were withdrawn. No 
further difficulties developed. 1 

It is apparent from Mr. Roosevelt’s letter that he was 
proud of -his prompt action in sending the troops. Yet 
there was evidently no need for them, and a short delay, 
while some federal officer investigated the need, might have 
been wiser. President Roosevelt’s care to investigate be¬ 
fore sending troops in later times is evidence that he realized 
that promptness .in such cases was not an unmixed advan¬ 
tage. 2 


3. THE COLORADO STRIKE OF I903-I904 

In 1903 there commenced a serious and bitter strike of 
gold miners in the Cripple Creek and Telluride districts of 
Colorado. 3 Bef ore long considerable violence and rioting de¬ 
veloped. State troops were sent in, but disorder continued. 
On November 16 Governor Peabody of Colorado wired to 
President Roosevelt, informing him that industrial troubles 
Were becoming more dangerous every day and that a serious 
emergency existed. “ Will you,” he asked, “ instruct Gen¬ 
eral Baldwin, commanding the Department of Colorado, 
to furnish me with such aid as I may call for? ” 4 

On November 17 Secretary of War Root wrote to the 
Governor, telling him he hoped matters would not reach 

1 Rep. of the War Dept., op. cit., p. 31. 

•The Western Federation of Miners later denounced the President 
for sending troops to Morenci in order to kill the strike. Miners 
Magazine, August, 1903. The charge does not appear to have been 
justified. 

3 For a complete account of the strike see Rastall, The Labor History 
of the Cripple Creek District, Madison, Wis., 1908. 

4 Report on Labor Disturbances in Colorado, 3rd iSess. 58th Cong., 
Senate Document 122, p. 9. 


309] PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, /poi-ipop 6 l 

a point beyond the ability of the state authorities to enforce 
the laws. If such a situation were to arise the Governor 
should make application to the President, since General 
Baldwin could not act prior to such application. 1 

The next day Governor Peabody again wired the Presi¬ 
dent. He claimed that armed pickets had taken possession 
of property in San Miguel County, that violence was being* 
committed, that the sheriff was unable to cope with the 
situation, and that the state had exhausted every means at 
its command to enforce the law, to suppress lawlessness, and 
to protect life and property. He again asked that General 
Baldwin be instructed to furnish aid. 2 On the 19th Secre¬ 
tary Root, in answer to the Governor, telegraphed that the 
President had no lawful authority to comply with the re¬ 
quest. The President could send troops at the request of 
the Governor only if the disturbance amounted to an insur¬ 
rection against the state. He could not place troops at the 
disposal of the Governor, but must himself direct their 
operation, 3 “ and he must be furnished with such facts as 
shall enable him to judge whether the exigency has arisen 
upon which the Government of the United States is bound 
to interfere.” 4 

The War Department, on November 20, instructed Major 
J. C. Bates to make an investigation into conditions of 
lawlessness and disturbances reported to exist in Colorado 
and to report whether such conditions amounted to insurrec¬ 
tion, whether state forces had been used to the extent which 
would justify the President in sending in United States 
troops, and Whether the laws of the United States were being 

1 Report on Labor Disturbances in Colorado, op. cit., p. 9. 

* Ibid., p. 10. 

3 Compare the way in which troops were used in the Coeur d'Alenes. 

4 Ibid., p. 11. 


62 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [31Q 

violated to an extent which would justify the President in 
sending troops on his own initiative. 1 On November 29 
Major Bates reported that a state of insurrection against 
the state existed justifying the employment of the state 
militia, hut that federal troops were not then needed. 21 
Though the strike lasted for many months longer no federal 
troops were sent to the district. 3 

The course of the President in this instance seems an ad¬ 
mirable one when compared to the hasty and ill-advised 
use of troops in other disturbances. The lesson of the 
Coeur d’Alenes appears to have been learned by 1903, and 
the principle that federal troops were not to be used in such 
cases until all the resources of the state were exhausted was 
maintained by the President with a firmness not found be¬ 
fore that time. 

4. THE COAL STRIKES OF 1906 

The wage agreements in both the anthracite and bitumin¬ 
ous coal fields were scheduled to expire on March 31, 1906. 
Early in the year the bituminous miners and operators held 
conferences over the new agreement. In 1905 the miners 
had undergone a reduction in wages. For the new scale 
they asked an increase of 5.55 per cent, which would place 
them on a par with their 1903 wages. They also made 
other demands. Against these demands the operators were 
firm. The most they would do was to offer to continue the 

1 Report on Labor Disturbances in Colorado , op. cit., pp. n-13. 

*Ibid., p. 14. 

8 President Roosevelt had several investigations made into the gen¬ 
eral strike situation in Colorado. On May 2, 1904, W. B. Palmer of 
the Bureau of Labor was sent in and made a thorough investigation, 
the report of which was made public in January, 1905, and is the source 
of information here used. On May 16, 1904, John Graham Brooks 
was also sent to investigate and report to the President. But the ad¬ 
ministration had no further connection with the strike, other than to 
ascertain that federal laws were being obeyed. 


311] PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, jpoi-ipop 63 

existing conditions. This offer was almost unanimously re¬ 
jected by the bituminous miners in convention, and they at 
the same time made preparations: for a strike. 1 

Meanwhile the anthracite miners, whose wages, under the 
award of the Anthracite Strike Commission, had not changed 
since 1902, were also planning to fight for an increase in 
wages and for certain other changes. 2 

The attitude of the operators and miners indicated that 
strikes in all fields were ilikely to occur. Accordingly, on 
February 24, President Roosevelt wrote a letter to President 
Mitchell of the miners, of which the following is a part: 

A strike such as is threatened on April 1 is a menace to the 
peace and general welfare of the country. I urge you tot 
make a further effort to avoid such a calamity. You and Mr. 
Robbins 3 are joint chairmen of the Trade Agreement Com¬ 
mittee of the National Civic Federation and it seems to me 
that this imposes additional duty upon you both, and gives an 
additional reason why each of you should join in making a) 
further effort. 4 

A, similar letter was sent to Mr. Robbins. As a result 
both operators and miners at once made further attempts to 
come to an agreement. In the bituminous conferences, 
however, no settlement had been reached by March 29. 
Most of the operators refused to grant an increase. The 
miners’ convention, under the circumstances, voted to strike, 
but with the understanding that work would be continued at 
those mines which put the 1903 scale into effect. 5 In a 
number of cases the increase was conceded. But not until 

1 Philadelphia Public Ledger, Feb. 1 and 2, 1906. 

3 Ibid., March 12, 1906. 

8 F. L. Robbins was the leader of the bituminous operators. 

K Ibid., Feb. 27, 1906. 

5 Ibid., March 30, 1906. 


64 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [312 

July 13 was an agreement signed which virtually ended the 
strike in the bituminous fields. The miners succeeded in 
getting their increase, but lost out on several other demands. 1. 

The anthracite miners also went on strike when their 
agreement ended. Throughout the month of April confer¬ 
ences were held with the operators, at which arbitration was 
proposed and rejected. Finally, on May 7, with the ap¬ 
proval of the anthracite miners’ convention, the union leaders 
signed an agreement with the operators continuing the award 
of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission for three years 
to March 31, 1909. 2 

It is evident that the strikes, occurring as they did in the 
spring, were not very serious, and though President Roose¬ 
velt’s letters perhaps hastened the conferences between 
operators and miners, it is doubtful whether the strike would 
have continued much longer had he not interfered. A dis¬ 
patch from Washington stated that the President and his 
cabinet, on March 30, had decided not to interfere in the 
coal situation unless public interest suffered from a coal 
famine, or general disorder occurred in the mining regions, 
or the operators and miners should agree to be bound by 
the award of a commission of arbitration. 3 

5. THE MINERS’ STRIKE IN GOLDFIELD, NEVADA, I907 

In the late fall of 1907 the gold miners of the Goldfield 
district of Nevada went on strike against payment of wages 
in the form of bank scrip. The operators claimed that cur¬ 
rency was not available, due to the panic of that year. The 
miners, on the other hand, maintained that the scrip was not 
accepted at par by the bank and by the merchants. Back 
of this direct cause of the strike there existed discontent due 

1 United Mine Workers Journal, July 19, 1906. 

2 Ibid., May 10, 1906. 

1 Philadelphia Public Ledger, March 31, 1906. 


3 i 3 ] PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, jpoi-ipop 65 

to the hostile attitude of the operators toward the Western 
Federation of Miners, and to the desire for higher wages. 1 

On December 5, 1907, Governor Sparks of Nevada ap¬ 
pealed to President Roosevelt for federal troops. / He as¬ 
serted that violence and unlawful conspiracies obstructed 
and hindered the execution of the laws and were depriving 
citizens of rights guaranteed by the Constitution, that the 
state authorities were unable to apprehend and punish the 
criminals, and that there had occurred “ unlawful dynamit¬ 
ing of property, commission of felonies, threats against 
lives and property of law abiding citizens, the unlawful pos¬ 
session of arms and ammunition, and the confiscation of 
dynamite with threats of the unlawful use of the same by 
preconcerted actions ”. He asked that two companies of 
United States troops be sent to Goldfield immediately. 2 

General Funston, commanding the Department of Cali¬ 
fornia, was at once instructed to send such troops to Gold¬ 
field as he thought necessary to cope with the situation. 8 
After conferring with a mine operator from Goldfield the 
general sent nine companies into the strike district. On the 
6th it was learned that the Governor had appealed for troops 
after having been requested to do so by the operators, and 
that the call on the President was made without consulting 
the local sheriff as to the need for troops.' 4 

On December 10 Colonel Reynolds, in charge of the 
troops at Goldfield, reported that conditions were quiet. As 
a New York editor put it, the troops found everything “ as 
quiet and peaceful as any slumbering New England town.” 5 
The President, on the next day, sent the following instruc¬ 
tions to Colonel Reynolds: 

1 Outlook, vol. 87, p. 838; vol. 88, p. 57; Overland, vol. 51, p. in. 

3 N. Y. Evening Post, Dec. 6, 1907. 

* Wilson, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances, p. 3 10 - 

4 N. Y. Evening Post, Dec. 6, 1907. 

s Ibid., Dec. 10 and 21, 1907. 


66 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [314 

j The troops are not sent to take the part of either side in a 
I purely industrial dispute, as long as it is kept within the bounds 
i of law and order. They are to be neither for nor against theS 
strikers or the employers. They are to prevent riot, violence, 
and disorder, under and in accordance with the Constitution 
and laws of the land. No man is to be interfered with so* 
long as he conducts himself in a peaceful and orderly man¬ 
ner. ... Do not act until President issues proclamation. 1 
Notify adjutant general at once whenever anything occurs 
making proclamation necessary, and then wait further orders. 
Better twenty-four hours of riot, damage, and disorder than 
illegal use of troops. 

There was no occasion for the issue of the proclamation, 
and at no time were the troops used against the strikers. 2 

On December 11 President Roosevelt appointed the fol¬ 
lowing commission to go to Nevada and make a thorough 
investigation into the strike and the need for troops: As¬ 
sistant Secretary of Commerce and Labor Murray, Com¬ 
missioner of Labor Neill, and Commissioner of Corpora¬ 
tions Smith. 3 

On the 17th lie telegraphed to Governor Sparks, inform¬ 
ing him that the troops were not sent to provide a substitute 
for the exercise by the state of its police functions, that in 
view of the fact that the Nevada legislature had not been 
convened to ask that they remain, it was fair to assume that 
the state officers were adequate to the situation, and that he 
would direct the troops to leave at once unless further cause 
for keeping them could be shown. Three days later, hav¬ 
ing received no answer, the President sent another message 

1 Rev. Stat. 5300 provides that the President shall issue a proclama¬ 
tion when troops are used, ordering the insurgents to retire peacefully 
to their homes. 

9 Wilson, op. cit., p. 310. 

* N. Y. Evening Post, Dec. 11, 1907. 


3 15 ] PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, jpor-jpop 6y 

to the Governor. He said that he had 'been informed by 
the commission which he had sent to Nevada that the Gov¬ 
ernor would neither convene the legislature nor take steps 
to form a military force, and that there was no disturbance 
in the state which the latter could not control if it made the 
attempt to do so. “ Federal aid,” he wrote, “ should not be 
sought by the State as a method of relieving itself from the 
performance of this duty, and the State should not be per¬ 
mitted to substitute the Government of the United States 
for the Government of the State in the ordinary duty of 
maintaining order within the State.” He informed the 
Governor that he had given orders for the withdrawal of 
the troops on December 30. 1 

The Governor finally replied to the President on Decem¬ 
ber 26. He asserted that the miners had been armed for 
the past year, that this was enough to overpower the civil 
authorities, and that in his judgment, therefore, a state of 
violence and insurrection had arisen. He believed that the 
troops should be kept at Goldfield indefinitely until both sides 
ceased being armed camps, that it was practically useless to 
convene the legislature, because it would require three weeks 
to get the members together, and he intimated that even if 
the legislature met he did not think it would call for the 
retention of the troops. 2 

To this telegram President Roosevelt replied on December 
28. He maintained that even though the legislature might 
refuse to call on the federal government, the Constitution 
nevertheless put that duty on it. 3 “ The state government,” 

1 N. Y. Evening Post, Dec. 21, 1907. 

* Miners Magazine, Jan. 2, 1908. 

* Article IV, Section 4, of the Federal Constitution says, “ The United 
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican forrri 
of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and 
on the application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the 
legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.” 


58 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [316 

he continued, “ certainly does not appear to have made any* 
serious effort to do its duty by the effective enforcement of 
its police functions.” He insisted that troops would be per¬ 
mitted to remain only if the legislature asked for them. 
“ You have,” the message concluded, “ fixed the period of 
three weeks as the time necessary to convene and organize a 
special session. If within five days from the receipt of this 
telegram you shall have issued the necessary notice to con¬ 
vene the Legislature of Nevada, I shall continue the station 
of the troops at Goldfield during such period of three weeks. 
If within the term of five days such notice has not been 
issued, the troops will 'be immediately returned to their for¬ 
mer stations.” 1 

On December 30 Governor Sparks called an extra session 
of the legislature to convene on January 14. On the 16th 
the legislature passed a resolution asking the President to 
keep the troops at Goldfield until it could provide for the 
formation of a state constabulary. A law enacting such a 
force was passed on February 1, and on March 7, 1908, 
the last of the federal troops were withdrawn. 2 

Meanwhile, on January 12, the report of the President’s 
commission was made public. The commission asserted 
that there was no warrant whatever for calling on the Pres¬ 
ident for troops, that there was no insurrection when the 
troops were called, that none of the conditions enumerated 
in the statutes empowering troops to be sent existed, and 
that the call for the troops was plainly the effort of the 
state to have the United States perform police duties for it. 
The commission reported that the operators had instigated 
the call for troops, that after having heard their side of the 
case the commission was satisfied that no justification for 

1 Wilson, op. cit., p. 310. 

* Ibid., p. 310; Miners Magazine, Jan. 9, 1908. 


3 1 7 ] PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, jpoi-lpop 69 

bringing in the soldiers existed, and that the mine operators, 
as soon as they had arrived, had issued a statement announce 
ing a 20 per cent reduction in pay, and their intention not 
to employ members of the Western Federation. Concern¬ 
ing this, the commission said: I 

The action of the mine operators warrants the belief that they 
had determined upon a reduction in wages and the refusal of 
employment to members of the Western Federation of Miners, 
but they feared to take this course of action unless they had 
the protection of federal troops, and that they accordingly 
laid a plan to secure such troops and then put their program 
into effect. 

The report of the investigators pointed out that the bulk 
of the testimony showed not the existence of past or pres¬ 
ent disorder, but the possibility of future disorder if the 
troops should be withdrawn, because of the operators’ inten¬ 
tion to reduce wages and not to employ Federation miners. 
The commission accordingly recommended that troops be 1 
kept at Goldfield for a short time longer. 1 

The incident again shows the necessity for investigation 
by some impartial agent before the President orders troops 
sent to the scene of a strike. The alarming tone of Governor 
Sparks’ first telegram to the President probably caused the 
latter to fear the evil consequences of delay, but, as he him¬ 
self said to the officer in charge of troops at Goldfield, 
“ Better twenty-four hours of riot, damage, and disorder 
than illegal use of troops.” Though his action in sending 
soldiers so hastily is deserving of criticism, his insistence that 
they be strictly impartial and his pressure on the Governor 
to have the legislature convened and to make provision for 
doing its own policing, when he realized that he had been 
placed in a false position, are worthy of praise. 

l N. V. Tribune, Jan. 13, 1908. 


7 o LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [318 

6. THE THREATENED WAGE REDUCTION ON THE LOUISVILLE 
& NASHVILLE RAILROAD, 1908 

Before proceeding to a discussion of railway labor disputes 
it is necessary to describe briefly the machinery set up by 
law for their adjustment, which might be invoked by the 
President in case of strike. In 1898 the Erdman Act * 
was passed to supersede the Act of 1888, already referred to 
in connection with the Pullman Strike. It provided that 
whenever a dispute occurred between a carrier and its em¬ 
ployees in train service or operation either side might ask 
the Commissioner of Labor or the Chairman of the Inter¬ 
state Commerce Commission to act as a mediator. If he 
were not successful attempts were to be made to get the 
parties to submit to arbitration. In case they agreed to this, 
each party was to choose one arbitrator, and the two thus 
appointed were to choose a third. If they could not agree, 
one of the commissioners mentioned above might appoint the 
third member. Though submission and arbitration were 
to be voluntary, the award was compulsory and provision was 
made for its enforcement through the federal courts. No 
strike or lockout might take place within thirty days after the 
granting of the award, according to the terms of the law. 
In case either party were dissatisfied it might carry an ap¬ 
peal to the courts. Only one effort was made to use this! law) 
during the first eight years of its existence, but beginning 
in 1906 it was invoked, particularly in its conciliation, pro¬ 
visions, in many instances. 

Inj the winter of 1907-1908 a number of roads in the 
Southeast, claiming the falling off in revenues due to the 
crisis as a reason, served notice on engineers and some other 
employees of their desire to change wage schedules. All 
of the unions declined to agree to any wage reductions, de- 


30 Stat. 424. 


3 1 9 ] PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, jpoi-ipop 71 

daring their intention of striking if the roads insisted on 
reducing wages. 1 In a statement announcing a reduction 
to go into effect on March 1, issued about the first of Feb¬ 
ruary, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad gave as one of 
the reasons for the proposed cut, that drastic railroad legis¬ 
lation had “ resulted and will undoubtedly continue to result 
in loss of revenue and increased expense.” 2 

This statement aroused President Roosevelt, a firm sup¬ 
porter of the railroad legislation which had been recently 
passed by Congress. On February 18 he wrote an open 
letter to the Interstate Commerce Commission, pointing out 
that the Louisville & Nashville had laid the necessity of a 
wage reduction to railroad legislation. He directed the 
commission to make an investigation of conditions on that 
road, and others as well, to find out whether the need of the 
wage cut was due to legislation or to misconduct on the 
part of the roads. He expressed his hope that any wage 
controversy between the railroads and their employees might 
find peaceful solution through the machinery of the Erdman 
Act. For this purpose the commission should be in a posi¬ 
tion to have relevant data pertaining to the carrier concerned, 
for the use of a board of conciliation or arbitration. Should 
conciliation fail, and arbitration be rejected, accurate infor¬ 
mation should be available to develop public opinion. 3 

It is difficult to say to what extent the events which fol¬ 
lowed were the results of the President’s letter. On Feb¬ 
ruary 22 a committee representing the railway Brotherhoods 
was assured by a number of important eastern roads that 
there would be no wage cuts. Union officials in public 

1 Neill, Mediation and Arbitration of Railway Labor Disputes in the 
U. S., Bureau of Labor, Bulletin 98, p. 22. 

2 Washington Post, Feb. 21, 1908. 

8 Roosevelt, An Autobiography, p. 496. 


72 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [320 

statements expressed their belief that the letter of the Pres¬ 
ident had had a good effect. 1 

Unable to secure an agreement with the unions for a 
wage reduction, the Southern Railway, late in February, in¬ 
voked the mediation provisions of the Erdman Act. Shortly 
afterwards the engineers and other employees on seven of 
the southern roads, including those of the Louisville & Nash¬ 
ville, did likewise, to avoid what they regarded as the neces¬ 
sity for a strike should wages be reduced. Commissioners 
Knapp and Neill, the mediators under the law, agreed to 
dispose of their cases after the negotiations in the Southern 
Railway case had been concluded. It became generally un¬ 
derstood 1 that the agreement reached in the latter case would 
be followed by the other roads. On April 1 an agreement 
continuing the existing wage schedule was reached. 2 Mean¬ 
while the Louisville & Nashville, soon after the publication 
of the President’s letter of February 18, had let it be known 
that for the present at least the existing wage scale would be 
maintained. 3 The settlement of the Southern Railway case 
virtually put an end to any further danger of strikes on 
any of the southern roads. 

If the letter of the President was the principal factor in 
preventing a railroad strike at this time, and no furthet 
evidence than the foregoing is available to prove it, it is in¬ 
teresting to observe the motive in the case. Apparently this 
is an instance in which the affection of a fond father for 
his legislative children led him to come to their defense 
with such vigor that it caused the offenders to retreat, and 
so neither a strike nor a wage reduction took place. 4 

1 Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1908. * Neill., op. cit., pp. 22-23. 

3 Washington Post, March 9, 1908. 

4 The next four years was a period of comparative prosperity, with 
few important labor disputes. This must be assigned as the reason 
for the fact that there is on record no instance in which President Taft 
used his powers or influence to prevent or settle a strike. 


CHAPTER IV 


President Wilson, 1913-1917 

I. THE THREATENED STRIKE OF CONDUCTORS AND TRAINMEN 
ON THE EASTERN RAILWAYS, I9I3 

At a meeting of the General Committees of the Order of 
Railway Conductors and the Brotherhood of Railway Train¬ 
men, representing the employees on the eastern railways, 
which was held in Rochester, N. Y., on October 19, 1912, 
demands were formulated to be presented to the roads. 
The employees asked that wages be increased 15 per cent, 
which would place the wages on the eastern roads on a level 
with the western scales, that in all freight service ten hours 
or less constitute a day’s work on runs of 100 miles or less, 
that overtime in excess of ten hours be paid for at the rate 
of time and a half, and that in cases where two engines were 
used double rates should be paid. 1 

Early in July, 1913, after conferences with the railway 
managers, the latter rejected the demands of the men, and 
also refused to consider their offer of arbitration under the 
Erdman Act on the ground that it placed the whole decision 
in (the hands of one man, the third member of the board. 
Furthermore, the managers claimed, the act had been framed 
to settle disputes on a single railroad, and not on all the 
railroads in a large territory. 2 Some time before, disputes 

1 Report of the Board of Arbitration, Eastern Railways, 1913, pp. 13- 
16, vol. i. 

2 N. Y. Times, July 5, 1913. 

321 ] 


73 


^4 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [322 

between the roads and the engineers and firemen had been 
settled by arbitration. In both instances dissatisfaction with 
the provisions of the Erdman Act had developed, and long 
before July, 1913, both the roads and the men thought the 
law should be amended. 1 

On July 8 the conductors and trainmen voted overwhelm¬ 
ingly in favor of a strike and gave their officers power to 
call one if necessary. 2 Both the managers and the men 
seemed to feel that a settlement without a strike was possible' 
if some change could be made in the Erdman Act. At the 
request of a committee of railway presidents, the chiefs of 
-the railway Brotherhoods, and some officials of the National 
Civic Federation, arrangements were made through the 
Secretary of Labor for a conference with President Wilson 
to discuss changes in the act. The President called the rep¬ 
resentatives of the roads and the Brotherhoods to meet' 
him for that purpose on July 14. 3 ! 

In the meantime identical bills to amend the act, satis¬ 
factory to both the Brotherhoods and the railways, had been 
introduced in the Senate and the House on June 17. The 
Senate soon passed the bill before it without amendment. 4 
It set up a permanent U. S. Board of Mediation and Con¬ 
ciliation, to consist of a Commissioner of Mediation and 
Conciliation, and not more than two other members, all of 
whom were to be appointed by the President, who was also 
to appoint an Assistant Commissioner of Mediation and 
Conciliation. The Commission might, if it thought ad¬ 
visable, attempt to mediate on its own initiative. In case 
mediation proved unsuccessful provision was made for 

1 Fisher, Use of Federal Power in Railway Labor Disputes, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, Bulletin 303, 1922, pp. 45-47. 

*N. Y. Times, July 9, 1913. 

3 Ibid., July 10 and 12, 1913. 

4 Congressional Record, vol. 50, p. 2182. 


323] PRESIDENT WILSON, Z pj3- jp 75 

arbitration by a board of three, or if desired by the dispu¬ 
tants, of six members, with powers similar to those of the 
boards under the Erdman Act. 1 * 

In the House the bill was so amended that it was equally 
unsatisfactory to the railway companies and to the men. 21 
At this stage, the conference, which President Wilson had 
called, took place. Besides representatives of the roads and 
the Brotherhoods, the President had also called in Congress¬ 
man Clayton, Chairman of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, and Congressman Mann, Republican leader in 
the House. The conference went to work earnestly to find 
some way to avert what threatened to be a most disastrous 
strike, and it succeeded in reaching a settlement on the first 
day. Congressman Clayton promised the two parties to 
the dispute that he would offer to the House the bill which 
had already passed the Senate, and would urge its passage. 
On their side, the railways and the unions promised to sub¬ 
mit the dispute to arbitration when the bill became a law. 3 
On the next day, July 15, the House passed the bill and 
the President signed it. 4 

Although the country was; greatly relieved at what had 
happened, the way to a settlement was not yet quite clear. 
On July 17 the railroads published their own set of griev¬ 
ances, which they insisted should be arbitrated along with 
the demands of the men. Against their inclusion the 
Brotherhoods stood quite firm. They maintained that the 
proper subjects for arbitration were their own demands and 
those alone, and that rather than yield the point they would 
go on strike as originally planned. Finally, on July 26, the 

1 38 Stat. 63rd 'Congress, Chap. 6. 

* N. Y. Times, July 10, 1913. 

• Congressional Record , vol. 50, p. 2432. 

4 Ibid., pp. 2442, 2471. 


76 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [324. 

railways gave in and joined the unions in signing a formal 
agreement to arbitrate under the Newlands Act, as it was 
called. 1 In due course an arbitration board of six men was 
constituted and considered the disputed questions. On 
November 10, 1913, it rendered its- award, giving the men 
a compromise increase in wages averaging 7 per cent, but 
rejecting the other important demands of the Brother¬ 
hoods. 2 

This case i9 significant for several reasons. In the first 
place, the calling of a conference by the President, and his 
efforts in the conference, averted a disastrous strike. 
Secondly, it was the first of many times that President Wil¬ 
son called a conference to settle a strike. And finally, it is 
one of the few instances in which a settlement was effected 
and a strike directly avoided by the passage of an act of 
Congress. For it must again be emphasized that the rail¬ 
ways were thoroughly determined not to arbitrate under 
the Erdman Act, and equally determined not to arbitrate- 
under an extra-legal board carrying no' statutory sanction 
whatever. 3 


2 . THE COLORADO STRIKE OF I913-I914 

The Colorado strike of 1913-1914 was one of the bitterest 
that the country has ever seen. It is particularly interesting 
because there were directly involved in it only about fifteen 
thousand men, but the issues it aroused and the antagonisms 
it stirred up were so important that they quite overshadowed 
its apparent insignificance. 

For years the miners in Colorado had made unsuccessful 
attempts to obtain recognition of their union. Since 1883 s 
strikes had occurred about every ten years, all of them end- 

1 N. Y. Times, July 27, 1913. 

* Report of the Board of Arbitration, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 34. 

9 Congressional Record, vol. 50, pp. 2430-2442. 


PRESIDENT WILSON, 


3 2 5] 


1913-1917 7 ?\ 


ing unsuccessfully and most of them disastrously. Chief 
among the coal companies, and the leader of the industry in 
the state, was the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company, controlled 
'by the Rockefeller family, and at the time of the strike of 
1913, under the particular supervision of John D. Rocke¬ 
feller, Jr. The unrest among the miners was not alone due 
to unsatisfactory industrial conditions. Added to these 
there existed political and social conditions which did much 
to arouse the workers. The men claimed, and most investiga¬ 
tors believe, with justice, that the coal companies, partic¬ 
ularly the Colorado Fuel & Iron Co., dominated political 
and economic affairs to such an extent that they were able to 
turn matters to their interest whenever they desired. The 
workers further maintained that this domination was 
achieved through ruthless suppression of unionism, through 
the blacklist, armed guards, spies, venal political officials, 
summary discharge, the suppression of free speech, free 
press, free assembly, and by various other means. 1 

It was this center of unrest and dissatisfaction that the 
United Mine Workers of America determined to unionize. 
It sent in organizers who built up small organizations in 
many of the non-union districts. On August 26, 1913, the 
Policy Committee of the union sent letters to every coal 
operator in the state, asking him to meet the union in joint 
conference for the purpose of adjusting matters in the in¬ 
dustry. The letter was not answered, except by two small 
operators. Undaunted, on September 8, the committee sent 
letters to the operators again, notifying them of a joint con¬ 
vention of operators and miners to be held at Trinidad, 
Colorado, on September 15, and asking them to be present. 

This convention met on the date appointed, but no opera- 


1 G. P. West, Report on the Colorado Strike, 1915, U. S. Commission 
on Industrial Relations, pp. 12-16. 


78 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [326 

tors appeared. The convention, which the employers 
claimed was made up of members hand picked 'by the U. M. 
W. officials, adopted a number of demands to be presented 
to the operators, and voted to strike September 23 if these 
were not granted. 1 These demands, which were at once sub¬ 
mitted as a basis of settlement, were as follows: 

1. Recognition of the union. ' 

2. A 10 per cent advance in tonnage and day rates of pay. 

3. An eigiht-hour day for all classes of labor. 

4. Pay for all narrow and dead work, including brushing, 
timbering, removing falls, handling impurities, etc. 

5. Checkweighmen at all mines, to be elected by the miners 
without any interference by company officials. 

6. The right to trade in any store they pleased, and the 
right to choose their own boarding houses and their own 
doctors. 

7. The enforcement of the Colorado mining laws, and the 
abolition of the “ notorious and criminal guard system, 
which has prevailed in the mining camps of Colorado for 
many years 

The miners claimed that demands 3, 5, 6, and 7 were 
already embodied in state laws, but that the operators did 
not comply with them, that the state law forbidding discrim¬ 
ination between union and non-union men was also* con¬ 
tinually violated, that wages in Colorado were the lowest 
paid in any Rocky Mountain state, and that workers were 
paid for work done under demand number 4 in all other 
states. 2 * 

The operators, on the other hand, maintained that 90 

1 Facts Concerning the Struggle in Colorado, Series 1, Coal Mine 
Managers, Sept. 21, 1914, p. 7; Report of the Commission on Industrial 
Relations, vol. vii, p. 6515. 

2 Rep. of the Com. on Ind. Rel., vol. viii, p. 7025. 


327] PRESIDENT WILSON, ipi 3 -i 9 iy 79I 

per cent of their workers did not belong to the unions, and 
to grant recognition of the union would be to force them in, 
that miners’ wages in the state were 20 per cent higher than 
in the districts with which it competed, that the pay 
asked under the fourth demand had been paid for many 
years, and that all the other demands were granted under 
state laws which were not and had not been violated by the 
operators. 1 The strike, as was expected, started on Sep¬ 
tember 23, most of the miners going out. 

Even 'before the strike had begun the federal government, 
realizing that it might bring about serious consequences, had 
made an attempt to avert it. In the act which created the 
Department of Labor and the office of Secretary of Labor, 
passed early in 19)13, 2 one section provided that “ the Secre¬ 
tary of Labor shall have power to act as mediator and to 
appoint commissioners of conciliation in labor disputes 
whenever in his judgment the interests of industrial peace 
shall require it to be done.” No restriction was made as to 
the industries in which mediators might be named, and under 
this provision the department built up a valuable and active 
bureau of mediation which settled many disputes. It was 
under this law that the administration attempted to avert, 
and later to end, the Colorado strike. 

'About a week before the Trinidad convention of Sep¬ 
tember 15, Ethelbert M. Stewart o*f the Department of 
Labor called at the New York office of John D. Rockefeller, 
Jr., to see the latter concerning the threatened strike in 
Colorado. At that time he was told that Mr. Rockefeller 
was on vacation, but that he would be back on September 15. 
Mr. Stewart called again on that day, but Mr. Rockefeller 
had not yet appeared and had instructed a member of his 
staff to talk with Mr. Stewart in his place. The latter called 

1 Facts etc., op. cit., pp. 7, 8, 9. 

2 37 St at.-at-Large 73&- 


go LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [328* 

attention to the letter of the miners to the operators and 
the operators’ failure to reply. The miners had then ap¬ 
pealed to the Secretary of Labor to appoint a mediator. Mr. 
Stewart asked if it would be worth while going to Colorado, 
as he did not care to make a fruitless trip. He was told 
that the matter would have to be handled by the executive 
officers in Colorado. He answered that he thought that 
the policy could be determined in New York, but he was 
told that New York would not interfere with the Colorado 
officers unless the latter saw fit to submit the matter. 1 This 
interview is reported at some length because it indicates the 
policy that was followed by John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 
throughout the strike. 

Failing in his efforts in New York, Mr. Stewart went to 
Colorado. The strike had already started, and he made un¬ 
successful attempts to bring the operators and miners to¬ 
gether in conference to end it. He had various meetings 
with L. M. Bowers, manager of the Col. F. & I. Co., with 
other operators, and with the miners. In a letter to John 
D. Rockefeller, Jr., written September 29, Mr. Bowers said 
that he had told Mr. Stewart that the company would con¬ 
tinue to work whatever mines it could, and that it would 
stand out against the union “ until our bones [are] bleached 
as white as chalk in these Rocky Mountains.” 2 

On October. 6 Mr. Rockefeller, in answer to Mr. Bowers, 
wrote as follows : 

We feel that what you have done is right and fair and that the 
position you have taken in regard to the unionizing of the 
mines is in the interests of the employees of the company. 
Whatever the outcome may be, we will stand by you to thd 
end. 3 

x Rep. of the Com., op. cit., vol. ix, p. 8413. 

2 Ibid., vol. ix, p. 8420. 

s Ibid. 


329] PRESIDENT WILSON, jpjj-rpjy 8l! 

On October 9 Mr. Stewart met representatives of the 
three most important coal companies, called at the request 
of Governor Ammons, in the latter’s office. He made them 
the following proposals: 

1. That the operators and strike leaders hold a conference. 

2. That the operators meet with Governor Ammons, of¬ 
ficials of the U. M. W., and himself, for an informal discus¬ 
sion of the situation. 

3. That the operators suggest some method of ending the 

strike. ! 

Each of these proposals was rejected in turn. On this 
Mr. Stewart stated that he would report to the Secretary of 
Labor and make recommendations for a Congressional in¬ 
vestigation. This first attempt at mediation thus came to 
an end. 1 

During the rest of October Governor Ammons and va¬ 
rious others continued their efforts to bring about a settle¬ 
ment, but to no avail. Meanwhile mine guards had been 
brought into the strike area in large numbers and efforts 
to work some of the mines continued. This situation soon 
developed much ill feeling in the strike districts, and finally 
the violence became so pronounced that the Governor, on 
October 27 and 28, sent in state troops to keep order. 2 

In November the Governor learned that Secretary of 
Labor Wilson was coming West, and he wrote to President 
Wilson asking that the Secretary be sent to Denver to at¬ 
tempt to bring about a settlement. 3 On November 20 Sec¬ 
retary Wilson sent the following telegram to John D. 
Rockefeller, Jr.: 

1 Rep. of the Com., op. cit., vol. vii, p. 6595; United Mine Workers 
Journal, Oct. 9, 1913. 

2 Rep. Com., op. cit., vol. vii, p. 6312. 

3 Ibid., vol. vii, p. 6413. 


82 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [330 

The governor of Colorado has asked me to lend my efforts 
toward settlement of coal strike there. He says the situation 
is critical and growing worse hourly. Can you help by using 
your influence to have representatives of the coal companies 
in Colorado meet representatives of miners with view to find¬ 
ing a mutual basis for settlement? . . - 1 

To this Mr. Rockefeller answered as follows : 

.... So far as Colorado Fuel and Iron Co. is concerned the 
matter is entirely in hands of its executive officers in Colorado. 
They have always been quite as solicitious for the well being 
of the employees as for the interests of the stockholders. The 
men who have brought about this strike are not representatives 
of our miners, as only a small percentage of our men are 
members of unions, and all but an inconsiderable fraction of 
those have protested against the strike. The action of our 
officers in refusing to meet the strike leaders is quite as much 
in the interest of our employees as of any other element in the 
company. Their position meets with our cordial approval, 
and we shall support them to the end. The failure of our 
men to remain at work is due simply to their fear of assault 
and assassination. The governor of Colorado has only to pro¬ 
tect the lives of bonafide miners to bring the strike to aj 
speedy termination. 2 

After much effort Secretary Wilson arranged a meeting^ 
between three operators, three union men who were em¬ 
ployees of the coal companies, and Governor Ammons, on 
November 26. At this conference it was agreed to submit 
identical propositions for a settlement to the operators and 
miners on the following day. On the 27th Secretary Wil¬ 
son and Governor Ammons drew up a letter submitting the 
following as a solution, and sent it to both sides: there was 
to be strict enforcement of all the statutes;, including that 

1 Rep. Com., op. cit., vol. ix, p. 8422. 

2 Ibid. 


331] PRESIDENT WILSON, jpjj-jpj; 83 

forbidding discrimination against union or non-union men; 
all employees on strike were to be reemployed except where 
their places were filled, or where they were guilty of unlaw¬ 
ful acts; and where the strikers’ places were filled, other 
places were to be furnished as soon as possible. 1 

On the same day Secretary Wilson and the Governor 
submitted another proposal to the effect that with the ac¬ 
ceptance of the other terms the following questions were to 
be submitted to a board of arbitration: (a) the question of 
an increase in wages; (b) the question of devising a method 
whereby future grievances and disputes might be adjusted 
without recourse to strikes. 2 

The operators accepted the first proposal, but objected to 
the second on the ground that the other should first be ac¬ 
cepted by the miners. The arbitration proposal was then 
withdrawn. 3 Concerning it Manager Bowers wrote to Mr. 
Rockefeller on November 28: 

I can see no particular objection to the formation of an arbi¬ 
tration board as suggested by Secretary Wilson, providing the 
three miners are non-union men who have remained in the 
employ of the coal operators during this strike, but to this I 
am sure neither Secretary Wilson nor the labor leaders would 
consent. 4 

Meanwhile the miners’ leaders had sent out the first pro¬ 
posal to be voted on by local unions throughout the state. 
It was overwhelmingly rejected by the men on the ground 
that to go back to work under the conditions proposed would 
leave them in precisely the same position they were in be- 

1 Rep. Com., op. cit., vol. viii, p. 7037. 

2 Testimony before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Mines and Mining, Investigating the Colorado Strike. Washington, 
1914, p. 411. 

l Rep. Com., op. cit., vol. vii, pp. 6413-6414. 

4 Ibid., vol. ix, p. 8424. 


84 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [332: 

fore the strike, since they would have to rely on the oper¬ 
ators’ promises to obey laws which the latter had claimed 
had always been obeyed. 1 Finding the administration’s 
second attempt at mediation no more successful than the 
first, Secretary Wilson returned to Washington. 2 

Before and during the period when Secretary Wilson 
was endeavoring to bring the strike to> an end, the President 
was making similar efforts, through letters to Manager 
Bowers, The following extracts from correspondence be¬ 
tween J. Starr Murphy, of Mr. Rockefeller’s personal staff in 
New York, Mr. Rockefeller himself, and Mr. Bowers, in¬ 
dicate the content of the President’s proposals and the nature 
of their reception. 

Letter from Murphy to Bowers, December 1, 1913, in 
which the former submits to the latter, at the request of Mr. 
Rockefeller, a suggestion with regard to President Wilson’s 
proposal for arbitration by an impartial board: 

.... whether it might not be a tactical advantage to say that 
while we refuse to consent to arbitraion, we are not only will¬ 
ing, but we strongly urge an investigation of all the facts as 
to the relation between the company and its employees and the 
circumstances leading up to the strike. . . . The investigators 
should not be politicians, but we might suggest that the Pres¬ 
ident appoint any three Federal judges. 

Letter from Bowers to Murphy, December 6, 1913: 

On the surface the President’s suggestion looks plausible but 
we are too well advised to believe that it would be possible to 
secure an impartial committee named by him. . . . 

1 Rep. Com., op. cit., vol. viii, p. 7038-7039. 

2 President Welborn of the Col. F. & I. Co., in a letter to J. H. 
McClement of New York, on Dec. 4, 1913, wrote, “Wilson says he 
expects to go back to Washington tonight and we hope he will.” Ibid., 
vol. viii, pp. 7117-7119. 


223] PRESIDENT WILSON, 85’ 

We know that the President will not ignore the head of the 
Department of Labor, but will let his Secretary of Labor name 

the committee, if such an agreement was entered into. 

No whipping around the bush is necessary on the part of the 
President, if he really wants to end the strike; but he is too 
fearful of the labor voters who are in the unions to come out 
into the open and demand an end of the strike by those who 
are responsible for it. . . . 

The writer has satisfied himself that the labor leaders in 
charge would laugh at any report of any committee that would 
leave recognition of the union open for the operators to decide 
for themselves. So we prefer to let the President ask Con¬ 
gress to make an investigation and take our chances. 

Letter from Bowers to Rockefeller: 

His Excellency [President Wilson] had an excellent oppor¬ 
tunity to end this correspondence upon receipt of my second 
letter, but unwisely, we all think, he allowed himself to write 
another one, which, if from a less dignified statesman, would 
be regarded as a bluff, as he was well aware that the efforts of 
Congressman Keating, of Colorado, and some other represent¬ 
atives catering to labor unions have utterly failed to induce 
Congress to make an investigation. We are confidentially ad¬ 
vised that President Wilson’s recommendation for a congres¬ 
sional investigation will be no more effective. Anyhow, he can 
meditate over his decidedly weak reply to my second letter and 
take such action as he sees fit. 1 

Evidently the President ceased his efforts with Mr. 
Bowers, for there is no mention of any further letters. But 
on January 27 the House of Representatives provided for 
an investigation into the Colorado strike to ascertain if the' 
Constitution or any federal laws were being violated. A 
subcommittee of the House Committee on Mines and Min¬ 
ing held hearings on the strike from February to April, 

1 Rep. Com., op. cit., vol. ix, pp. 8425-8427. 



86 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [334 

1914, made a report to Congress rather favorable to the 
strikers for the most part, and published the testimony 
taken by it. The latter furnished the public much needed 
information concerning the strike. 1 

Throughout the winter much enmity had developed be¬ 
tween the miners and the militia stationed in the strike dis¬ 
tricts. As spring came on conditions seemed to become 
more peaceful and plans were considered for removing* 
most of the soldiers. The Governor had also had difficulty 
in raising money to support them, and this was an additional 
reason for the withdrawal plans. About April 1 a consider¬ 
able number of troops were sent to their homes, and ar¬ 
rangements were made for the departure of the few re¬ 
maining about April 22. 2 In reality, however, though vio¬ 
lence may have diminished, the antagonism between the 
miners and the soldiers, who had used their efforts in aid¬ 
ing the operators in their attempts to run the mines with 
strikebreakers and had done various other things calculated 
to arouse the men (for example, the imprisonment of 
Mother Jones), was by no means diminished. 

The miners and their families, having been evicted from 
the company houses they had previously occupied, had 
settled in several tent colonies in the mountains near the 
mines. At one of these colonies, Ludlow, a rumour spread 
shortly before April 20 to the effect that the militia were 
planning to descend on the colony and wipe it out. The 
colonists prepared for the expected attack by getting ready 
their arms and making arrangements to protect their fami¬ 
lies. On April 20, seeing a party of militia approaching the 
colony and believing that its intention was to attack them, 

1 Report on the Colorado Strike Investigation 3rd Sess., 63rd Cong., 
House Document 1630. 

2 Ibid., vol. vii, pp. 6415-6416. 


335 ] PRESIDENT WILSON, jpjj-jpj; 87} 

the colonists are believed to have opened fire. That was the 
beginning of what soon became known the country over as 
“ the Ludlow Massacre ”. The soldiers, whatever their in¬ 
tent may have really been in the beginning, did just what the 
miners feared they were going to do. A large number of 
men were killed that day and the next, both among the 
militia and among the miners, and after the battle had 
cleared a group of women and children, who had escaped 
into a dugout beneath a tent to escape the gun fire, were 
found smothered to death by the fires which the soldiers 
had started to destroy the colony. 

Some time afterward a military board of investigation 
made up of officers of the state militia reported: “ Beyond 
a doubt, it was seen to intentionally that fire should destroy 
the whole of the colony. This, too, was accompanied by 
the usual loot. ... So deliberate was this burning and loot¬ 
ing that we find that cans of oil found in the tents were 
poured upon them and the tents lit with matches.” 1 

On hearing of what had happened, Governor Ammons, 
who had gone to Washington to see the federal authorities 
in order to get them to make another attempt to end the 
strike, at once started back to Denver without an oppor¬ 
tunity to accomplish his purpose. On the way he asked 
the administration to send troops into the state, but did not 
receive a favorable answer at first. He at once ordered the 
militia which had been relieved into the strike zone again. 2 

Before sending any federal troops to the scene of the dis¬ 
turbance President Wilson determined first to do what he 
could to bring the strike to an end and thus do away with 

1 Ibid., vol. ix, p. 8765. There have been many contradictory descrip¬ 
tions of this unfortunate event, but that here given seems, after an 
examination of the testimony before the Commission on Industrial 
Relations and of other reports, to be nearest the truth. 

8 Ibid., vol. vii, pp. 6415-6416. 


88 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [336 

the need for troops. On April 26 he had a conference with 
Representative Foster of Illinois, who had been chairman 
of the House investigating committee, and with a number 
of Colorado congressmen. They all joined Governor 
Ammons in urging him to send troops. He also conferred 
with Secretary Wilson and Secretary of War Garrison. 1 
On the same day he sent a message to John D. Rockefeller, 
Sr., asking him to intervene to bring about peace in Colo¬ 
rado. The elder Mr. Rockefeller answered that he had 
turned the control of the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company 
over to his son, but that he would ask the latter to take up 
the matter. Accordingly the President at once sent Mr. 
Foster to New York to see John D. Rockefeller, Jr. On 
the 27th a meeting between the two took place. Mr. Foster 
asked Mr. Rockefeller to agree to have a commission ap¬ 
pointed to settle the strike, so that federal troops would not 
have to be sent. This request met with a flat refusal. Mr. 
Rockefeller was also asked to shut down the mines pending! 
arbitration, but this request met a similar answer. 2 The 
next day Mr. Rockefeller published a statement regarding 1 
the conference. He said that Mr. Foster could suggest 
nothing as a solution which did not mean either recognition 
of the union or arbitration, and he defended his company’s 
stand against the demands of the strikers. 

On the same day, April 28, realizing that a settlement was 
unlikely, the President ordered federal troops to Colorado. 
In a telegram notifying the Governor of his action he said 
that he expected the latter to call the attention of the legis¬ 
lature, which was due to meet on May 4, to the necessity f or 
considering the whole situation and coming to prompt 
action, “ in order that the use of the Federal power may 

1 N. Y. Times, April 27, 1914. 

*Ibid., April 28, 1914. 


337] PRESIDENT WILSON, 7913- jpjy 89; 

be limited within its contemplated confines, and in order 
that the state may take up its duty as soon as it is possible 
for it to do so.” He also asked that the state militia be 
withdrawn as soon as federal troops had arrived and taken 
control. 1 

Meanwhile Representative Foster continued his efforts. 
On April 29 he sent a telegram once more asking Mr. Rocke¬ 
feller to end the strike, especially in view of an announcement 
which had recently been made by William Green, Secretary- 
Treasurer of the United Mine Workers, to the effect that 
the miners would waive their demand for recognition of the 
union in order to settle the strike. Mr. Rockefeller replied 
that he was forwarding the telegram to the Colorado officers 
of the company, who were the only ones competent to deal 
with it. 2 On the 30th the Colorado operators wired Mr. 
Foster, recounting the violence committed by the strikers 
and refusing to enter negotiations, but stating that they con¬ 
ceived it to be the duty of the United Mine Workers to call 
off the strike. On the same day Mr. Rockefeller wired to 
President Welborn in Colorado asking that the operators 
call Mr. Foster’s attention to their acceptance of the Am¬ 
mons-Wilson proposal of November 27. This the opera¬ 
tors did in a telegram sent on May 1. That day and the 
next Mr. Foster sent further messages, asking that the 
operators arbitrate regardless of whose fault the trouble 
was. On May 4 the operators again sent a telegram to 
Mr. Foster refusing negotiations with the union, and reiter¬ 
ating their position that the men could always bring their 
grievances to the company officers. 3 

In the meantime the limelight into which the whole strike, 

1 N. Y. Times, April 29, 1914. 

2 Rep. of the Com., op. cit., vol. vii, p. 6713. 

* Ibid., vol. vii, pp. 6713-6718. 


90 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [338 

and especially the affair at Ludlow, had thrown John D. 
Rockefeller, Jr., became distasteful, and his support of 
Messrs, Bowers and Welborn in their stand against any con¬ 
cessions whatever had aroused considerable public opinion 
rather unfavorable to the company. In this situation the 
Colorado operators, not including the Col. F. & I. Co., sent 
a long telegram to President Wilson. They pointed out 
that their companies operated 60 to 70 per cent of the mines, 
that they deplored the injustice done to John D. Rocke¬ 
feller, Jr., and they took upon themselves independently of 
him and the Colorado company the responsibility for the 
conduct of the strike and the refusal to arbitrate or to rec¬ 
ognize the union. 1 

The federal troops which the President had ordered out 
arrived in the strike district about May 1. On May 2 
Secretary of War Garrison, by authority of the President, 
issued a proclamation calling upon and directing all persons 
in the district not in the military service of the United 
States, who had arms or ammunition in their possession or 
under their control, to deliver them to the army officers. 2 
For some time afterwards the troops endeavored to en¬ 
force the proclamation, disarming both mine guards and 
miners, and though it was claimed they were not entirely 
successful, no violence occurred after they were settled in 
the district. On May 10 President Wilson, acting through 
the War Department, instructed the officer in charge of the 
troops to permit no importation of strike breakers. 3 Im¬ 
mediately afterwards the officer in charge ordered that all 
mines which were closed before the strike began, or at 
the beginning of the strike, should not open, but that all 
mines not closed before April 20 might reopen. 4 

1 Rep. Com., op. cit. vol. vii, pp. 6718-6720; vol. ix, p. 8416. 

2 United Mine Workers Journal, May 17, 1914. 

•iV. Y. Times, May 11, 1914. 

4 Ibid., May 12, 1914. 


PRESIDENT WILSON, 


339 ] 


1913-1917 91 


The policy of the federal troops in this strike is worthy 
of further attention. In a letter sent to Mr. McClement, of 
New York, on May 27, 1914, President Wellborn writes : 


The policy of the Federal troops is not entirely satisfactory to 
us. . . . They will not permit us to bring in any men from 
outside the state and require that all of those seeking employ¬ 
ment shall go direct to the mines where they want to work and 
make their application, rather than making it through our office 
here [Denver] or in Trinidad. 


In a later letter written on August 18 he says, “No change 
has taken place in the policy of the Federal troops with re¬ 
spect to the employment of men, although I do not think 
their rules are as rigidly enforced as at the beginning/’ 1 
The unions also felt that the enforcement of the rules 
was 'becoming less strict, for on September 1 the Secretary 
of War had occasion to send the following telegram to a 
union official in Aguilar, Colorado, who had complained that 
troops were permitting the importation of strikebreakers in 
his district: 


I was not aware that the orders of the department were being 
interpreted differently in the different districts. To prevent 
any such difference of interpretation I have communicated 
with all the commanders, advising them that hereafter orders 
shall be carried out as follows, with respect to those mines 
which are running: First—Operators are not to be permitted 
to gather men and ship them into such mines. Second — 1 
Miners who apply at the mines may be there employed pro¬ 
vided they are residents of the state of Colorado, and have 
complied with the laws of Colorado relative to miners. 2 

As a whole it may be said that the miners were well satis- 

l Rep. Com., op. cit., vol. viii, pp. 7120-7123. 

1 United Mine Workers Journal, Sept. 3, 1914* 


g 2 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [340 

tied with the federal troops; so much so that on October 29 
Mother Jones, one of their organizers, and James Lord, of 
the Mining Department of the American Federation of 
Labor, called on President Wilson and asked him not to 
withdraw them, 1 It is evident from what has been said 
concerning the troops that the operators were eager to have 
them afford such protection and aid that they might operate 
the mines and thus defeat the strike; and it is equally 
evident that President Wilson was determined that the 
strike, if it were defeated, should not be defeated because 
of the activities of the federal troops, a position which ap¬ 
pears widely divergent from that taken by President Cleve¬ 
land in the Pullman Strike, as well as from that taken by the 
officer in command of troops' in the Coeur d’Alenes. 

It will be recalled that the President, in sending the 
troops, had notified the Governor that he expected the 
Colorado legislature to take such action as would make it 
possible for the state to assume its whole duty in the mat¬ 
ter. On May 16, hearing that the legislature was prepar¬ 
ing to adjourn without acting on all the emergency meas¬ 
ures before it, the President sent the following telegram to 
Governor Ammons: 1 

Am disturbed to hear of the probability of the adjournment 
of your legislature, and feel bound to remind you that my 
constitutional obligations with regard to the maintenance of 
order in Colorado are not to be indefinitely continued by the 
action of the state legislature. The federal forces are there 
only until the state of Colorado has time and opportunity to 
resume sovereignty and control in the matter. I cannot con¬ 
ceive that the state is willing to forego her sovereignty or to 
throw herself entirely upon the government of the United 
States, and I am quite clear that she has no constitutional right 


1 United Mine Workers Journal, Nov. 5, 1914. 


34 I ] PRESIDENT WILSON , jpij-jpjy 93; 

to do so when it is within the power of her legislature to take 
effective action. 1 / 

Governor Ammons replied on the same day, saying 
that the legislature had authorized a million-dollar bond 
issue, that as soon as these bonds could be issued funds 
would be available and the state could control the situation, 
that a commission of mediation had been appointed to settle 
the strike, and that other measures had been passed. 2 How¬ 
ever, on May 19 the operators announced that they would 
not consider mediation by the commission, since they had 
“ nothing to mediated 3 And the Governor found that it 
was easier to have the legislature authorize a sale of bonds 
than it was to sell them.' 4 The activities of the state of 
Colorado did not obviate the necessity for federal troops 
until after the strike was over. 

On April 29 President Wilson had directed the Secretary 
of Labor to make another attempt to mediate the strike. 
For that purpose the latter asked Hywd Davies, president 
of the Kentucky Mine Operators Association, and W. R. 
Fairley of Alabama, an officer of the United Mine Workers, 
to go to the strike district and attempt a settlement. 5 These 
two spent several months in Colorado, the one mostly with 
the operators getting their side of the case, the other with 
the miners. Finally, late in the summer of 1914, they 
drew up a “ tentative basis of adjustment ”, to be approved 
by both operators and miners in order to bring the strike to 
an end. 

This plan was submitted to President Wilson, and on 

1 United Mine Workers Journal, May 21, 1914. 

*N. Y. Times, May 17, 1914. 

z lbid., May 20, 1914. 

*Rep. Com., op. cit., vol. vii, p. 6416. 

6 N. Y. Times, April 30, 1914. 


94 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [342 

September 5 he proposed it to both sides. The basis of ad¬ 
justment was to be as follows : 

^ There should be enforced a three-year truce, subject to 
the following conditions: 

1. The mining laws of the state were to be enforced. 

2. AM strikers not guilty of violation of law were to be 
given employment. Where the miner’s place was filled he 
was to be given employment as a miner at the same or at 
another mine of the company. 

3. There was to be no intimidation of union or non-union 
men. 

4. The current scale of wages, rules, and regulations for 
each mine was to be printed and posted. 

5. Each mine was to have a grievance committee elected 
by employees. The members of the committee were to be 
employees of at least six months standing, and married men 
were to be in the majority. Grievances not settled individ¬ 
ually were to be taken up by the committee. If it could not 
settle a matter it was to go to a commission of three men, 
one of them representing the miners, one the operators, and 
the third to be appointed by the President. 

6. During the life of the truce, as a condition of the estab¬ 
lishment of the above machinery, 

a. The claim for contractual relations was to be waived. 

b. No mine guards, with the exception of the necessary 
watchmen, were to be employed. 

c. The presence of troops was to be made unnecessary. 

d. There was to be no picketing, parading, colonizing, 
or mass campaigning by representatives of labor organiza¬ 
tions, which would interfere with mine work during the 
truce. 

e. The decisions of the commission were to be binding 
and final during the truce. 


343] PRESIDENT WILSON, 95 

f. There was to be no suspension of work during in¬ 
vestigation and adjustment. 

g. There was to be no suspension of the mines over six; 
consecutive days pending the dispute. 

h. Wilful violations of these conditions were to be sub¬ 
ject to the penalties of the commission, the expenses of 
which were to be shared equally by employers and employees. 

In a letter accompanying the proposal, the President 
wrote: 

I feel justified in addressing you with regard to the present 
strike situation in Colorado because it has lasted so long, has 
gone through so many serious stages, and is fraught with so 
many possibilities that it has become of national impor¬ 
tance. . . . 

I am now obliged to determine if I am justified in using the 

Army of the United States indefinitely for police purposes_ 

I recommend [the tentative basis] for your most serious con¬ 
sideration. I hope that you will consider it as if you were 
acting for the whole country, and I beg that you will regard 
it as urged upon your acceptance by myself with very deep 
earnestness. 1 

The President’s proposal was considered by a special 
miners’ convention called for the purpose at Trinidad, 
Colorado, and on September 16 it was approved by a vote 
of 83 to 8. 2 Meanwhile the Colorado Fuel and Iron Co., 
with the help of Mr. Rockefeller’s staff, 3 was preparing its 
answer to the President. On September 22 President Wel- 
born replied to the proposal, accepting it as regards the en¬ 
forcement of the statutes, but rejecting practically all the 

1 Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1914, pp. 40-41. 

2 Ibid., p. 42. 

2 See Letter Welborn to Murphy, Sept. 18, Rep. Com., op. cit., vol. vii, 
p. 6691. 


9 6 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [344 

rest. 1 On the same day the other operators sent their reply 
to the President, taking the same position. 2 For some time 
after hopes were entertained at the White House that the 
postion of the operators might change, but by the middle of 
October the President admitted that chances of acceptance 
of the plan had passed. 3 

The strike continued, and numerous plans were suggested 
to the President for handling the situation. Chief among 
them was a proposal made by the miners that the govern¬ 
ment take over the mines and operate them. It was also 
suggested that the government close the mines and not 
permit them to operate until the companies were willing to 
settle. The administration especially considered the first 
plan, but upon consultation with officials as to its legality, 
decided that it had no legal warrant.' 4 

On November 30 the President made his final move in the 
direction of a settlement. He appointed Seth Low, Charles 
W. Mills, and Patrick Gilday as a commission to go to 
Colorado. In a statement explaining the purpose of the 
commission the President said: 

I think the country regretted [the operators’ decision concern¬ 
ing the proposal of September] and was disappointed that 
they should take so uncompromising a position. I have waited 
and hoped for a change in their attitude, but now fear that 
there will be none. And yet I do not feel that I am at liberty 
to do nothing in the presence of circumstances so serious and 
distressing. Merely to withdraw the federal troops and leave 
the situation to clear and settle itself would seem to me to be 
doing something less than my duty after all that has occurred. 

l N. Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1914. 

1 Ibid., Sept. 24, 1914. 

3 United Mine Workers Journal, Oct. 22, 1914. 

*N. Y. Times, Nov. 25, Dec. 9, 1914. 


PRESIDENT WILSON, 


345 ] 


1913-1917 97 ! 


I have, therefore, determined to appoint the commission con¬ 
templated in the plan of temporary settlement, notwithstand¬ 
ing the rejection of that plan by the mine operators, and thus 
at least to create the instrumentality by which like troubles and 
disputes may be amicably and honorably settled in the near 
future, in the hope .... that both parties may .... make 
use of this instrumentality of peace and render strife of [this 
kind] .... impossible of repetition. 1 


By this time the strikers were in distressing circum¬ 
stances, the strike had evidently been proven a disastrous 
failure, and the union officials realized the fruitlessness of 
continuing it. On December 8 the Executive Board of the 
United Mine Workers recommended to a miners’ convention 
at Denver that the strike be called off, calling attention to the 
President’s appointment of a commission, and deeming it 
“ the part of wisdom to accept his suggestion and terminate 
the strike ”. Two days later the convention formally voted 
the strike at an end, directed the miners to apply at once 
for their former positions, and recommended that efforts to 
organize the miners in Colorado' be continued. 2 

On hearing of the miners’ action President Wilson wired 
Governor Ammons, asking if it would be safe to withdraw 1 
federal troops. The Governor replied, requesting that 
troops be kept in the strike zone for the time being, since 
he feared that the strikers might attempt reprisals on the 
mines, the companies having thus far refused all their ap¬ 
plications for work. 3 The troops were permitted to remain 
for the rest of the month, but on January 1, 1915, condi¬ 
tions having become more satisfactory, their withdrawal 
commenced. By January 10 all of them had departed. 4 

1 United Mine Workers Journal, Dec. 3, 1914. 

'Ibid., Dec. 17, 1914; N. Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1914* 

* N. Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1914* 

4 Annual Reports of the War Department, vol. i, 1915, P- I 5 2 - 


gS LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [346 

The strike over, the commission appointed by the Presi¬ 
dent found itself in a rather awkward position. It proceeded 
to Colorado, however, made an investigation, and reported 
on February 23, 1915. 1 Its report appears strangely in¬ 
significant, after an examination of all the other available 
material on the strike. It describes conditions in Colorado 
as more or less harmonious, and it approves the newly in¬ 
troduced Colorado Plan, the* company union arrangement 
to which Mr. Rockefeller was converted by Mackenzie King, 
but which was quite actively opposed by the Colorado Fuel 
and Iron Company officials during the strike as a concession 
to the union which the latter would publish to the world as 
a victory. 2 

This strike is perhaps the best instance available of the 
unsuccessful use of the Presidential influence to end a dis¬ 
pute. 3 It is rarely that one can find an instance in which 
continually repeated requests for settlement addressed by* 
the executive to a contestant elicit no concessions. There 
are on record in this case five entirely distinct and separate 
attempts on the part of the President and his officials to 
bring the strike to an end by mediation, with at least four 
of which attempts he had a direct connection. It is not 
often that a group of employers or of employees dares to 
face such a long and concentrated attack of public opinion 
as must come from a persistent refusal to be affected by 
the requests of the President of the United States. That 
the President in this case did all that he could do in the 
way of mediation is apparent. 

1 House Document 859, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 

2 See letter of Bowers to Rockefeller, Aug. 16, 1914, Rep. Com., op. 
cit., vol. ix, p. 8441. 

8 The fact that the miners gave the appointment of the commission as 
a reason for ending the strike seems more like a polite gesture than 
a statement of fact. 


347] PRESIDENT WILSON , i 9 i 3 -i 9 i 7 gg 

Enough attention has also been given to the use of fed¬ 
eral troops in the strike to show that the policy followed for 
the most part was an enlightened and satisfactory one. 
Especially does this appear true when comparison is made 
with the use of troops in some of the earlier instances. In 
Colorado the President himself saw to it that troops were 
used for the only valid reasons which excuse their use in 
domestic troubles, that is, to preserve the peace and the law, 
and to prevent disturbances when the state government is 
unable to do these things itself. Neither side in the strike 
could with justice complain of the partiality of the troops, 
and the public interest was at the same time entirely pro¬ 
tected by their use. 

The question that remains unanswered is whether Mr. 
Wilson should have made attempts of a different sort in 
order to end the strike. There were no precedents which 
he could have followed, had he decided to take over the 
mines and put them under federal operation or to close 
them. It is doubtful, under the circumstances, whether such 
a step would have been a wise one. Such procedure was, 
as already indicated, of questionable legal validity. The 
further consideration that after all the strike was compar¬ 
atively unimportant as far as it affected the welfare of the 
country as a whole is to be called to mind. The coal pro¬ 
duced in Colorado, though important locally, was only a 
small proportion of the total tonnage, and the strike itself 
concerned only a few thousand men. 1 

1 There was one other instance in 1914 of the President’s sending 
troops to the scene of a strike. In April of that year the Bache- 
Denman Company, operating coal mines in Hartford Valley, Arkansas, 
tried to introduce the open shop. Considerable picketing and some 
violence took place when the men struck. The company obtained an 
injunction from the federal court to prevent interference with its 
operations. Later the court appointed Franklin Bache, one of the 
owners of the company, as a receiver under the court’s orders. From 


IOO 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [348 


3. THE THREATENED STRIKE OF ENGINEERS AND FIREMEN 
ON THE WESTERN RAILWAYS, I914 

In October, 1913, the officers O'f the Brotherhood of Loco¬ 
motive Engineers and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire¬ 
men and Enginemen presented demands for important wage 
increases and changes in working rules, largely connected 
with wages, to the managers representing 98 western rail¬ 
roads. The managers! and the union officials held confer¬ 
ences in Chicago during the next seven or eight months, but 
found it impossible to come to any agreement. Meanwhile 
a strike vote had been taken and the employees were ready 
to quit work if no satisfactory agreement could be ob¬ 
tained. 3 

Finally, on July 14, negotiations were broken off and a 
serious strike threatened the country. 2 A week later the 
United States Board of Mediation and Conciliation, es¬ 
tablished under the Newlands Act, took a hand in trying to 
effect a settlement. The mediation proceedings extended 
for some time, but were unsuccessful because the railway rep¬ 
resentatives declined to accept any of the proposals of the 

then on more violence occurred, until finally, early in November, the 
court asked for federal troops to aid in enforcing its orders. Presi¬ 
dent Wilson sent 250 men to the scene, the troops arriving.November 4, 
and he issued at the same time a proclamation ordering the dispersal 
of unlawful assemblages in the district. The miners were not averse 
to the sending of federal trooops, which they preferred to the presence 
of state militia. The strike was finally settled when the control of 
the property passed by ..purchase into the hands of the United Mine 
Workers on January 19, 1915. The federal troops left the district in 
the middle of February. See the N. Y. Times, Nov. 4 and 5, 1914, 
Jan. 21, 1915; Wilson, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances, pp. 317, 
321. 

1 Lauck, Railway Labor Arbitration, -Report of the U. S. Board of 
Mediation and Conciliation. Washington, 1916, p. 457. For the de¬ 
mands of the men see ibid., pp. 459-463. 

2 N. Y Times, July 15., 1914. 


ioi: 


349] PRESIDENT WILSON, 

mediators unless certain counter demands of the railroads 
were also considered. Against this stand the employees’ 
representatives strongly protested. The mediators then 
tried to induce the parties to arbitrate the men’s demands 
under the Newlands Act. The men finally agreed to this, 
but the railway managers insisted that their own counter de¬ 
mands be arbitrated with those of the employees. 1 

With the situation at a standstill the Board of Media¬ 
tion asked President Wilson to use his influence. On July 
31 the Brotherhood presidents made a public statement an¬ 
nouncing that the strike order would go into effect August 
7 if the railway managers did not accept the plan of settle¬ 
ment which had been proposed by the Board of Mediation. 
They asserted that since the managers were the first to ap¬ 
peal to the board for its aid in avoiding a strike they ought 
to 'accept the plan which it supported. 2 The next day Pres¬ 
ident Wilson had separate conferences with the managers 
and with the Brotherhood chiefs at the White House, 3 and 
urged them to arbitrate the controversy. The managers 
promised him that they would give the proposal their fur¬ 
ther consideration. 4 

Meanwhile the war in Europe had just begun. The 
panic and uneasiness which the reports announcing the entry 
into it of one great nation after another caused in this 
country will be readily recalled. Taking this feeling of dis¬ 
quiet as his leading motive, the President wrote on August 
2 to A. W. Trenholm, Chairman of the Conference Com¬ 
mittee of Railway Managers. After referring to the pre¬ 
vious day’s conference at the White House he continued: 

1 Report of the U. S. Board of Mediation and Conciliation, 1913-1917. 
Washington, 1918, p. 21. 

3 N. Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1914. 

3 Rep. of Board., op. cit., p. 22. 

4 N. Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1914. 


102 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [35a 

I am sure that you appreciate the extreme gravity of the 
•situation into which the country and your roads would bd 
plunged if the strike now threatened should unhappily occur. 
In view of world wide conditions, unparallelled in recent 
history, which have arisen in the last few days, it is obvious 
that the suspension of business on roads serving more than 
half the territory of the United States would be a calamity of 
incalculable magnitude. The situation has reached a crisis 
which hardly permits a full consideration of the merits of the 
controversy, and I feel that in the circumstances I can ap¬ 
peal with confidence to your patriotism and to your regard 
for the public welfare to make whatever sacrifice is necessary 
to avert a national disaster. The mediators under the New- 
lands law were impelled to propose a certain plan of arbitra¬ 
tion because they were fully convinced, as I am also* convinced, 
that under existing conditions no other peaceful solution of 
the dispute is possible. For these reasons, I very earnestly 
urge the acceptance of that plan, even though you may regard 
it as in some respects unfair to the interests you represent; 
and I am certain that in so doing you will perform an invalu¬ 
able public service which will be everywhere deeply applauded 
and deeply appreciated. 

The next day, after a meeting, the managers notified the 
President through Mr. Trenholm that they would yield to 
his request. The concluding part of their message follows: 

In view .... of the situation as you have presented it, and 
of your appeal to our patriotism and to our regard for public 
welfare, we beg to express to you herewith our acceptance of 
the plan of arbitration proposed. 1 

On the same day, August 3, the managers and employees 
signed an agreement to arbitrate under the Newlands Act. 
By August 11 the four members of the board of arbitration 
representing the parties to the dispute had been chosen. 

1 Rep. of Board., op. cit., p. 22. 


PRESIDENT WILSON, 


351] 


1913-1917 io 3 


These four found it impossible, however, to agree on the 
two impartial members, and under the terms of the law the 
latter were named by the U. S. Board of Mediation and 
Conciliation on November 21. The men thus chosen were 
Judge J. C. Pritchard, of the U. S. Circuit Court, and 
Charles Nagel, an attorney of St. Louis. On November 
30 the hearings before the board commenced, and on April 
30 the award was handed down. 1 It conceded only a small 
increase to the employees, and made only a few of the 
changes in working rules which had been demanded. It 
was an award distinctly unfavorable to the Brotherhoods. 2 

Meanwhile considerable complaint and difficulty were oc¬ 
casioned because of the membership of Charles Nagel on 
the board. On April 26, 1915, Brotherhood Presidents 
Stone and Carter had sent sharp protests to President Wil¬ 
son, to Judges Chambers and Knapp of the U. S. Board 
of Mediation and Conciliation, and to Judge Pritchard, of 
the board of arbitration. They asserted that Mr. Nagel 
was a co-executor in the Busch estate, which owned stocks 
and bonds in 21 railways, and protested against the de¬ 
cisions which a board with him on it as a neutral member 
would hand down. After a conference on the 271th Pres¬ 
ident Wilson and Messrs. Chambers and Knapp asked the 
Brotherhood chiefs that the protests be withheld from the 
board of arbitration. It was too late to do this, however, 
since they had already been filed. 3 

On April 30, after a conference with Judge Knapp, Pres¬ 
ident Wilson decided that there was no good reason for the 
withdrawal of Mr. Nagel, since the employees knew that 
he was a trustee of the Busch estate and had not protested 


1 Rep. of Board, op. cit. pp. 23, 24, 25. 

5 Ibid., pp. 23-25; Lauck, op. cit., p. 493; editorial, AT. Y. Times, May 

2, I9I5- 

3 N. Y. Times, May 1, 1915. 


104 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [352 

his selection when he was appointed. On the same day, 
however, Messrs. -Stone and Carter denied that they had 
known of Mr. Nagel’s connections, and issued a statement 
saying that “ candor compels us to state that we have been 
grossly deceived in being compelled to submit our cases to 
a jury upon which sat not only two railroad officials, but 
also one alleged neutral arbitrator, who has shown by his 
conduct and demeanor throughout the whole hearing that he 
was a violent partisan of the (railroads. 1 

The next day the delegates of the Brotherhoods met at 
Chicago. They declared that the award was a joke and the 
arbitration a farce; that they had “ played in a game with 
the cards stacked against them ”; that the wage increase 
didn’t “ amount to carfare ”; that Mr. Nagel had been 
moved throughout by his “ class consciousness ” ; but they 
ended by deciding to accept the award and to file no protest 
against it. 2 

The incident of the protest against Mr. Nagel was greatly 
to be regretted. The fault seems to have rested on the U. 
S. Board for appointing him under the circumstances, and 
on him for having accepted appointment. It is probable 
that no one at the time gave any thought to his connection 
with an estate owning railroad securities. President Wil¬ 
son’s decision, under the circumstances, seems to have been 
justifiable. It was rather late for the Brotherhoods to pro¬ 
test. The affair is worth consideration because it increased 
the dislike of the railway employees for arbitration by 
“ so-called neutral ” outsiders, a dislike which later oc¬ 
casioned the necessity for further exercise of the President’s 
influence to avert strikes. 

The whole incident is significant not alone because it 

1 N. Y. Times, May 1, 1915. 

2 Ibid., May 2, 1915. 


PRESIDENT WILSON , 


1913-1917 


105 


353] 

shows the influence of the President in averting a strike 
involving over 50,000 men and threatening serious harm to 
a large part of the United States, but also because it was 
among the first of many similar pleas for industrial peace 
made by President Wilson, based on grounds of patriotism 
and war necessity. 

4. THE EASTERN OHIO COAL STRIKE, ’I914-I915 

The President, in 1915, made an unsuccessful attempt to 
settle a strike of coal miners in eastern Ohio. The strike, 
which was due to a dispute over the terms of an agreement 
embodying the provisions of a recently passed Ohio law 
which required that miners be paid on the run-of-the-mine 
basis rather than the screened-coal basis, began April 1, 1914, 
and was not finally settled until more than a year later. In 
January, 1915, mediators from the Department of Labor 
attempted a settlement, but the miners refused to accept less 
than 47 cents per ton for machine-mined coal and declined 
to arbitrate, while the operators insisted on not paying more 
than 44.61 cents. The mediators, therefore, failed to ac¬ 
complish their purpose. 

Further attempts were made by the Secretary of Labor 
early in March, but as these also failed, President Wilson 
met the operators on March 12. After this meeting the 
President consulted with the mediators and asked them to 
submit a basis of settlement to him. This they did on 
March 17. It was expected for some time after that Mr. 
Wilson would submit this basis to the miners and ask them 
to arbitrate the issue, but there is no record of such a re¬ 
quest from him. The miners having refused previous of¬ 
fers to arbitrate, and being unwilling to accept less than 47 
cents, the President seems to have preferred to keep his 
hands off. The strike was finally settled through the efforts 


I06 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [354 

of the Governor of Ohio, who brought the parties to¬ 
gether and on May 8 succeeded in getting an agreement. 1 

5. THE THREATENED RAILWAY STRIKE OF I916. 

THE ADAMSON ACT 

On March 29, 19:16, the four railway Brotherhoods, 
consisting of engineers, conductors, firemen, and trainmen 
on practically all roads in the United States, adopted de¬ 
mands to be presented to the railway managers. These de¬ 
mands were concerned principally with the introduction of 
the eight-hour-day-100-mi le-run standard as a day’s work in 
■the freight service, and the payment for all time over eight 
hours per day at the rate of time and a half. At the same 
time the chiefs of the Brotherhoods, which were acting con- 
certedly, notified the railway managers of the desired changes 
and requested that all the railroads join together for the pur¬ 
pose of handling the proposals at one and the same time 
through a joint committee of all the roads. 

About a month later the roads replied in a more or less 
uniform manner, neither accepting, rejecting, nor modifying 
the demands made on them, but proposing that the whole 
question of compensation in the classes of service affected 
be opened up for consideration and disposal. On May 18, 
according to the union’s request, the railroads organized the 
National Conference Committee of Railway Managers. 2 

From June 1 to June 15 the representatives of the rail¬ 
ways and of the Brotherhoods held wage conferences in 
New York City. On the 14th the men made a definite de- 

1 For the incidents of the strike and' the issues involved see United 
Mine Workers Journal from March 1914 to June 1915, especially the 
issues of April 2 and April 30, 1914, and Jan. 21, Feb. 4 and 18, April 
1, and May 13, 1915. See also the Cincinnati Enquirer, March 11, 13, 
19, and 25, 1915; The Survey, May 29, 1915, vol. 34, p. 190, and the 
Report of the Secretary of Labor for 1915, p. 24. 

3 Report of the U. S. Eight Hour Commission, Washington, 1918, p. 8. 


355] PRESIDENT WILSON, i 9 i 2 -i 9 i 7 107 

mand for information as to whether the managers would 
accept and apply the propositions for the eight-hour day and 
time and a half for overtime. On the next day the man¬ 
agers declined to accept the proposals and suggested that 
the whole matter, including their own as well as the Brother¬ 
hood demands, be submitted to arbitration by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, or by a board constituted under 
the provisions of the Newlands Act. This proposal was de¬ 
clined by the men, whose experience with arbitration had 
not left them favorably disposed toward it. The Brother¬ 
hood chiefs, on the break-up of the conference, ordered that 
a strike vote on the demands be taken. 1 

At a joint meeting of the managers and the men, taking 
place on August 8, the former were notified that the men 
had voted overwhelmingly in favor of a strike if no satis¬ 
factory agreements were made. 2 The managers again of¬ 
fered to arbitrate and again the men refused. On the next 
day the railway representatives proposed that the unions 
join them in invoking the aid of the U. S. Board of Media¬ 
tion and Conciliation to effect a settlement. This the men 
declined to do, but they consented to give the board a chance 
to mediate the controversy. 3 

Some time previously Judge Chambers of the U. S. Board 
had consulted with President Wilson concerning the threat¬ 
ened strike, and when the meeting of August 8 took place 
he was in New York, ready, with the President’s approval, 
to offer the services of the board if a break came. 4 Accord¬ 
ingly, the board responded promptly to the manager’s call 
and commenced work on August 9. After working for 

1 Report of the U. S. Eight Hour Com., op. cit., p. 9; The Railway 
Conductor, July 1916, p. 528. 

2 Rep. Com., op. cit., p. 8; N. Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1916. 

3 The Railway Conductor, Sept., 1916, p. 671. 

4 N. Y. Times, Aug. 4 and 9, 1916. 


I0 g LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [356 

several days with both sides, the mediators, who could obtain 
no concession from the men and none except the arbitra¬ 
tion proposal from the managers, announced on August 12 
that their efforts at obtaining a settlement had failed. 1 At 
the same time they notified the parties concerned that the 
President desired conferences with them before a final break 
was made. 

On the 13th Mr. Wilson sent requests for conferences to 
the two sides, of which the following letter to Elisha Lee, 
Chairman of the National Conference Committee of Rail¬ 
way Managers, is an example: 

I have learned with surprise and with keen disappointment 
that an agreement concerning the settlement of the matters in 
controversy between the railroads and their employees has 
proved impossible. A general strike on the railroads would 
at any time have a most far-reaching and injurious effect upon 
the country. At this time the effect would be disastrous. I 
feel that I have the right, therefore, to request, and I do hereby 
request, as the head of the Government, that before any final 
decision is arrived at I may have a personal conference with 
you here. I shall hold myself ready to meet you at any time 
you may be able to reach Washington. 2 

On the 14th and 15th the President had separate con¬ 
ferences with the managers and the four Brotherhood chiefs. 
The latter told the President that they had no power to 
agree to arbitrate, and that only the 600 district chairmen, 
who were in New York at the time, had that power. Mr. 
Wilson then requested that they come to Washington, and 
on the 16th they arrived in the city. 3 

A day or two later the President made the following pro¬ 
posals for a settlement of the controversy: 

1 N. Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1916. 

2 Ibid., Aug. 14, 1916. 

3 Ibid., Aug. 15, 16, 17, 1916. 


PRESIDENT WILSON, 


1913-1917 


109 


357] 

Concession of the eight-hour day. 

Postponement of the other demand, as to payment for 
overtime, and the counter suggestions of the railway managers, 
until experience actually discloses the consequences of the 
eight-hour day. 

In the meantime the constitution, by authority of Congress, 
of a commission or body of men, appointed by the President, 
to observe, investigate, and report upon those consequences, 
without recommendation. 

Then such action upon the facts as the parties to the pres¬ 
ent controversy may think best. 1 

The proposals were a compromise of the demands of the 
men. Under the then existing conditions, with a standard 
ten-hour-day-100-mile-run basis, the men were paid for a 
day’s work after completing ten hours, or after accomplish¬ 
ing a run of 100 miles even though this might be done in 
less than ten hours. Were the President’s plan accepted the 
men would receive a day’s pay after eight hours of work, 
regardless of the run accomplished, or after a run of 100 
miles, whether accomplished in eight hours or less. Thus 
an actual increase in wages would accrue to them even 
without the time and a half rate, for on runs that took over 
eight hours or were more than 100 miles in length they 
would receive extra pay pro rata, whereas under the then 
existing conditions, such pay would not be received until 
ten hours had elapsed. The proposal was by no means all 
that the men asked for, but it was a generous concession, 
granting more than half of their demands. 2 

The plan, which had been previously discussed rather fully 
by the managers, was rejected by them on the 17th. The 
President immediately sent the following telegram to the 
presidents of the railways: 

1 Hearings on the Threatened Strike, Senate Committee on Interstate 
Commerce, 1st 'Sess., 64th Congress. (Senate Document 549, p. 41. 

2 Ibid., p. 68. 


no 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [358 

Discussion of the matters involved in the threatened railway 
strike has reached a point which makes it highly desirable 
that I should personally confer with you at the earliest pos¬ 
sible moment, and with the presidents of any other railroads 
affected who may be immediately accessible. Hope you can 
make it convenient to come to Washington at once. 1 

On the next day, after a meeting of the 600 Brotherhood 
officials, the unions formally accepted the President’s pro¬ 
posals. On the same day thirty-one railway presidents 
likewise met Mr. Wilson and discussed his plan of settle¬ 
ment. They failed to accept it, however, but agreed to 
consider the matter further before giving the President 
their last word. 2 The next day the President issued a 
statement giving his plan to the public, and saying, “ This 
seems to me a thoroughly practical and entirely fair pro¬ 
gram, and I think the public has the right to expect its ac¬ 
ceptance.” 1 

The railway executives again met the President on Au¬ 
gust 19, rejected his proposals, and demanded arbitration as 
a matter of principle. Replying to them Mr. Wilson said 
that “ this is a condition and not a principle which we face. 
.... We must face the naked truth in this crisis. We 
must not discuss impractical things. We must get down to 
a basis on which this situation can be solved.” He pointed 
out that he favored arbitration, but that under the law it 
was impossible if one side refused it. “ If it should prove 
through experience that the eight-hour day imposed a new 
and heavy added burden to the cost of operation I will lend 
my influence personally and officially to influence the rate 
making body of the government to grant an increase in 
freight rates, if the findings of the federal commission show) 

1 N. Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1916. 

* Ibid., Aug. 19, 1916. 


PRESIDENT WILSON , 


1913-1917 


III, 


359] 


that such a course would be just.” At the conclusion of 
his appeal to the railway heads the President said, “ If a 
strike comes, the public will know where the responsibility 
rests. It will not be upon me.” After the meeting he sent 
telegrams to sixty-three other railway presidents not in 
Washington, evidently desiring that the responsibility should 
be borne by all of them. 1 

For the next few days Mr. Wilson had further confer¬ 
ences with the railway presidents and managers, who, though 
still unwilling to accept the proposal, displayed a fear that 
if it were accepted they had no guarantee of being able to 
raise their rates to meet the increased wages. Meanwhile 
the 600 union representatives were growing unruly and 
tired of waiting in Washington. Being notified that they 
were ready to leave the city, the President, on August 25, 
informed the railway heads that he must have their answer. 

The latter framed two separate sets of counter proposals 
for the President to submit to the union officials, who re¬ 
jected them and stood out for the President’s own plan. 
The first proposal recommended an investigation by some 
government authority or commission into all the facts of 
the case. Meanwhile there was to be no strike, and a law 
was to be passed similar to the Canadian law requiring in¬ 
vestigation before the calling of any strike. After a re¬ 
port had been made and the facts ascertained the railroads 
would be in a position to make a prompt answer to the 
President’s proposals. The second proposal of the rail¬ 
ways suggested that beginning September 1 they would 
keep separate accounts of the rates of pay on the eight-hour 
and on the ten-hour basis, and would pay over the differ¬ 
ence to the men if the question should be adjudged in their 
favor. Meanwhile the President was to appoint a com- 


1 N. Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1916. 


112 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [360 

mission to inquire into the matter and make an award, by* 
which the roads would abide. 1 

There still being a possibility of the acceptance of the 
President’s own plan if they were assured of an increase in 
rates to make up for an increase in costs involved in its 
acceptance, Mr. Wilson, on August 26, consulted with ad¬ 
ministration leaders in Congress, and asked them to have 
the Interstate Commerce Commission increased by two 
members so that it could handle rate cases promptly. He 
also asked that the Commission be empowered to take wage 
schedules into account in fixing rates, that Congress provide 
for a permanent arbitration board to hear railway labor dis¬ 
putes, and that it pass a resolution declaring itself of the 
opinion that rates should be increased if the eight-hour day 
put an extra burden on the railways. 2 

On August 27 the 600 district chairmen left Washington 
with conditional strike orders in their pockets. The next 
day it developed that in these secret orders, which were not 
to be opened until a few days later, directions had been 
given that the strike commence on all the roads at 7 A.M., 
September 4. On hearing of this, the President summoned 
the Brotherhood chiefs, who acknowledged the truth of the 
report, and on the President’s request that they have the 
orders rescinded, answered that they were beyond recall 
and that they could not be rescinded, according to the vote 
of the 600 chairmen, unless the President’s proposal were 
accepted by the railroads. On the same day the railway 
executives again rejected the plan and insisted on their final 
counter-proposal. 3 

Mr. Wilson having exhausted his resources in attempting 

1 Hearings, op. cit., p. 41; N. Y. Times, Aug. 22-Aug. 26. 

7 N. Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1916. 

3 Ibid., Aug. 28 and 29, 1916; Hearings, op. cit., p. 66; Congressional 
Record, vol. liii, Part 15, Appendix, p. 1956. 


PRESIDENT WILSON } 


1913-1917 


36l] 


”3 


to effect a voluntary settlement, and the most serious strike 
in its history facing the nation as a practical certainty unless 
the eight-hour day were granted, he appeared before Con¬ 
gress on August 29, and requested that the following be 
enacted into legislation: 

1. Immediate provision for the enlargement and admin¬ 
istrative reorganization of the Interstate Commerce Com¬ 
mission, so that it might deal with the many duties before 
it with more promptness and thoroughness. 

2. “ [The] establishment of an 8 hour day as the legal 
basis alike of work and wages, in the employment of all rail¬ 
way employees who are actually engaged in the work of 
operating trains in interstate transportation.” 

3. “ [The] authorization of the appointment by the Presi¬ 
dent of a small body of men to observe the actual results 
in experience of the adoption of the 8 hour day in railway 
transportation, alike for the men and the railroads; its ef¬ 
fects in the matter of operating costs, in the application of 
the existing practices and agreements to the new conditions, 
and in all other practicable aspects, with the provision that 
the investigators shall report their conclusions to Congress 
at the earliest possible date, but without recommendation as 
to legislative action; in order that the public may learn from 
an unprejudiced source just what actual developments have 
ensued.” 

4. Explicit approval by Congress of consideration by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission of whatever increase in 
freight rates would be necessitated by the adoption of the 
8 hour day. 

5. Amendment of the Newlands Act to provide compul¬ 
sory investigation into railway disputes before a strike or 
a lockout might be lawfully attempted. 

6. Lodgment in the President's hands, of power, in case 


H 4 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [362 

of military necessity, to take such control of the railroads 
as is necessary for military use, “ with authority to draft 
into the military service of the United States such train 
crews and administrative officials as the circumstances re¬ 
quire for their safe and efficient use.” 

This action of the President has been subject to so much 
adverse criticism that it seems best to give several excerpts 
from his address to Congress in support of his proposals. 
After describing the great hardships which would result 
from a strike of such magnitude the President continues: 

It has seemed to me, in considering the subject matter of the 
controversy, that the whole spirit of the time and the pre¬ 
ponderant evidence of recent economic experience spoke for 
the 8 hour day. It has been adjudged by the thought and ex¬ 
perience of recent years a thing upon which society is justified 
in insisting as in the interest of health, efficiency, contentment, 
and a general increase of economic vigor. The whole presump¬ 
tion of modern experience would, it seemed to me, be in its 
favor, whether there was arbitration or not, and the debat¬ 
able points to settle were those which affected its establish-* 
ment. . . . 

I unhesitatingly offered the friendly services of the admin¬ 
istration to the railway managers to see to it that justice was 
done the railroads in the outcome. I felt warranted in as¬ 
suring them that no obstacle of law would be suffered to stand 
in the way of their increasing their revenues to meet the ex¬ 
penses resulting from the change so far as the development 
of their business and of their administrative efficiency did 
not prove adequate to meet them. The railway managers 
based their decision to reject my counsel in this matter upon 
their conviction that they must at any cost to themselves or 
to the country, stand firm for the principle of arbitration 
which the men rejected. I based my counsel upon the indis¬ 
putable fact that there was no means of obtaining arbitration. 
The laws supplied none; earnest efforts at mediation had failed 


PRESIDENT WILSON, 


1913-1917 


3 ^ 3 ] 


1151 


to influence the men in the least. To stand firm for the prin¬ 
ciple of arbitration and yet not get arbitration seemed to me 
futile, and something more than futile, because it involved in¬ 
calculable distress to the country, and consequences in some 
respects worse than those of war, and that in the midst of 
peace. . . . 

I yield to no man in firm adherence, alike of conviction and 
purpose, to the principle of arbitration in industrial disputes; 
but matters have come to a sudden crisis in this particular 
dispute and the country has been caught unprovided with any 
practicable means of enforcing that conviction in practice (by 
whose fault we will not now stop to inquire). . . . 

Having failed to bring the parties to this critical controversy 
to an accommodation, therefore, I turn to you, deeming it 
clearly our duty as public servants to leave nothing undone 
that we can do to safeguard the life and interests of the nation. 11 ' 


Immediately after the President’s, address numerous 
measures to meet the strike situation were introduced in 
Congress. They provided that the* roads be placed under 
federal control and management under certain conditions, 
that the Brotherhoods be requested to postpone the strike 
for a week to give the Senate a chance to investigate, that 
receivers be appointed for the railroads in certain cases, 
that arbitration be made compulsory, etc., etc. On Au¬ 
gust 31 Representative Adamson introduced House Resolu¬ 
tion 17700, entitled “ A bill to establish an 8 hour day for 
employees of carriers engaged in interstate and foreign 
commerce, and for other purposes.” The measure was re¬ 
ferred to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce. 2 On the next day the committee reported the 
bill favorably, with only slight modifications, and no changes 
in principle. As thus reported the bill passed the House 

1 Congressional Record, vol. liii, pp. I 333 ! 5 “ I 3337 * 

2 Ibid., vol. liii, p. 13540 * 


H6 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [364 

on the same day by a vote of 239 to 56. 1 The measure was 
then taken up by the Senate and discussed on September 1 
and 2. On the latter day, the Senate having become ac¬ 
quainted with the situation through hearings before the 
Committee on Interstate Commerce on August 311, the bill 
was passed by a vote of 43 to 28. 2 On September 3 Pres¬ 
ident Wilson approved the bill, but it being Sunday, and 
the next day being Labor Day, he -signed it a second time 
on September 5. 3 

The bill, which came to be known as the Adamson Act, 
provided that “ beginning January first, 1917, eight hours 
shall, in contracts for labor and service, be deemed a day’s 
work and the measure or standard of a day’s work for the 
purpose of reckoning the compensation for services of all 
employees ” on railroads engaged in train operation in in¬ 
terstate commerce, excepting those not over 100 miles in 
length and excepting electric street and interurban roads; 
that the President appoint a commission of three to observe 
the operation and effects of the eight-hour standard work¬ 
day and report its findings to the President and Congress ; 
“ that pending the report of the commission herein provided 
for and for a period of 30 days thereafter the compensa¬ 
tion of railway employees subject to this Ad: for a standard 
eight hour work day shall not be reduced below the present 
standard day’s wage, and for all necessary time in excess 
of eight hours such employees shall be paid at a rate not less 
than the pro rata rate for such standard eight-hour work¬ 
day”; and finally, that violation of the Act be a misde¬ 
meanor punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. 4 

It will be observed that the measure practically enacted 

1 Congressional Record, vol. liii, pp. 13608^13609. 

8 Ibid., pp. 13566, 13610, 13655- 

1 Ibid., p. 14158. 

4 39 Stat. at Large, p. 721. 


PRESIDENT WILSON, 


365] 


1913-1917 II 7 


into law the provisions of the President’s original proposals 
to the railroads and the men, and further, that it enacted 
only two of his six recommendations to Congress. Those 
two, however, were the ones which were particularly de¬ 
signed to avert the threatened strike. 

Immediately on the passage of the act by the Senate the 
Brotherhood officials, on September 2, without waiting for 
the President to sign the bill, rescinded the strike order. 1 

The President and Congress, by their prompt action, had 
averted a great strike, but they had not settled the dispute. 
In November and December, 1916, the railroads brought 
many suits to enjoin the enforcement of the Adamson Act. 
By agreement between railroad counsel and the Attorney 
General it was arranged to continue all these cases except 
one, which was made a test case, to be expedited as much as 
possible. The roads agreed to keep their books and ac¬ 
counts so that if the constitutionality of the act were upheld 
the men could be paid from January 1, 1917, in accordance 
with the terms of the law. The case was argued before the 
Supreme Court on January 8, but the Court’s decision was 
delayed for some time. 2 

Meanwhile, however, considerable dissatisfaction pre¬ 
vailed among the railroad employees. The law which gave 
them the eight-hour day did not provide for a wage agree¬ 
ment with the roads for putting it into effect. When Jan¬ 
uary 1 came they were in the same position as before, and 
the situation promised that they would remain in that posi¬ 
tion for some time to come. By March unrest had reached 
such a point, due to the continuation of the old conditions, 
and the fear that the Supreme Court would decide against 
the Adamson Act, .that the Brotherhood chairmen notified 


*N. Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1916. 

J Report of the Eight Hour Commission, p. 10. 


H8 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [366 

the railway managers that a strike applying to men in the 
freight service would go into effect at 6 P.M., March 17, 
unless some satisfactory settlement were reached. 1 

On the 15th the union heads met with the railway manag- • 
ers. In answer to the men’s demands that the eight-hour day 
be put into effect at once, retroactive to January 1, the em¬ 
ployers refused to do anything until the Supreme Court 
rendered its decision, and offered, in case the law was de¬ 
clared unconstitutional, to arbitrate the matter through the 
Eight-Hour Commission. This proposal the Brotherhoods 
rejected, and notified the employers that the strike would go 
into effect on the 17th as planned. 2 

With danger of a strike once more at hand President 
Wilson, on March 16, wrote to the managers and the 
Brotherhood heads and appealed to them to reopen the 
question at issue: “ It is now the duty of every patriotic man 
to bring matters of this sort to immediate accommodation. 
The safety of the country against manifest perils affecting 
its own peace and the peace of the whole world makes ac¬ 
commodation absolutely imperative and seems to me to render 
any other choice or action inconceivable.” The President 
further notified them that he had appointed a committee of 
mediation, representing the Council of National Defense, to 
confer with them in order to bring about a settlement. The 
members of this body were Secretary of the Interior Frank¬ 
lin K. Lane, Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson, Presi¬ 
dent Daniel Willard of the Baltimore and Ohio, and Samuel 
Gompers.® 

On the 17th, at the request of the mediators, the Brother¬ 
hood chiefs sent out an order delaying the strike for 48 

l N. Y. Times, March 12, 1917. 

2 1 bid. j March 16, 1917. 

l Ibid., March 17, 1917. 


367] PRESIDENT WILSON, jpjj-jpjy 119 

hours. Conferences continued throughout that day and 
the next. Shortly after midnight of the 18 th, when the 
conference seemed hopelessly deadlocked, the mediators re¬ 
ceived word from the President, that in view of the increas¬ 
ing gravity of the international situation caused by the sink¬ 
ing of three American vessels by German submarines on 
the same day, he had decided that under no conditions 
should there be a strike. On receipt of this message the 
two sides immediately came to an agreement. By day¬ 
break of the 19th the agreement had been signed. 1 It put 
into effect the terms of the eight-hour law, but defined some¬ 
what more specifically the application of the eight-hour basis 
to existing schedules, and provided for a Commission of 
Eight, representing the roads: and the men, to decide dis¬ 
puted questions arising under it. On the same day, March 
19, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the! 
Adamson Act. 2 It is probable that the railroad managers, 
expecting the result, were in the position of conceding more 
gracefully to the President’s demand for a settlement on the 
night before. The basic eight-hour day had become an 
accomplished fact, and all danger of a strike on that issue 
was past.® 

It is apparent that though the passage of the Adamson 
Act averted a strike, it did not obtain the eight-hour day 
for railroad employees. That was not obtained until the 
railroads signed the agreement of March 19, 1917? though 
undoubtedly the enactment of the law made it easier to win 
the assent of the employers to this agreement. 

1 N. Y. Times, March 19, 20, 1917. 

2 Wilson v. New et al., 243 U. S. 332. 

zRep. Eight Hour Com., p. 10. Of course, neither the agreement 
between the roads and the men nor the Adamson Act itself limited 
hours of labor on the railways. -Since they provided only propor¬ 
tionate pay for over-time, they served rather to increase wages than 
to decrease hours. 


120 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [368 

There can be little question that it was the influence of the 
President which prevented the threatened strikes of Sep¬ 
tember, 1916, and March, 1917. As regards the latter, little 
discussion seems necessary. War between the United States 
and Germany threatened at any time. Two weeks later it 
was actually declared. To permit a great strike at such a 
time would have been without justification. The Presi¬ 
dent, in using pressure to avert it, seems to have been en¬ 
tirely justified. 

Concerning his connection with the Adamson Act, how¬ 
ever, there has been much unfavorable criticism. He was 
accused of surrendering the country to the Brotherhoods, 
of using a pliable Congress to create political support for 
himself in the campaign of 1916 at the expense of the rest 
of the country, etc., etc. It seems, that such charges, whether 
there be truth in them or not, are aside from the point. The 
facts were that the President had proposed a settlement 
which appeared fair and just. The Brotherhoods accepted 
this proposal and the railroads rejected it. The Brother¬ 
hoods were probably at fault in refusing to consider arbitra¬ 
tion. They were perhaps also in the wrong in refusing 
to delay the strike, though their belief that the railroads 
were profiting by every day of delay through the perfection 
of their arrangements to defeat the strike was doubtless 
justified by the facts. 1 But by August 29, 1916, it was not 
a question of which slide was in the right. It was a question 
of whether or not the. most disastrous strike in our history 
was to be averted. The employees had positively refused 
to arbitrate or to delay the strike. The railroads had just 
as positively refused to do anything but arbitrate. There 
was no existing law which could have forced the men to 
arbitrate, or the employers to concede their demands, and 


1 Hearings, op. cit., pp. 61, 67. 


PRESIDENT WILSON, 


1913-1917 


121 


369 ] 


the President had already done his utmost to bring about a 
voluntary settlement. 

There appear to have been several courses open to the 
President. One was to get an injunction against the strike 
on the ground that it would be a conspiracy in restraint of 
trade. But the Clayton Act, passed but two years earlier, 
had exempted , labor unions from the provisions of the 
anti-trust laws. President Wilson had given his strong 
support to that act. To have sought an injunction under 
such conditions would have been inconsistent and apparently 
unwarranted. Furthermore, even had an injunction been 
obtained, experience has shown that that would not in itself 
have prevented the strike. There is a great difference be¬ 
tween obtaining an injunction and enforcing it. 

A second course would have been to ask Congress for 
power to enable the administration to take over the rail¬ 
roads and operate them while a commission of arbitration 
was deciding the eight-hour question, the assumption being 
that the railroad employees would not strike against the 
government. It is extremely doubtful if Congress would 
have given the administration such power on a moment’s 
demand in 1916, with the United States not in the war, and 
the government quite unprepared to administer such power. 
It is to be doubted also whether the railway workers would 
have given up the strike simply because: the government 
rather than the roads became their employer. 

'Mr. Wilson might have chosen a third course by asking 
Congress to pass a law requiring arbitration of railway 
labor disputes. In his address to that body in August he 
did ask for an amendment to the Newlands Act providing 
for compulsory investigation of railway disputes before a 
strike or a lockout might be lawfully attempted. But he 
cannot be said to have emphasized such a measure, and his 
readiness to sign the Adamson Act without any provision 


122 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [370 

having been made for compulsory investigation indicates that 
he did not consider it a means of preventing the threatened 
strike. Yet it is reasonable to ask why, if the President 
favored arbitration in principle, he was not ready to ask 
Congress for a law which would make the calling of the 
threatened strike unlawful unless the disputants first sub¬ 
mitted to arbitration. In his address to Congress the Presi¬ 
dent pointed out that the laws supplied no means of com¬ 
pelling arbitration. Neither did the laws provide for a 
basic eight-hour day on the railroads. It would have been 
as easy, as far as his power was concerned, to have asked 
for the enactment of one as for the other. For the Presi¬ 
dent to have asked Congress for the enactment of a com¬ 
pulsory arbitration law would, of course, have evoked a 
tremendous opposition from labor. The President, having 
already placed all his influence behind a certain plan of 
settlement, which was accepted by the employees, would have 
been severely criticized had he given up this plan and in¬ 
sisted on the arbitration which the employers, refusing his 
proposal, had themselves demanded. It would probably 
have been better for the President to have postponed the 
making of a definite proposal until he knew that there was 
a likelihood of its being accepted. As it was, he shot his 
bolt early, and could consistently do nothing but insist on 
the acceptance of his plan. His sympathy with the demand 
for an eight-hour day, his pique at the employers because of 
their persistent refusal to accede to his request, and the cer¬ 
tain opposition of great numbers of voters were he .to change 
his stand, were also probably important factors in determin¬ 
ing his policy. Moreover Mr. Wilson, though favoring 
arbitration in principle, was probably opposed to compul¬ 
sory arbitration in times of peace. Had he asked Congress 
for a law making the arbitration of the dispute compulsory, 
his request, though arousing tremendous opposition the 


PRESIDENT WILSON 


371 ] 


1913-1917 12$ 


country over, might have been granted, but there is a ques¬ 
tion whether the enactment of such a law would have been 
effective in preventing the strike. The feelings of the rail¬ 
way employees were at fever heat, they were determined 
not to arbitrate, and after their hopes had been raised by the 
proposals of the President the shock of a disappointment 
might easily have resulted in a decision to defy the govern¬ 
ment. 

A fourth course would have been for the President to step 
aside and let the employees strike if they so wished, there 
being the probability that public opinion would have been 
so outraged that the strike could only last a short time be¬ 
fore a settlement was forced. Such a course would have 
involved more criticism and complaint than the course ac¬ 
tually taken. A strike involving but one class of employees, 
or one small section of the country, might be permitted to 
take place without a great deal of harm to the country as 
a whole. But this strike would have involved 400,000 em¬ 
ployees, practically all of those engaged in train operation 
throughout the country. Such a strike, at the end of a 
few days, would have caused untold hardships. 

There remained the course actually taken by the Presi¬ 
dent. It subjected him to the charge that he had permitted 
labor to hold up the government, but it seems, to have been 
the course most certain to prevent the strike, and it must be 
judged from that point of view, unless one assumes that 
a strike would have been preferable to what critics called 
“ a surrender to the domination of a class.” 

'However necessary one may consider Mr. Wilson’s action, 
one cannot ignore the possible consequences. In the last 
analysis the affair resolved itself into an attempt at en¬ 
forcement by law of the President’s proposals for settle¬ 
ment. It is evident that labor itself realized the danger of 
such a precedent, f or its leaders promptly declared that they 


124 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [372 

had not asked for Congressional legislation in its behalf. 
They saw clearly that the legislation might as easily have 
provided for the enforcement of proposals unfavorable to 
them. In war-time such compulsion as the government finds 
necessary for the successful accomplishment of its work 
or for the purpose of safeguarding public interest is doubt¬ 
less permissible, but it may be seriously questioned whether 
such a method can be justified in times of peace. Its use in 
the case of the threatened railway strike of 1916 cannot 
easily be defended, despite the fact that the occasion was 
as serious a one as any President is likely to face. 


CHAPTER V 


President Wilson : War-Time Activities 

From the moment that the United States declared war 
against Germany in April, 1917, there were two outstanding 
methods of participation on which the government con¬ 
centrated its energies. One was to make preparations for 
giving our allies aid in the shape of fighting men. The 
other was to produce as much as possible of the food and 
supplies needed by the allies and ourselves. To that end it 
was necessary to correct as far as possible peace-time ineffi¬ 
ciency and all other causes leading to decreased production. 
It was felt that all industrial disturbances involving suspen¬ 
sion of production must be avoided. In order to accomplish 
this, the governmental agencies engaged in war production 
began, in the summer of 1917, to establish various boards 
f or the settlement of labor disputes. Such boards were .all 
the more necessary because the continually rising cost of 
living caused strikes for higher wages to become more fre¬ 
quent. All of these war-time agencies cannot be discussed 
here. 1 Discussion will be limited to those boards in the 
creation of which the President took an active part, and to 
those instances in which he used his personal influence to 
end or avert a strike. 

1 For a thorough discussion of them see Bing, War Time Strikes and, 
their Adjustment, New York, 1921; and Watkins, Labor Problems and 
Labor Administration in the United States during the World War, 
Urbana, 1919. 

3731 I2 5 


126 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [374 

I. THE PRESIDENT'S MEDIATION COMMISSION ' 

In the summer of 1917 considerable unrest and numerous 
strikes developed in the Far West, especially in the copper 
and lumbering industries, in which continued production 
was essential for war purposes. The strikes in the copper 
districts of Arizona involved not alone a serious decrease in 
production. In Bisbee they were accompanied by forcible 
deportation of strikers, by objectionable treatment of union 
officials, and by other outrages. These conditions the 
Arizona Federation of Labor reported to President Gompers 
of the American Federation, requesting that he use his in¬ 
fluence to have them investigated. Mr. Gompers thereupon 
presented the employees’ position to President Wilson, who 
brought the matter to the attention of Secretary of War 
Baker, the Chairman of the Council of National Defense, 
and asked that the Council take it under advisement and de¬ 
termine what ought to be done. 

Late in August the Council reported to the President and 
suggested that he appoint a commission to investigate labor 
conditions in the western states, from which reports of un¬ 
rest and strikes continued to come. 1 On September 19 the 
following letter to the Secretary of Labor, made public the 
next day, was written by the President: 

I am very much interested in the labor situation in the moun¬ 
tain region and on the Pacific Coast. I have listened with 
attention and concern to numerous charges of misconduct and 
injustice that representatives both of employers and employees 
have made against each other. I am not so much concerned, 
however, with the manner in which they have treated each 
other in the past as I am desirous of seeing some kind of 
working arrangement arrived at for the future, particularly 
during the period of the war, on a basis that will be fair to all 
parties concerned. To assist in the accomplishment of that 

1 American Federationist, October, 1917, p. 846. 


375] PRESIDENT WILSON, WAR-TIME ACTIVITIES 12 y 

purpose, I have decided to appoint a commission to visit the 
localities where disagreements have been most frequent as my 
personal representatives. The commission will consist of Wm. 
B 1 Wilson, Secretary of Labor; Col. J. L. Spangler, of Penn¬ 
sylvania; Verner Z. Reed, of Colorado; John H. Walker, of 
Illinois; and E. P. Marsh, of Washington. Felix Frankfurter, 
of New York, will act as secretary of the commission. 

It will be the duty of the commission [to lend] sympathetic 
counsel and aid to the state government[s] in the development 
of a better understanding between laborers and employers,... 
to deal with employers and employees in a conciliatory spirit, 
seek to compose differences and allay misunderstanding and 
in any way that may be open to them to show the active in¬ 
terest of the National Government in furthering arrangements 
just to both sides . . . , [to call whenever] it is deemed ad¬ 
visable conferences of employers and employees .... with 
the purpose of working out a mutual understanding between 
them which will insure the continued operation of the industry 
on conditions acceptable to both sides . . . , to learn the real 
causes for any discontent which may exist on either side .... 
I would be pleased to have the commission report to me from 
time to time such information as may require immediate atten¬ 
tion. 1 

The commission thus appointed, which became known as 
the President’s Mediation Commission, soon began its task. 
It carried on investigations into conditions', used its good 
offices in settling various strikes, and accomplished much 
valuable work. More specifically, on November 6, 1917, it 
made a special report to the President on the Bisbee de¬ 
portations, recommending action by the Attorney General 
and by other authorities to punish offenders against the law. 2 
It settled the strikes in the copper-mining districts of 
Arizona, and set up agencies to handle future disputes and 

1 Official Bulletin, 'Committee on Public Information, Sept. 21, 1917. 

* Report on the Bisbee Deportations, Washington, 1918. 


I2 8 labor disputes AND THE PRESIDENT [376 

to improve relations between employers and employees. It 
settled an important dispute in the California oil fields and 
appointed administrators to take care of future relations. 
It ended a serious strike of telephone employees which had 
tied up to a considerable extent telephone communication in 
California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Nevada, and, 
as in the other cases, set up machinery for future adjust¬ 
ment. It investigated unrest in the lumber industry of the 
Pacific Northwest, and although the strike of the summer 
was practically over and had been defeated, it recommended 
the granting of the eight-hour day, for which the strike was 
fought, and the establishment of some means of collective 
bargaining. The commission was also instrumental in ef¬ 
fecting the settlement of a strike in the packing industry, 
involving nearly 100,000 men, and of serious consequences 
to the meat supply of the nation. In addition to ending the 
strike it secured the acceptance of Judge Samuel Alschuler 
as an arbitrator to determine wages, hours, and working* 
conditions. 1 The award 2 of the arbitrator, made on March 
30, 1918, secured peace in the industry for the duration of 
the war and for some time afterwards. 

In its report of January 9, 1918, the commission made 
valuable recommendations concerning war-time labor poli¬ 
cies. During the same month it investigated the Mooney 
case, reported to the President its belief that the conditions 
under which Mooney was sentenced were unjust, and rec¬ 
ommended that he use his good offices to secure a new 
trial. 3 Later in the year the President succeeded in secur¬ 
ing a commutation of Mooney's sentence to life imprison¬ 
ment. 4 

1 Report of the President’s Mediation Commission, Jan. 9, 1918, 
Washington, 1918. 

2 Monthly Labor Review, May, 1918, p. 115. 

a Official Bulletin, Jan. 28, 1918. 

l N. Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1918. 


377] PRESIDENT WILSON, WAR-TIME ACTIVITIES 129 

In February, 1918, the commission, at the request of the 
Council of National Defense, tried to bring about the ami¬ 
cable settlement of a street-car strike in St. Paul and Minne¬ 
apolis, but was unsuccessful. 1 After that its activities seem 
to have come to an end. It attempted in all its settlements 
to introduce the principle of collective bargaining and to 
set up machinery which would substitute quick settlement of 
disputes and amicable relations for industrial unrest and 
warfare. It is apparent that its appointment by the Pres¬ 
ident filled an important war need. By the time its activi¬ 
ties had ceased other agencies had been created to handle 
the problems which it had for the most part treated so suc¬ 
cessfully. 

2. miners' wages and strike penalties 

The Lever Act of August 10, 1917, put control over food 
and fuel in the hands of the President, in order that he might 
safeguard production in any way he thought desirable. On 
August 23 he appointed H. A. Garfield as U. S. Fuel Ad¬ 
ministrator. Soon after the Fuel Administration started to 
function, Mr. Garfield took over the matter of supervising 
wage agreements between miners and operators. A bitu¬ 
minous agreement was reached on October 6, 1917, provid¬ 
ing for an increase in wages, and for an automatic penalty 
clause to be introduced into wage contracts to prevent strikes 
and lockouts. The agreement was to be extended for the 
continuation of the war and not to exceed two years from 
April 1, 1918. It was to be put into effect provided the 
government, which had assumed control of fuel prices, per¬ 
mitted an advance in the price of coal sufficient to meet the 
burden of increased wages, 

A committee of the Fuel Administration soon after re¬ 
ported as to the amount of price increase necessary for the 

1 Monthly Labor Review, April, 1918, pp. 302-304. 


I3 o LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [378) 

purpose. This report the Fuel Administrator submitted to 
the President, who on October 27 ordered an increase in the 
price of coal, subject to certain conditions, one of which was 
that the increase should apply only to those districts in which 
the operators and miners agreed on a penalty clause pro¬ 
viding for the automatic collection of fines from employers 
and employees for lockouts and strikes. The penalties, 
which in most cases were fixed at $1 per day per worker 
to be paid by whichever side was responsible for the suspen¬ 
sion, played a considerable part in preventing strikes and 
lockouts in the bituminous industry during the war. 1 

In November, 1917, the President, at the request of the 
Fuel Administrator, granted an increase in the price of an¬ 
thracite coal to permit an increase in wages, but in this case, 
Mr. Garfield pointed out that the Anthracite Board of Con¬ 
ciliation sufficed to prevent strikes, and no automatic penalty 
clause was required. 2 

3. RAILWAY LABOR DISPUTES 

In the fall of 1917 the rapidly increasing cost of living led 
to considerable agitation for wage increases among railroad 
employees. Attempts made by the Brotherhood officials to 
secure increases from the railroads proved unsuccessful. 
By November talk of a strike became quite common, and 
several of the unions had decided to take strike votes. 8 
Preliminary efforts made by Judge 'Chambers of the U. S. 
Board of Mediation and Conciliation to secure an agree¬ 
ment to arbitrate or mediate the controversy did not prove 
successful. 4 

On November 14 President Wilson wrote to Judge 

1 Final Report, U. S. Fuel Administrator, 1917-1919, p. 209. 

* Official Bulletin, Dec. 3, 1917. 

*N. Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1917. 

K Ibid., Nov. 15, 1917. 


379] PRESIDENT WILSON, WAR-TIME ACTIVITIES !£! 

Chambers, expressing his interest in the latter’s efforts to 
prevent a strike, and continuing: 

I take it for granted that your efforts will succeed, because 
it is inconceivable to me that patriotic men should now for a 
moment contemplate the interruption of the transportation 
which is so absolutely necessary to the safety of the nation 
and to its success in arms, as well as to its whole industrial 
life. . . . 

The last thing I should wish to contemplate would be the pos¬ 
sibility of being obliged to take any unusual measures to> 
operate the railways, and I have so much confidence that the 
men you are dealing with will appreciate the patriotic motives 
underlying your efforts that I shall look forward with assur¬ 
ance to your success. 

A few days later the Brotherhood chiefs agreed to permit 
mediation of the controversy, and on the 19th the railway 
managers, in a letter to Judge Chambers, agreed not only to 
arbitrate the issue, 'but went on to say that, as “ no inter¬ 
ruption of continual railroad operation can be tolerated 
under war conditions, we are ready, should any crisis now 
arise, unreservedly to place our interests in the hands of the 
President for protection, and for disposition as he may de¬ 
termine is necessary in the public interest.” 1 2 

Two days later President Wilson met the four Brother¬ 
hood head's and received a promise from them that they 
would not call a strike. They agreed to abide by any form 
of settlement the President might urge in case no agreement 
with the carriers could be reached. 3 Further negotiations 
between the roads and their employees again having met 
with failure, and dissatisfaction and unrest still threatening 

1 Official Bulletin, Nov. 15, 1917. 

2 N. V. Times, Nov. 17, 20, 1917. 

* Ibid., Nov. 23, 1917. 


X ^ 2 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [380 

a strike, the President, who in a proclamation of December 
26 had announced government control of the railways to 
take effect on December 28, called the leaders of the Brother¬ 
hoods for another conference. The latter agreed, at the 
President’s request, to withhold their wage demands until 
government control got started, and for a period of thirty 
days after December 31. 1 

On January 18, 1918, Secretary of the Treasury William 
G. McAdoo, who had been appointed Director General of the 
Railways, issued an order creating a Railroad Wage Com¬ 
mission. After an exhaustive study of general wage con¬ 
ditions the commission recommended a wage increase on 
April 30, 1918. Some weeks later Mr. McAdoo ordered 
an increase in wages to meet the conditions which had 
threatened to produce a railway strike in the previous winter. 
Adjustment boards to handle labor problems were set up 
and strikes on the roads were avoided during the war by 
means of them. 2 

4. THE SHIPBUILDING LABOR ADJUSTMENT BOARD 

On August 20, 1917, the Emergency Fleet Corporation, 
which was in charge of the government’s war-time shipbuild¬ 
ing program, entered into an agreement with the Metal 
Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor, 
creating the U. S. Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board. 
The board was to have jurisdiction over disputes concerning 
wages and working conditions in shipbuilding plants oper¬ 
ated by the U. S. Shipping Board, or under contract with 
it; and, under certain conditions, over similar disputes in 
plants operated by the Navy Department. The decisions of 
the board were to be binding on all parties to the agreement. 3 

1 Ibid., Dec. 28, 30, 1917; Official Bulletin, Dec. 27, 1917. 

* Annual Report of the Director General of the Railroads. Washing¬ 
ton,, 1919, pp. 3, 4. 

* History of the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board, 1917-1919. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 283. Washington, 1921, pp. 8, 9. 


381] PRESIDENT WILSON , WAR-TIME ACTIVITIES ^3 

On September 7 Chairman Hurley of the Shipping Board 
set up the claim that the awards of the Adjustment Board 
should be subject to the approval of the Emergency Fleet 
Corporation. The board, which had already been appointed, 
refused to agree to this procedure. After many conferences 
the question was laid before the President, and an under¬ 
standing was reached that the decisions of the board should 
be final and not subject to review by any of the parties con¬ 
cerned. 1 

Meanwhile conditions on the Pacific Coast had become 
so unsatisfactory to the workers that on September 17 the 
shipbuilding trades in San Francisco struck for higher 
wages. Some time earlier the shipyard workers in Seattle 
and Portland had also voted to strike. Chairman Hurley 
asked the workers not to quit pending a settlement by the 
Adjustment Board, and invited the representatives of the 
unions to come to Washington to talk the matter over. 
They arrived in the capital in time to find the controversy 
concerning the board’s status going on, and returned home. 2 
By the last week of September the Seattle and Portland 
unionists had followed the example of those in San Fran¬ 
cisco and gone on strike. 3 

On September 21 President Wilson and Chairman Hurley 
requested Gavin McNab, of San Francisco, to attempt a 
temporary settlement of the strike in that city, pending the 
arrival of the Adjustment Board. Two days later Mr. 
McNab obtained a temporary agreement ending the strike 
and submitting the dispute to the board for settlement. The 
President, on the same day and before the agreement was 
actually made, wired his approval of this method of ending 

1 History of the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board, 19.17-1919, 
op. cit., p. 12. 

* Ibid., p. II. 

8 Ibid., p. 15. 


X34 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [3821 

the strike, and recommended similar temporary settlements 
to the unions in Seattle and Portland. 1 

The Adjustment Board started for the coast on October 
3, and succeeded in getting temporary settlements at Seattle 
and Portland about the middle of October. It then pro¬ 
ceeded to San Francisco, and after hearings and delibera¬ 
tions handed down an award on November 4, 1917) fixing 
basic wage rates for the whole Pacific Coast. 2 The board 
then returned East and devoted its attention to controver¬ 
sies in the shipyards of the Delaware River district 

During the winter of 1917-1918 the carpenters working 
in shipyards near New York harbor became dissatisfied with 
the wages paid for government work, claiming that the 
rates on the Pacific Coast were much higher, and that the 
Emergency Fleet Corporation had delayed increases un¬ 
necessarily. The carpenters’ union had been the only 
organization in the Metal Trades Department of the A. F. 
of L. which had declined to abide by the terms of the agree¬ 
ment creating the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board, 
the signature of its representative signing the agreement 
having been withdrawn several weeks after the board was 
set up. 3 W. L. Hutcheson, president of the international 
union, conferred with Chairman Hurley early in February, 
1918, but refused to agree to submit the demands of the 
carpenters to the Adjustment Board or to abide by its award. 

On February 11 considerable numbers of ,the men quit 
work. Three days later, the strike having spread to the 
Baltimore shipyards, Mr. Hurley wired President Hutche¬ 
son, asking him to get the men back to work and let the 
board handle the dispute. “ You will be well advised,” the 

1 History of the Board, op. cit., p. 20; San Francisco Chronicle, 
Sept. 22, 24, Oct. 2, 1917. 

* History of the Board, op. cit., pp. 18, 20, 21. 

8 Ibid., p. 10. 


383] PRESIDENT WILSON, WAR-TIME ACTIVITIES 135 

telegram said, “ to f ollow the methods of well-managed and 
patriotic labor organizations, at least until you have tested 
whether or not your Government, for which as shipbuilders 
you are now working, can be fair.” 1 

The next day Mr. Hutcheson replied to this telegram, say¬ 
ing that the strikers were willing to resume negotiations and 
go back to work if their demand for the Pacific Coast rate 
of pay were granted, and if certain conditions, which really 
amounted to the closed shop, were put into effect. In an¬ 
swer to this Mr. Hurley again asked that work be resumed, 
and refused to grant the demands for what he believed were 
special privileges for which not even all the carpenters 
asked. Referring to the Adjustment Board agreement he 
said, “ You are the only international President of all crafts 
working in the shipyards who refused to become a party to 
this agreement. Are the other international Presidents less 
patriotic or less careful of the interests of their crafts than 
yourself ? ” 2 

After this there followed an exchange of telegrams be¬ 
tween President Wilson and Mr. Hutcheson which show' 
so clearly the President’s attitude toward questions of a 
similar nature during the war that they are given in full: 

New York, February 16, 1918. 

The President. 

My Dear Mr. President: The situation now existing in the 
shipyards is of a nature that requires immediate attention. I, 
as President of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
Joiners of America, endeavored to reach an understanding 
with the officials of the U. S. Shipping Board but was unable 
to do so. I feel that if given the opportunity to lay the mat¬ 
ter fully before you that a solution should be quickly arrived 
at. I desire to inform you, my dear Mr. President, that I as 

1 AT. Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1918. 

2 Ibid., Feb. 16, 1918. 


X 3 6 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [384 

a patriotic citizen am desirous of rendering every assistance 
to you and our country to carry on the work necessary to 
bring about a successful conclusion of the world war in which 
we are engaged. 

Yours, most respectfully and sincerely, 

William L. Hutcheson. 

February 17, 1918^ 

William L. Hutcheson. . . . 

I have received your telegram of yesterday and am very 
glad to note the expression of your desire as a patriotic citizen 
to assist in carrying on the work by which we are trying to 
save America and men everywhere who work and are free. 
Taking advantage of that assurance, I feel it to be my duty 
to call your attention to the fact that the strike of the carpenters 
in the shipyards is in marked and painful contrast to the 
action of labor in other trades and places. Ships are abso- 
lutely necessary for the winning of this war. No one can 
strike a deadlier blow at the safety of the Nation and of its 
forces on the other side than by interfering with or obstructing 
the shipbuilding program. All the other unions engaged in 
this indispensable work have agreed to abide by the decisions 
of the Shipbuilding Wage Adjustment Board. That board 
has dealt fairly and liberally with all who have resorted to it. 

I must say to you very frankly that it is your duty to leave 
to it the solution of your present difficulties with your em¬ 
ployers and to advise the men whom you represent to return 
at once to work pending the decision. No body of men have 
the moral right in the present circumstances of the Nation td 
strike until every method of adjustment has been tried to the 
limit. If you do not act upon this principle you are undoubt¬ 
edly giving aid and comfort to the enemy, whatever may be 
your own conscious purpose. I do not see that anything will 
be gained by my seeing you personally, until you have ac¬ 
cepted and acted upon that principle. It is the duty of the 
Government to see that the best possible conditions of labor 
are maintained, as it is also its duty to see to it that there is 


385] PRESIDENT WILSON, WAR-TIME ACTIVITIES ^7 

no lawless and conscienceless profiteering and that duty the 
Government has accepted and will perform. Will you co¬ 
operate or will you obstruct? 

Woodrow Wilson. 1 

On receipt of this message from the President the officers 
of the carpenters’ union gave orders to all the local officials 
to get the men back to work immediately. At the same 
time Mr. Hutcheson again wired the President, informing 
him that he had no power to sign an agreement to abide by 
the award of the Adjustment Board “ which would deprive 
our members of their constitutional rights,” and asked for a 
conference, as he felt that was the only way to solve the 
question. The President, however, refused to grant a con¬ 
ference unless the carpenters submitted the dispute to the 
board. 2 

In a few days the strike, which had for a brief time 
paralyzed shipbuilding work in New York, was completely 
at an end. Soon afterwards the Adjustment Board took 
up the demands of the carpenters along with those of the 
other employees in the North Atlantic district, and on April 
6, 1918, handed down an award granting increases in wages. 
The award, though not entirely satisfactory to the men, was 
accepted and lived up to in good faith by them.* 

5. THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD 

One of the principal difficulties encountered by the govern¬ 
ment in handling its war labor problems in 1917 was the 
great difference in the methods and policies of the various 
war-production agencies. In September of that year the 
National Industrial Conference Board, an employers’ organ¬ 
ization, submitted to the Council of National Defense a 

1 Official Bulletin, Feb. 18, 1918. 

*N. Y. Times, Feb. 18, 19, 1918. 

8 History of the Board, op. cit., pp. 37-39. 


! 3 8 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [386 

proposal for the creation of a federal board to adjust labor 
disputes, and suggested that a set of war labor principles 
be drawn up by a conference appointed for that purpose. 
In December the Council called a conference of representa¬ 
tives of the various governmental production departments. 
This conference, on December 20, recommended the setting 
up of national adjustment machinery “ in accordance with 
the principles to be agreed upon between labor and capital 
and without stoppage of work.” The matter was then 
taken up with the Secretary of Labor, who submitted it to 
President Wilson. On January 4, 1918, the President ap¬ 
pointed the Secretary as labor administrator along the lines 
of the interdepartmental conference report. 1 

In order to assist him in carrying out this program Secre¬ 
tary Wilson appointed an advisory council of seven mem¬ 
bers. The council met on January 16, and three days later 
presented a report to the Secretary recommending the ap¬ 
pointment of a board of twelve persons for the purpose of 
negotiating agreements for the war period and of establish¬ 
ing war labor principles and policies. It suggested that the 
board consist of five representatives of the employers and 
five of the employees, each of these groups to choose a joint 
chairman of the board, who would also represent the public. 2 

These recommendations were approved by the Secretary 
of Labor, who on January 28 created the War Labor Con¬ 
ference Board and called upon the National Industrial Con¬ 
ference Board and the American Federation of Labor to 
appoint representatives of capital and labor respectively to 
the board. The personnel of the board thus chosen was as 
follows: 

Joint chairmen: William Howard Taft, chosen by the 
employers; Frank P. Walsh, chosen by the employees. 

1 National War Labor Board. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 287. 
Washington, 1921, p. 9. 

* Ibid., p. 10. 


387] PRESIDENT WILSON, WAR-TIME ACTIVITIES 139 

Employers’ representatives: L. A. Osborne, C. E. Michael, 
W. H. Van Dervoort, B. L. Worden, and L. F. Loree. 

Employees’ representatives : F. J. Hayes, W. L. Hutche¬ 
son, W. H. Johnston, Victor Olander, and Thomas H. 
Rickert. 1 

The board began its sessions February 25, 1918, and on 
March 29 handed down a unanimous report suggesting the 
appointment of a National War Labor Board for the pur¬ 
pose of adjusting labor disputes, to be appointed in the 
same way as the War Labor Conference Board. It also 
outlined the powers and functions of such a board, and set 
forth the principles and policies to govern industrial re¬ 
lations in war industries during the war. In the opinion of 
the Secretary of Labor the persons best fitted to carry out 
the policies and suggestions were those who had unani¬ 
mously agreed on them. He accordingly appointed the mem¬ 
bers of the board as the members of the new National War 
Labor Board. 2 

On April 8, 1918, President Wilson issued a proclama¬ 
tion in regard to the new organization. After approving 
the appointments of the Secretary of Labor the proclamation 
continued: 

The powers, functions, and duties of the National War Labor 
Board shall be: To settle by mediation and conciliation contro¬ 
versies arising between employers and workers in fields of pro¬ 
duction necessary for the effective conduct of the war, or in 
other fields of national activity, delays and obstructions which 
might, in the opinion of the national board, affect detrimentally 
such production; to provide, by direct appointment or otherwise, 
for committees or boards to sit in various parts of the country 
where controversies arise and secure settlement by local media- 

1 National War Labor Board, op. cit. p. 10. 

*Ibid., p. 11. 


140 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [388 

tion and conciliation; and to summon the parties to contro¬ 
versies for hearing and action by the national board in event 
of failure to secure settlement by mediation and conciliation. 
The principles to be observed and the methods to be followed 
by the national board in exercising such powers and functions 
and performing such duties shall be those specified in the said 
report of the War Labor Conference Board dated March 29, 
1918, a complete copy of which is hereunto appended. 

The national board shall refuse to take cognizance of a con¬ 
troversy between employer and workers in any field of in¬ 
dustrial or other activity where there is by agreement or 
Federal law a means of settlement which has not been invoked. 
And I do hereby urge upon all employers and employees within 
the United States the necessity of utilizing the means and 
methods thus provided for the adjustment of all industrial 
disputes, and request that during the pendency of mediation 
or arbitration through the said means or methods there shall 
be no discontinuance of industrial operation which would re¬ 
sult in curtailment of the production of war necessities. 1 

The principles of the board, approved by the President 
and appended to his proclamation, may be summarized as 
follows: 

There are to be no strikes or lockouts during the war. 

The right of workers to organize into trade unions and 
to bargain collectively is affirmed and shall not be interfered 
with by employers in any manner whatsoever. 

The right of employers to organize into associations and 
to bargain collectively is affirmed and shall not be interfered 
with by workers in any manner whatsoever. 

Workers shall not 'be discharged for trade-union member¬ 
ship or for legitimate union activities. 

Workers shall not use coercive methods to induce persons 
to join unions or employers to bargain with them. 


1 National War Labor Board , op. cit., p. 34. 


389] PRESIDENT WILSON, WAR-TIME ACTIVITIES I4 i 

Where the union shop and union standards exist they shall 
be continued. 

Where the open shop exists its continuance is not to be 
considered a grievance. 

Established safeguards for the protection of health and 
safety of workers shall not be relaxed. 

Where it is necessary to employ women on men’s work 
they must be allowed equal pay for equal work. 

The 'basic eight-hour day is recognized. 

Maximum production of all war industries should be 
maintained, and all methods of employees or employers 
hindering it should be discouraged. 

In fixing wages and conditions regard should be had to 
standards prevailing in the localities affected. 

The right of all workers to a living wage is hereby de¬ 
clared. 

In fixing wages minimum rates of pay shall be established 
which will insure the subsistence of the worker and his 
family in health and reasonable comfort. 1 

The proclamation of the President and his approval of 
the board’s method of procedure and policies gave it great 
prestige and insured its success. The board functioned 
about sixteen months, in almost all cases as arbitrator, rather 
than as conciliator. A total of 1251 cases came before it, 
and its awards and findings directly concerned more than 
1100 establishments, employing about 711,500 persons, 
about 90,500 of whom were street railway employees. Of 
the 1251 cases before it, it made awards and findings in 490 
and dismissed or referred most of the remainder to other 
boards because the cases did not come under its jurisdiction. 
To expedite its work the board decided many cases in sec¬ 
tion ; that is, the case was investigated and the award drawn 
up by one employer representative and one worker repre- 

1 National War Labor Boardop. cit., pp. 32-33. 


142 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [39Q 

sentative, the award (being then approved by the remainder 
of the board. Its first decision was rendered June 12, 1918. 
Thereafter the number of cases increased each month until 
in November, 1918, 275 were submitted. 1 

After November ri, 1918, when the armistice was signed, 
objections were made to accepting the board’s decisions on 
the ground that it was created only for the war period. At 
the request of the President, however, the board decided to 
continue its work. On December 5, in view of increasing 
complaints, it decided to hear only those cases which were 
jointly submitted by both parties to the dispute after media¬ 
tion by the Department of Labor had failed. 2 After this 
cases continued to be submitted, but the activity and the ef¬ 
fectiveness of the board gradually declined. On August 12, 
1919, it held its final meeting and formally dissolved. 8 

The President’s relation to the board extended beyond the 
fact that he approved its appointment and upheld its prin¬ 
ciples and policies. In several important instances in which 
a party to a dispute refused to accept the award of the board, 
the President used his war-time powers to force an accep¬ 
tance. These cases, because they are such important evi¬ 
dence of his power and his attitude with regard to labor con¬ 
troversies during the war, are worth discussing at some 
length. 

a. The Western Union Case. 

In April, 1918, over 20,000 telegraph operators employed 
by the Western Union and the Postal Telegraph Companies, 
members of the Commercial Telegraphers’ Union of 

1 National War Labor Board, op. cit., pp. 16-22. 

* Ibid,, p. 35. Previously the board had heard and decided many 
cases in which only one side submitted the grievance. Until after the 
armistice, however, there were very few cases, even of this sort, in 
which the award was not accepted by both sides. 

*Ibid., p. 13. 


391 ] PRESIDENT WILSON, WAR-TIME ACTIVITIES I43 

America, voted to strike because some of their number had 
been discharged for belonging to the union. On April 28, 
the strike, which was scheduled to commence the next day, 
was postponed, the War Labor Board having invited the 
men to present their grievances to it. 1 The board in a few 
days appointed Joint Chairmen Taft and Walsh to attempt 
to settle the controversy. 

Mr. Taft, at the suggestion of Mr. Walsh, submitted to 
the heads of the Western Union a proposal to the following' 
effect: That the company receive back the men whom it had 
discharged upon condition; (1) that the company receive 
committees of its own men to present requests for better 
conditions, and if an agreement could not be reached the 
matter would be submitted to the board; (2) that the com¬ 
pany should not be required in any way to deal with or to 
recognize the union; (3) that the Commercial Telegraphers , 
Union should agree not to permit any strike and to submit 
its grievances to the board and abide by its award; (4) that 
if any member of the union employed by the company should 
fail to conform to the agreement the company might dis¬ 
charge him and the board would sustain such discharge. 

Newcomb Carlton, head of the Western Union, declined 
to accept this proposal on the ground that the company could 
not give uninterrupted and competent telegraph service if 
its operators belonged to the union. He offered to permit 
the employees to vote as to whether they desired to join the 
union. In case a majority voted to join he promised to 
withdraw his objections to union membership, but would 
not deal with the union. If the employees opposed the 
union the company would continue the existing practise. 
To this proposition Mr. Taft replied on May 27: “ I do not 
think our principles include the closed non-union shop in 


1 N. Y. Times, April 29, 1918. 


144 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [392 

the status quo to be maintained,” and rejected the com¬ 
pany’s offer. He again urged the acceptance of the com¬ 
promise plan previously suggested, but Mr. Carlton per¬ 
sisted in his refusal. 

On June 1 Messrs. Taft and Walsh reported to the board, 
recommending the publication of their report. The board 
thereupon approved the report, all the workers and the Joint 
Chairmen voting for it while all the employers opposed it.* 

On June 11 President Wilson addressed the heads of the 
Postal Telegraph and the Western Union Companies. 
After referring to the decision of the War Labor Board and 
the companies’ refusal to accept it, he continued: 

May I not say that in my judgment it is imperatively neces¬ 
sary in the national interest that decisions of the National 
War Labor Board should be accepted by both parties to labor 
disputes? To fail to accept them is to jeopard the interests 
of the Nation very seriously. ... I do not hesitate to say 
that it is a patriotic duty to cooperate in this all-important 
matter with the Government .... I, therefore, write to ask 
that I may have your earnest cooperation in this matter. . . . 

The next day Mr. Mackay of the Postal Telegraph Com¬ 
pany replied to the President, agreeing not to discharge 
union men during the war. 1 2 Mr. Carlton, of the Western 
Union, however, denied the right of the board to enforce 
its recommendation and refused to accede to the President’s 
request. 3 The persistent opposition of the company to the 
union affiliation of its employees continued and the teleg¬ 
raphers’ union again decided to strike, the time being set 
for July 8. 4 

1 Official Bulletin, June 4, 1918. 

2 Ibid., June 15, 1918. 

• Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 108. 

4 N. Y. Times, July 8, 1918. 


393] PRESIDENT WILSON, WAR-TIME ACTIVITIES I45 

Toward the end of June a resolution was introduced in 
the House of Representatives providing that the President 
be given power to take over possession and control of the 
telephone and telegraph systems. On its introduction Post¬ 
master General Burleson sent a letter to Chairman Sims of 
the House Committee on Interstate Commerce, urging the 
passage of the resolution. “ At this moment,” he wrote, 
“ paralysis of a large part of the system of electrical com¬ 
munication is threatened, with possible consequences prej¬ 
udicial to our military preparation and other public activi¬ 
ties that might prove serious or disastrous.” 

This letter was referred by Mr. Sims to the President, 
who on June 29 replied, “ I indorse heartily the enclosed 
letter from the Postmaster General, . . . and think that the 
reasons are stated by him truly and comprehensively.” 1 
Meanwhile the telegraphers’ strike was called off at the re¬ 
quest of Secretary Wilson, who pointed out the likelihood 
of government control. 2 The resolution providing for gov¬ 
ernment control was passed by the House on July 5 and by 
the Senate eight days later. 3 On July 16 the President ap¬ 
proved the act and at midnight of July 31 control of the 
telegraph and telephone lines passed over to the govern¬ 
ment. 4 

For a few weeks after government control went into 
effect the Western Union continued to discharge union mem¬ 
bers, but the Postmaster General soon issued orders forbid¬ 
ding discrimination and the company ended the practice. 5 

1 Official Bulletin, July 2, 1918; Congressional Record , vol. lvi, p. 8716. 

• N. Y. Times, July 8, 1918. 

• Cong. Rec., vol. lvi, pp. 8735, 9094. 

4 Official Bulletin, July 24, 1918. 

• Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1918, p. 108; AT. Y. Times, Aug. 
2-8, Aug. 22, 1918. 


I4 6 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [394 
b. The Bridgeport Case. 

In August, 1917, machinists employed in the manufac¬ 
ture of munitions in Bridgeport, Connecticut, 'began to de¬ 
mand wage increases and the adjustment of other griev¬ 
ances, which included discrimination against union men, and 
the alleged intimidation of workmen through threats of ap¬ 
plying the military draft to them. Various efforts at local 
conciliation proved unsuccessful, and in March and May, 
1918, numerous strikes occurred at the larger plants. Finally 
the wage adjustment board of the Ordnance Depart¬ 
ment took up the demands. It handed down on June 7 an 
award which was accepted by the employees only after much 
complaint. Some of the employers, however, who had not 
bound themselves to abide by the award, refused to put it 
into effect. 

After consideration of the problem the Secretary of War, 
on June 24, formally referred the entire controversy to the 
War Labor Board. In a short time the board took up the 
matter, and succeeded in obtaining, on July 3, the formal 
agreement of all the employers and of the union to abide by 
its decision. 1 In August, however, the 'board announced its 
failure to agree unanimously upon the award, such an agree¬ 
ment being necessary under its rules in case of joint submis¬ 
sion, and chose O. M. Eidlitz, of New York City, Director 
of the Bureau of Housing of the Department of Labor, as 
umpire to determine the undecided points in the contro¬ 
versy. 2 

The umpire’s decision, which was announced on Sep¬ 
tember 4, was duly made the award of the board and for¬ 
warded to the parties at Bridgeport. The decision, though 

1 Report of the Activities of the War Department in the Field of 
Industrial Relations during the War. Washington, 1919, pp. 32-33. 

* Official Bulletin, Aug. 16, 1918. The board’s rules provided that 
such cases were to be referred to an umpire having final authority. 


395] PRESIDENT WILSON, WAR-TIME ACTIVITIES 1471 

it upheld some of the workers’ contentions, granted in¬ 
creases an wages very unsatisfactory to the men, who, hav¬ 
ing waited nearly a year for a settlement of the question, 
were bitterly disappointed. 1 Early in September, contrary 
to the advice of their leaders, many of the men went on 
strike against the award. 

At this point President Wilson, acting on the joint rec¬ 
ommendation of the Secretary of Labor, the Acting Secre¬ 
tary of War, and the Chairmen of the War Labor Board, 
addressed the striking employees on September 13, and 
threatened to have them drafted into the military service 
unless they returned to work. 2 The letter, after pointing 
out that the employees had agreed to accept the award of 
the board, continued as follows: 

[Whatever] the merits of the issue it is closed by the award. 
Your strike against it is a breach of faith calculated to reflect 
on the sincerity of national organized labor in proclaiming its 
acceptance of the principles and machinery of the National 
War Labor Board. ... I desire that you return to work and 
abide by the award. If you refuse, each of you will be barred 
from employment in any war industry in the community in 
which the strike occurs for a period of one year. During that 
time the U. S. Employment Service will decline to obtain em¬ 
ployment for you in any war industry elsewhere in the United 
States, as well as under [any] Government agencies, and the 
draft boards will be instructed to reject any claim of exemp¬ 
tion based on your alleged usefulness on war production. 3 

The letter had an immediate effect, the strikers voting 
to return to work on September 17. On the same day the 
President was informed by the representatives of the strikers 

'Official Bulletin, September 4, 1918; War Dept. Rep., op. cit., p. 33. 

* War Dept. Rep., op. cit., p. 33. 

* National War Labor Board, op. cit., p. 36. 


148 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [396 

that the manufacturers were refusing to reinstate the men. 
He at once wrote to the employers, concluding his letter 
thus: “ In view of the fact that the workmen have so 
promptly complied with my directions, I must insist upon the 
reinstatement of all these men'.” 1 The strikers were then 
taken back and the provisions of the award were put into 
effect. 

c. The Smith and Wesson Case. 

At about the same time that President Wilson brought 
pressure to bear upon the Bridgeport strikers to abide by 
the award of the War Labor Board it became necessary for 
him to use his power in a similar way in an attempt to get 
a recalcitrant employer to abide by another award of the 
board. In the early summer of 1918 the employees of the 
Smith and Wesson Company, of Springfield, Massachu¬ 
setts, manufacturing munitions under contract with the 
War Department, appointed a committee from among their 
own number to confer with the management for the pur¬ 
pose of negotiating an increase in wages. The company re¬ 
fused to see this committee and discharged its members. 
Thereupon the employees asked the machinists’ union to 
organize the plant. From time to time the company con¬ 
tinued to discharge men for union activity. 

Finally, on July 12, about half the employees went on 
strike. The company being engaged in the manufacture 
of supplies that were greatly needed, the War Department 
intervened on the 17th, under a clause in the contract with 
the company giving the Secretary of War the right to 
mediate labor difficulties. On the advice of his assistants 
the Secretary formally referred the dispute to the National 
War Labor Board, which investigated the case and handed 
down an award on August 211. The award granted a 

1 National War Labor Board, op. cit., p. 36. 


397] PRESIDENT WILSON, WAR-TIME ACTIVITIES I49 

number of the demands of the employees, directed the com¬ 
pany to reemploy all men discharged f or union affiliation, and 
ordered the establishment of a system of collective bargain¬ 
ing- 1 

The company, on August 30, wrote to the War Depart¬ 
ment refusing to recognize the jurisdiction of the War 
Labor Board or to put its award into effect, and offered to 
turn the plant over to the government in preference to doing 
so. It saw “ no reason why it should abandon its lawful 
and legitimate method of doing business known and proved 
by it to be conducive to industrial peace and high efficiency 
for the fantastic method outlined by the War Labor Board 
in its recommendations for dealing with its employees.” 
This position was considered to be so serious in its implica¬ 
tions that the War Department urged the company to recon¬ 
sider its action, but this the management declined to do. 2 

On September 14 the War Department announced that it 
had taken over the plant and business of the company with 
the consent of the President. “ The language employed by 
the company/’ said the statement, “ [in its refusal to abide 
by the award] was held to be calculated to induce other 
employers to avoid the jurisdiction of the War Labor Board 
and to defeat the object of the President in its creation, and 
the company’s general attitude toward the reasonable find¬ 
ings of the board was deemed such as might be expected to 
disturb industry and interfere with production. ... It is 
the policy of the War Department to give effect to the 
decisions of the War Labor Board in all cases coming under 
the jurisdiction of the Department.” s 

x War Dept. Rep., op. cit., p. 34; Nat. War Labor Board, op. cit., p. 
260. 

* Official Bulletin, Sept. 14, 1918; War Dept Rep., op. cit., p. 34. 

* Official Bulletin, Sept. 14, 1918. The plant was commandeered for 
the duration of the war under Section 120 of the National Defense 
Act, and an officer of the Ordnance Department was placed in charge. 


I 5 Q LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [398 

d. The New York Harbor Strike, January, 1919. 

Brief mention should be made of one other instance in 
which the President used his influence in connection with an 
adjustment made by the War Labor Board. In December, 

1918, various private employers engaged in harbor work in 
New York refused to agree to accept the decisions of the 
New York Harbor Wage Adjustment Board, which had 
been functioning during the war in connection with disputes 
in longshore and harbor work. The Railroad Administra¬ 
tion, which employed men in the same work, also refused 
to abide by the board’s decisions, claiming with the other 
employers that the board had no jurisdiction after the sign¬ 
ing of the armistice. 

The Adjustment Board then recommended that the em¬ 
ployees’ demands be referred to the National War Labor 
Board, which held hearings on the matter on January 7, 

1919. The private owners and the Railroad Administra¬ 
tion, however, refused to accept the board’s jurisdiction and 
would not agree to be bound by its award. Under the con¬ 
ditions, the board announced that it could not undertake to 
settle the controversy. 

On January 9 all of the 16,000 harbor workers in New 
York went out on strike, and in addition about 50,000 long¬ 
shoremen were thus forced out of work. The strike par¬ 
alyzed harbor traffic, including ferry boats &nd those boats 
operated by the federal government. 

Two days later President Wilson, who was then in 
Europe for the purpose of attending the Peace Conference, 
having been informed by Secretary of Labor Wilson as to 
the seriousness of the strike, addressed a cablegram to the 
Joint Chairmen of the National War Labor Board. He asked 
the board to take up the case again and expressed himself 
as certain that all the government agencies interested would 
use all their power to make the findings effective. In con- 


399] PRES1DEN T WILSON, WAR-TIME ACTIVITIES 15^ 

elusion he stated that it was his earnest hope “ that in the 
present period of industrial transition arising from the war 
the board should use all means within its power to stabilize 
conditions and prevent industrial dislocation and warfare.” 

After this the Railroad Administration could hardly con¬ 
tinue its opposition to the board. The men voted to return 
to work January hi, and on the 13th hearings before the 
War Labor Board began once more. The private boat 
owners still persisted in their refusal to submit, but the 
board proceeded to hear the case on the joint submission of 
the public owners and the employees. 1 

6. CONCLUSION 

The war period showed Woodrow Wilson at his best. It 
gave him the opportunity to take the part of a strong leader 
such as he believed the President should be. Until after 
the armistice, when the treaty of peace and the League of 
Nations Covenant absorbed hi9 attention, he acted the part 
of a fair-minded and intelligent statesman in dealing with 
the industrial situation. Realizing that the essential thing 
was to raise production to the highest point and keep it there, 
he threw his energies into preventing the suspension of work 
in essential war industries. To this end he approved the 
creation of the various adjustment agencies and lent them 
his full support whenever it was necessary. But he did not 
rely on such agencies alone. Early in the war he obtained 
the promise of Samuel Gompers, president of the American 
Federation of Labor, to do everything possible to work with 
the government in avoiding strikes, 2 and by putting Mr. 

1 B. M. Squires, “ The New York Harbor Strike.” Monthly Labor Re¬ 
view, February, 1919, p. 330. For a good account of war and after¬ 
war adjustments in New York Harbor see other articles by the same 
author in the same publication, September, 1918, and August, 1919. 

* N. V. Times, April 9, 1917. 


152 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [400 

Gompers in the position of aid and advisor to the admin¬ 
istration he gained from the first the good will and coopera¬ 
tion of the A. F. of L. and its affiliated unions in carrying 
out his war labor policies. 

It is true that more strikes occurred during the war than 
at any previous period in our history. In 1917 the U. S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics reported a total of 4450 strikes 
and lockouts. For the next year, when our war efforts 
had attained their highest point, 3337 such cases were re¬ 
ported. 1 But these figures do not minimize the importance 
of the efforts of the administration to prevent strikes. The 
establishment of the numerous government boards of arbi¬ 
tration, the support given by the President to the principles 
and methods of the National War Labor Board, and the 
readiness of the President, while under the already great 
strain of other war-time responsibilities, to step in and use 
his power to aid the various boards, all undoubtedly tended 
to lessen the severity and frequency of strikes, especially in 
the war industries. It should be remembered also that most 
of the important agencies of adjustment, including the War 
Labor Board, were created and supported without any spe¬ 
cific authorization or appropriation for the purpose from 
Congress. Their activities and accomplishments were pos¬ 
sible largely because of the initiative of administration of¬ 
ficials and the determination of the President and his as¬ 
sistants to lend them support. 

The vigor with which Mr. Wilson upheld the National 
War Labor Board in its awards might, in time of peace, 
have subjected him to the accusation of 'being arbitrary and 
high-handed, but few would criticize the staunch support 
which helped the board maintain the dignity and prestige so 
necessary in time of war. 


* Monthly Labor Review, June, 1920, p. 506. 


4 oi ] PRESIDENT WILSON , WAR-TIME ACTIVITIES ^3 

The record of the President in industrial disputes during! 
the war was one of which he might be justly proud. By in¬ 
cluding in his proclamation creating the War Labor Board 
the statement of the principles which should govern it in 
its dealings with labor, Mr. Wilson established a definite 
governmental labor policy for the first time in our history. 
Thereafter, during the war period, the administration gave 
its support to the right of workers and employers to organize 
as they wished and to bargain collectively, to the basic eight- 
hour day, to the principle of the living wage, and to the 
maintenance of established safeguards of health and safety. 
By the same act the government put itself in opposition to 
strikes or lockouts during the war, to discrimination against 
workers for legitimate trade-union activities, and to the use 
of coercion on the part of trade unions. By giving his 
approval to these principles the President made possible the 
establishment of a constructive government labor policy 
which was as a whole characterized by intelligence and a 
desire to act fairly. Undoubtedly it was the war-time spirit 
of cooperation which was largely responsible for the success 
of this policy. But the carrying out of a definite set of 
principles so efficiently indicates that even in ordinary times 
the adoption of a constructive labor policy by the administra¬ 
tion would not only be possible, but would be attended by" 
some degree of success. 


CHAPTER VI 


President Wilson, 1919-1921 

Although the joint resolution of Congress declaring 
war between the United States and Germany at an end was 
not approved until July 2, 1921, and peace was not formally 
proclaimed by the President until November 14, 1921, it 
seems best to consider that, in the treatment of industrial 
problems, the post-war period began with the signing of the 
armistice in November, 1918. The war-time purpose of 
the President, that is, his desire to prevent interruption in 
the production of goods for war purposes, cannot be said 
to have been a guiding motive in his attitude toward in¬ 
dustrial controversies after the war. The strikes and 
threatened strikes of 1919 and thereafter were handled by 
the President from a viewpoint quite different from that of 
the war period. The motives to action on his part were 
more like those which prevailed before war was declared. 

I. THE RAILROAD SHOPMEN^ STRIKE OF I919 

It has already been observed that the rapidly rising cost 
of living during the war was probably the most important 
factor in producing strikes and industrial unrest. Con¬ 
trary to the expectation of many, the year 1919, instead of 
witnessing a decline in prices due to the absence of the war 
demand, was accompanied by continued increases in prices. 
Thus, taking 1913 as a base of 100, the index number of 
retail food prices in the United States was 160 in January, 
1918, 167 in July, 1918, and 185 in January, 1919. By 
154 [402 


i55 


_ 4 0 3 ] PRESIDENT WILSON, jpjp-jp^j 

August, 1919, it had reached 192, and by the following 
January was.up to 201. 1 It was to be expected that under 
such conditions considerable unrest and agitation for higher 
wages would develop. The fact is borne out by the statis¬ 
tics of strikes and lockouts. Whereas for 1918 the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics reported a total of 3337, the number in 
1919 had mounted to 3374. 2 

Among those workers whose wages had lagged behind 
the continually increasing cost of living the railroad em¬ 
ployees were perhaps the most numerous. The railroad 
shopmen in particular had become greatly dissatisfied. 
They had received a general increase to a 68 cent per hour 
minimum on July 2, 1918, 3 but this had still left them 
in the position of receiving less pay than did the machinists 
in similar work in the shipyards, who received 80 cents per 
hour. 4 

In January, 1919, the men asked for an increase of from 
68 cents to 85 cents per hour, with proportionate increases 
for helpers and apprentices. 5 The consideration of these de¬ 
mands by the Board of Railway Wages and Working Con¬ 
ditions, to which they had been referred in February, was 
considerably delayed because of other matters which had 
been presented to it previously. Finally, on July 16, the 
board announced its inability to agree on the increase to be 
made. The matter was thus left to Director General Hines 
to decide. On July 28 and 29 he had conferences with the 
representatives of the shopmen, who informed him of the 
great dissatisfaction among the men, due to the long delay 

1 Monthly Labor Review, vol. x, p. 1368. 

2 Ibid., vol. x, p. 1306. 

3 U. S. Railroad Administration. Wages of Railroad Employees. 
Supplement No. 4, General Order 27. Washington, 1919, p. 32. 

4 Bing, War Time Strikes and Their Adjustment, p. 92. 

*N. Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1919. 


i5 6 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [404 

in the determination of their demands, and to the fact that 
men engaged in similar work elsewhere were and had been 
getting much higher wages. Under existing circumstances, 
however, the Director General did not feel himself to be in 
a position to grant increases on his own responsibility. 

In a letter to President Wilson, written on July 30, Mr. 
Hines pointed out that many classes of railway workers all 
over the country were demanding wage increases, that the 
government was already incurring a deficit because railway 
rates had not been increased, that were a 12 cent increase 
to be granted to all railway men the added annual cost to the 
railroads would be $800,000,000, and that any increase in 
wages would necessarily entail an increase in rates. Though 
the President had power under the law to increase the rates, 
the Director General did not think that this power should 
be exercised at such a time without specific authority from 
Congress. Accordingly, he recommended that “ Congress 
be asked promptly to adopt legislation providing a properly 
constituted body on which the public and labor will be ade¬ 
quately represented, and which will be empowered to pass 
upon these and all railroad wage problems. . . . Such legis¬ 
lation should also provide that if wage increases shall be 
decided upon it shall be mandatory upon the ratemaking 
body to provide, where necessary, increased rates to take 
care of the resulting increases in the cost of operating the 
railroads.” 1 

The refusal of the Director General to grant them their 
long delayed wage increase, and his suggestion that the ques¬ 
tion be referred to a new board and thus delayed still further, 
so aroused the shopmen that large numbers of them, on 
August 1, obeyed the call of some of the less conservative 
leaders and went on strike in defiance of instructions from 


1 Congressional Record, vol. lviii, p. 3545. 


i57 


405] PRESIDENT WILSON, 

their international officers. The strike started with the quit¬ 
ting of many men in and about Chicago. 1 It soon spread 
to various sections all over the country, until, at the end of 
a week, thousands of shopmen had followed the Chicago 
strikers, despite the orders from the heads of the unions. 

Meanwhile, on August 1, President Wilson had written 
to the chairmen of the Congressional committees on inter¬ 
state commerce forwarding the suggestions of Mr. Hines, 
and recommending that they be enacted into legislation. At 
the same time, the House having previously decided to take 
a recess of five weeks, the President asked the Republican 
leaders to postpone it until he had had an opportunity to 
make recommendations to Congress for the purpose of deal¬ 
ing with the cost-of-living problem. 2 On the afternoon of 
August 1 the House rescinded its recess resolution. 3 

Conditions, in the meantime, were growing more and 
more unsatisfactory. Not only was the unauthorized strike 
of the shopmen spreading, but the railway Brotherhoods and 
the other railway unions issued a statement on August 2 
asserting the impossibility of continuing to work under the 
rising cost of living unless they received wage increases. 
They maintained that the railway problem could not be 
solved if the roads were returned to their former control, 
and recommended the enactment of the Plumb Plan of 
railway management as a solution. At the same time B. 
M. Jewell, president of the Railway Department of the 
American Federation of Labor and leader of the shopmen, 
announced that his unions had decided to send out a call for 
a strike vote on the question of accepting the proposal of 

l N. Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1919. 

* Congressional Record, vol. lviii, pp. 3626, 3543. 

*N. Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1919. 


l-S LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [406 

Mr. Hines to the President as a solution of their demands. 1 
On August 4 the shopmen’s representatives called on the 
President and rejected the proposal, pending the final de¬ 
cision of the members of the unions as indicated 'by the strike 
vote. 2 1 

The House Interstate Commerce Committee, after con¬ 
sidering the President’s proposal, reported back to the House 
on August 4 that Congressional action in the situation was 
unnecessary, since, during the continuation of federal con¬ 
trol, the President had the power to fix railway rates and 
could handle the wage question on his own responsibility. 5 
On being informed of this, the President, on August 7, 
wrote to the Director General, authorizing him to tell the 
shopmen that “ the question of wages they had raised will 
be taken up and considered on its merits by the Director 
General in conference with their duly accredited representa¬ 
tives.” His letter continued: 

The chief obstacle to a decision has been created by the men 
themselves. They have gone out on strike and repudiated the 
authority of their officers at the very moment when they were 
urging action. ... In the presence of these strikes and the 
repudiation of the authority of the representatives of the 
organization concerned, there can be no consideration of the 
matter in controversy. Until the employes return to work 
and again recognize the authority of their own organization, 
the whole matter must be at a standstill. . . . - 
Concerned and very careful consideration is being given by the 
entire government to the question of reducing the high cost 
of living. I need hardly point out how intimately and directly 
this matter affects every individual in the nation; and if 
transportation is interrupted it will be impossible to solve it. 
This is a time when every employe of the railways should help 

1 N. Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1919. 

* Ibid., Aug. 5, 1919. 

l Ibid., Aug. 5, 1919. 


159 


407] PRESIDENT WILSON, 

to make the processes of transportation more easy and eco¬ 
nomical rather than less, and employes who are on strike are 
deliberately delaying a settlement of their wage problems and 
of the standard of living. They should promptly return to 
work, and I hope that you will urge upon their representatives 
the immediate necessity for their doing so. 1 

This letter Mr. Hines forwarded to Mr. Jewell, who, at 
midnight of the same day on which it was written, sent 
messages to all the shopcraft unions asking them to have 
their men return to work at once in accordance with the 
President’s request. 2 On the day following it was reported 
that many strikers were returning to work. 

It was apparent that President Wilson had determined to 
attempt a solution of the problem by making efforts to re¬ 
duce the cost of living. Accordingly he appeared before a 
joint meeting of Congress on August 8 and recommended 
the enactment of the following measures in order to lower 
prices: (1) Extension of the food control act to peace-time 
and the widening of its scope to cover all necessaries; (2) 
Licensing of all corporations engaged in interstate com¬ 
merce to insure competitive selling and prevent “ unconscion¬ 
able profits ”; (3) Passage of a law to regulate cold storage, 
limiting the time of storage, and requiring goods to bear the 
date of receipt and the price at the time they went into 
storage; (4) Provision of a penalty for violation of the 
profiteering clauses of the food control act; (5) Passage of 
a law requiring all goods destined for interstate commerce 
to be marked when possible with their price when leaving 
the producer; (6) Enactment of the proposed law for the 
control of security issues; (7) Additional appropriations 
for government agencies which would inform the public of 
the prices at which retailers buy. 

1 N. Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1919. 

* Ibid., Aug. 8 , 1919. 


!6o LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [408 

The President also informed Congress that the adminis¬ 
tration would take the following steps on its own account 
to cope with the situation: (11) Limit wheat shipments and 
credit to lower the price of flour; (2) Sell the surplus stocks 
of food and clothing now in the hands of the government 
without profit; (3) Draw surplus stocks out of storage and 
put them upon the market, by legal action wherever neces¬ 
sary; (4) Prosecute combinations of producers and trades 
formed for the control of supplies and prices; (5) Employ 
publicity, through the Departments of Commerce, Agricul¬ 
ture, and Labor, and the Federal Trade Commission, to ac¬ 
quaint the public with supplies not available because of 
hoarding, and methods of price fixing. 

“ I believe, too,” he said, “ that the more extreme leaders 
of organized labor will presently yield to a sober second 
thought, and, like the great mass of their associates, think 
and act like true Americans. They will see that strikes 
undertaken at this critical time are certain to make matters 
worse, not 'better—worse for them and for everybody else.” 1 

By August 13 the backbone of the strike was broken, and 
a week later the Director General renewed conferences with 
the shopmen’s representatives. These meetings, however, 
did not result in any settlement of the issue. On the 25th 
the shopmen’s leaders announced that the men had voted 
98 per cent in favor of a strike, to start on September 2 if 
the wage increases were not granted. 2 This result they 
communicated to the President in conference. Mr. Wilson 
thereupon requested the leaders to present the question to 
the men once more, since in his opinion the vote had been 
taken on the matter of accepting the submission of their 
claims to a new tribunal, a question which no longer was 

1 Congressional Record , vol. lviii, p. 3718. 

J iV. Y. Times, Aug. 14, 21, 26, 1919. 


4 09] PRESIDENT WILSON , /p/p-jp^j 161 

pertinent, since such a tribunal was not then contemplated. 
After referring to the government’s measures to reduce the 
cost of living, the President continued: 

A general increase in the levels of wages would check and 
might defeat all this at its very beginning. Such increases 
would inevitably raise, not lower, the cost of living. Manu¬ 
facturers and producers of every sort would have innumer¬ 
able pretexts for increasing profits and all efforts to discover 
and defeat profiteering would be hopelessly confused. I be¬ 
lieve that the present efforts to reduce the cost of living will 
be successful if no new elements of difficulty are thrown in 
the way and I confidently count upon the men engaged in the 
service of the railways to assist, not obstruct. . . . All that I 
am now urging is that we should not be guilty of the inex¬ 
cusable inconsistency of making general increases in wages on 
the assumption that the present cost of living will be per¬ 
manent at the very time that we are trying with great con¬ 
fidence to reduce the cost of living and are able to say that it is 
actually beginning to fall. 

The President, at the suggestion of the Director General, 
at the same time offered the shopmen an increase of 4 cents 
an hour, instead of the 17 cent increase they demanded, 
pointing out that the increase offered would bring their 
wages into alignment with the same basis on which wages 
of other classes of railway workers were fixed, and that 
such an increase would bring the shopmen’s wages up to the 
rate of pay for machinists in private employments, as shown 
by the Department of Labor figures. 1 

In a statement to the public, also made on August 2 5, 
the President gave the government’s case in the same man¬ 
ner as above, and asserted that the wages of the shopmen, 
working regularly, many of them in districts in which prices 
were relatively low, were not comparable with wages paid 

1 Congressional Record, vol. lviii, p. 4344. 


!52 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [410 

for fluctuating employment in war industries situated in in¬ 
dustrial centers where the cost of living was highest. 1 

On August 26 the leaders of the shopmen notified Mr. 
Hines of their rejection of the 4-cent offer, and sent out a 
call for a vote by the men as to whether they would accept 
it or strike. 2 On the next day, however, after conferences 
with the heads of the American Federation of Labor, the 
leaders sent messages to the locals advising the shopmen to 
accept the offer of the President, pointing out that it would 
be a fatal mistake to strike at that time. They referred to 
a letter of August 26 from the Director General to the 
Chairman of the Board of Railway Wages and Working? 
Conditions, in which the former directed that the board 
should not consider general increases in wages pending ef¬ 
forts of the government to reduce the cost of living. The 
leaders then pointed out that since all the other unions had 
also asked for wage increases, which, as Mr. Hines’ instruc¬ 
tions indicated, would not be granted, and since these unions 
had not decided to strike, the shopcrafts would be com¬ 
pelled to carry the whole burden of a strike, a very undesir¬ 
able situation for them. 3 The offer of the President was 
then reluctantly accepted. 

The shopmen did not finally receive what they asked for 
in January, 1919, until July 20, 1920, when the new Rail¬ 
road Labor Board, believing that the cost of living was not 
likely to decrease very much, granted them a 13 cent in¬ 
crease, which, together with the increase granted by the 
President, made up the 17 cent advance which they had 
long before demanded. 4 

1 Cong. Rec., vol. lviii, p. 4343. 

*N. Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1919. 

3 Ibid., Aug. 29, 1919. 

4 Decisions of the U. S. Railroad Labor Board, vol. i, 1920, pp. 15, i6 r 

23. 


411 ] PRESIDENT WILSON, jpjp-jp^j 1631 

Critics of the administration have attacked the action of 
the President in the shopmen’s strike principally along two 
lines. Many of those who sympathized with the difficult 
position of labor at this time felt that in strict justice the 
shopmen were entitled to a larger increase than 4 cents, 
since their wages had remained stationary over a long period 
of rising prices. Yet it was probably true that the granting 
of an increase to them would have involved similar advances 
to other railway employees, which, taken altogether, would 
have been an added factor in the increased cost of living. 
To have increased wages would have necessitated an in¬ 
crease in railway rates, and consequently a vigorous and 
continued protest on the part of shippers and the general 
public. Undoubtedly the President was in a difficult posi¬ 
tion. Congress had refused to take the action he had re¬ 
quested for the establishment of a new wage board and had 
definitely placed all responsibility in the matter of wages 
upon him. Under these circumstances Mr. Wilson cannot 
be judged harshly for asking the shopmen to suffer what 
was perhaps an undue share of hardship. 

There remains one other matter, however, which cannot 
<be so easily defended. The President, after having de¬ 
termined on action to reduce the cost of living, decided on 
measures, which, even had Congress granted all he asked 
for, could not have had any important effect on prices. 
Mr. Wilson does not seem to have realized that his plan 
for reducing the cost of living could have but little result as 
long as credit remained uncontrolled. Though profiteering 
probably had something to do with high prices, it does not 
appear to have been an important factor. Profiteering itself 
was a result of the same cause which brought about high 
prices, that is, the continual expansion of credit on the part 
of the banks, based on an enormous gold reserve. If the 
President’s efforts to reduce the cost of living were really 


!54 labor disputes and THE PRESIDENT [412 

to be successful it would have been necessary for him to 
use whatever influence he had, either through Congress or 
directly, with the Federal Reserve Board, to restrict the 
rediscounting of commercial paper. Doubtless such a move 
on his part, did it become generally known, would have 
given rise to much criticism from those to whom high prices 
meant prosperity, i. e., to a large proportion of the bankers 
and business men of the country. But it would probably 
have been much more effective than the inconsequential 
measures actually taken by the administration, and upon 
which the railway employees and all other workers were 
asked to place their reliance, as an alternative to higher 
wages. 1 


2 . THE SYMPATHETIC RAILWAY STRIKE IN THE 
SOUTHWEST, I919 

About the 21st of August, 1919, large numbers of rail¬ 
way employees, including shopmen, yardmen, and many 
engaged in train operation about Los Angeles, went on 
strike in sympathy with the striking trainmen of the Pacific 
Electric Railway Company, the employees of which had quit 
work in order to obtain higher wages. The employees on 
the other roads, on going out, gave as a cause for their 
strike their refusal to handle freight from the Pacific electric 
lines. The suspension spread quickly, and, by the 26th had 
paralyzed rail service throughout Southern California. 1 

In the meantime officials of the railway Brotherhoods 
ordered the strikers employed on roads under government 
control to return to work at once. On the 27th the heads 
of the engineers’ and the trainmen’s Brotherhoods threat¬ 
ened them with expulsion if they did not return within 24 
hours. The strike, however, continued to spread, and soon 


l N. Y. Times, Aug. 26, 27, 31, 1919. 


413] PRESIDENT WILSON, jpjp-ip^i 165 

affected not only parts of California, but of Arizona and 
Nevada as well. 1 

On August 28, President Wilson, learning of large quan¬ 
tities of perishable foodstuffs halted by the strike, author¬ 
ized the Railroad Administration to exercise the entire 
power of the government, if necessary, to operate the rail¬ 
roads in the strike region. At the same time the Attorney 
General, with the sanction of the President, sent messages 
to the federal district attorneys in all the districts involved, 
ordering them to aid in the arrest and prosecution of any 
persons interfering with the operation of the railways under 
federal control, or whose action might delay the mails. The 
Director General on the same day issued a statement point¬ 
ing out that the strike was in violation of agreements with 
the Railroad Administration, and was illegal under the 
Brotherhood rules; that he had published advertisements in 
the California newspapers pointing out the absence of justi¬ 
fiability for the strike and urging the strikers to return to 
work; but that many still remained on strike. He accord¬ 
ingly announced that the places of all the strikers not at 
work by 7 A.M., August 30, would be filled. His state¬ 
ment also informed the public of the administration’s action 
in directing U. S. officials to enforce that section of the 
federal railroad control act which provided for fine or im¬ 
prisonment of anyone interfering with the operation of the 
.railroads under government control, and announced that the 
governors of the states and the mayors of the cities in the 
strike districts had been asked to cooperate with the govern¬ 
ment by enforcing any local or state laws which might aid 
operation of the railroads. 2 

The strikers quickly heeded the Director General’s warn- 

1 N. Y. Times, Aug. 28, 29, 1919. 

J Ibid., Aug. 29, 1919. 


r 66 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [414 

ing, and most of them returned to work by August 30. In 
a short time the sympathetic strike was at an end. 1 

3. THE STEEL STRIKE OF I919 

The great strike of the steel workers in the autumn of 
1919 has already received so much attention from other 
writers, and the sources of information concerning the 
issues involved and the progress of the strike are so readily 
available, that the general subject may be treated briefly 
here. 

At the annual convention of the American Federation of 
Labor held in St. Paul in June, 1918, resolutions were 
unanimously adopted to the effect that a campaign be in¬ 
augurated to organize the steel workers. 2 On August 1 and 
2 fifteen international unions affiliated with the A. F. of L. 
organized the National Committee for Organizing the Iron 
and Steel Workers, with Samuel Gompers as chairman and 
W. Z. Foster as secretary-treasurer.® This committee pro¬ 
ceeded with the work of organization, and was so success¬ 
ful that by the time the strike commenced over a year later 
they had enrolled over 150,000 steel workers, this number 
including only those who had paid the $1 initiation fee re¬ 
quired. 4 

On May 15, 1919, the Amalgamated Association of Iron, 
Steel, and Tin Workers, one of the most important of the 

1 N. Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1919. A number of suits were brought against 
strikers in accordance with the Attorney General’s orders. In the 
spring of 1920 30 of them were indicted for violating the Lever Act, 
and on June 19, 1920, a jury trying three of the cases together returned 
a verdict of guilty as to five defendants, fining them $1000 each, dis¬ 
agreed as to twelve defendants, and declared the remaining thirteen 
not guilty. Report of the Attorney General, 1920, p. 42. 

1 Foster, The Great Steel Strike and Its Lessons, 1920, p. 18. 

% Ibid., p. 23. 

6 Ibid., p. 65. 


4I5 ] PRESIDENT WILSON , jp/p-jp^j 167, 

organizations making up the National Committee, wrote to 
E. H. Gary, head of the United States Steel Corporation and 
the controlling factor in the steel industry, asking that he 
meet a committee of representatives of the steel workers. 
Five days later Mr. Gary replied, refusing a conference be¬ 
cause his company did “ not confer, negotiate with, or com¬ 
bat labor unions as such. We stand for the open shop. . . . 
We think this attitude secures the best results to the em¬ 
ployees generally, and to the employers.” 1 

On May 27 the National Committee, now representing 
twenty-four international unions, met in Washington and 
resolved that all the affiliated unions make a joint effort to 
enter into negotiations with the steel companies for the 
purpose of securing the establishment of better wages, 
shorter hours, improved working conditons, and collective 
bargaining in the steel industry. A committee headed by 
Samuel Gompers was appointed to have charge of the pre¬ 
liminary negotiations with the companies. 2 On June 20 
Mr. Gompers sent a letter to Mr. Gary asking for a con¬ 
ference with the committee. 3 After waiting for several 
weeks for an answer and receiving none, the National Com¬ 
mittee recommended to its affiliated unions that they take 
a strike vote of the locals in the steel industry. 4 5 

On July 20 the National Committee met again, and for¬ 
mulated a set of twelve demands of which those for collec¬ 
tive bargaining, the eight-hour day and the six-day week, 
and an increase in wages were probably the most important.® 

1 Foster, op. cit., pp. 70, 71. 

* Ibid., p. 73. 

s Report of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor Investi¬ 
gating the Steel Strike, 1st Sess., 66th Cong., Senate Report 289, p. 2. 

4 Foster, op. cit., p. 76. 

5 Ibid., p. 77. 


!58 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [416 

The tabulation of the strike vote was completed by Au¬ 
gust 20, and the organizers claimed that about 98 per cent 
of the union men had voted for a strike in case no settle¬ 
ment could be reached. The conference committee, with 
John Fitzpatrick, president of the Chicago Federation of 
Labor at its head, attempted to see Mr. Gary at his New 
York office on August 26, but was refused a conference, 
and was requested to submit its proposition in writing. 
This was done on the same day, and the committee once 
more asked for a conference. 1 

To this request Mr. Gary replied the next day, refusing 
the proposal and pointing out that his company stood for 
the open shop and did not discuss business with labor unions. 
The conference committee thereupon tried once more to 
have Mr. Gary meet them, asserting that “ reason and fair¬ 
ness should obtain rather than that the alternative [should] 
be compulsory upon [them].” 2 

Receiving no reply to this communication, the Execu¬ 
tive Council of the A. F. of L. delegated Mr. Gompers to ac¬ 
company the conference committee and present the mat¬ 
ter to President Wilson. About August 28 the committee 
met the President and asked him to arrange a conference 
between Mr. Gary and a committee of the employees of his 
corporation. Mr. Wilson agreed to try to bring about 
such a meeting. In order to give him an opportunity to do 
so the unions withheld the setting of the strike date. 3 

On September 4, while the President was on his western 
trip advocating the League of Nations, the National Com¬ 
mittee sent a telegram to him pointing out that the repres- 

1 Foster, op. cit., p. 79. 

* Senate Rep., op. cit., p. 4. 

* Hearings before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor 
Investigating the Steel Strike, Washington, 1919, p. 106, Testimony of 
Mr. Gompers. 


4 I 7 ] PRESIDENT WILSON, jpjp.jp^/ 169 

sive acts of the officials in the steel towns and the discharge 
of union men by the companies were so exciting the workers 
that it would be difficult to keep them from striking much 
longer. The committee asked the President to reply by 
September 9 as to whether a conference with Mr. Gary 
could be arranged. 1 

On the 9th the presidents of the unions in the Steel in¬ 
dustry met to determine on a course of action. There was 
laid before the meeting a telegram from the President's 
secretary, Mr. Tumulty, informing them that Mr. Wilson 
had not yet been successful in arranging a conference, but 
that he was continuing his efforts. The meeting then sent 
another telegram to the President asking for a definite state¬ 
ment as to the possibility of his being able to arrange a con¬ 
ference with Mr. Gary. The next day Mr. Tumulty an¬ 
swered this telegram in practically the same way as he had 
answered the previous one. His message held out no def¬ 
inite hope for a conference, nor did it suggest any other 
way out. On receipt of this reply the meeting voted that 
the steel strike begin on September 22. 2 

This decision, which was at once published, probably 
reached the ears of the President immediately, for on the 
same day, September 10, Secretary Tumulty sent the follow¬ 
ing telegram, which was published in the press the next day, 
to Mr. Gompers: 

In view of the difficulty of arranging any present satisfactory 
mediation with regard to the steel situation, the President de¬ 
sires to urge upon the steel men, through you, the wisdom and 
desirability of postponing action of any kind until after the 
forthcoming Industrial Conference at Washington. 3 

Foster, op. cit., p. 85. 

3 Ibid., pp. 86-88. 

* Senate Report, op. cit., p. 4. President Wilson, on September 3,. 


iy 0 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [418 

Mr. Gompers forwarded this message to Chairman Fitz¬ 
patrick of the National Committee, expressing the hope 
“ that something can be done without injury to the workers 
and their cause to endeavor to conform to the wish ex¬ 
pressed by the President.” 1 On the 12th Mr. Fitzpatrick 
replied to Mr. Gompers, saying: 

It would be a thousand times better for the entire labor move¬ 
ment that we lose the strike and suffer complete defeat, than 
to attempt postponement now, except under a definite arrange¬ 
ment which would absolutely and positively guarantee the steel 
workers substantial concessions and protection. If these things 
cannot be guaranteed, then, in our opinion, our only hope is 
the strike. 2 

After considering the President's request, and after re¬ 
ceiving many protests against postponement of the strike 
date and threats from the men to go on strike even if it were 
postponed by the leaders, 3 the National Committee voted 

1919, and thereafter, had asked various bodies representing organized 
labor, employers and farmers to appoint representatives to an Indus¬ 
trial Conference, to meet in Washington on October 6, for “the pur¬ 
pose of reaching, if possible, some common ground of agreement and 
action with regard to the future conduct of industry.” The President 
himself appointed 22 “ representatives of the public,” among whom 
were John D. Rockefeller, Jr., E. H. Gary, B. M. Baruch, Dr. Charles 
W. Eliot, Henry S. Dennison, Charles Edward Russell, John Spargo, 
and B. M. Jewell. Proceedings of the First Industrial Conference, 
Oct. 6-23, 1919, Washington, 1920, pp. 4-6. 

1 Senate Report, op. cit., p. 4. 

2 Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 4. W. Z. Foster, who managed the 
strike for the unions, said of this request of the President, “ It was 
like asking one belligerent to ground arms in the face of its onrushing 
antagonist. The employers gave not the slightest sign of a truce. 
Long before anything could be hoped for from the Industrial Con¬ 
ference, they would have cut the unions to pieces, had the workers 
been foolish enough to give them the opportunity.” Foster, op. cit., 

p. 90. 

3 Foster, op. cit., pp. 91-92. 


419] PRESIDENT WILSON, IJV 

to reaffirm September 22 as the strike date. The committee 
then sent a long letter to the President, giving in detail their 
reasons for not acceding to his request, and pointing out 
especially that the continued discharge of union men by the 
Steel Corporation, and preparations on a large scale by the 
companies to defeat the strike, would make postponement 
fatal. The letter continued, “ If delay were no more than 
delay, even at the cost of membership in our organizations, 
we would urge the same to the fullest of our ability, not¬ 
withstanding the men are set for an immediate strike. But 
delay here means the surrender of all hope ”. 1 

On September 22 the strike commenced, about 280,000 
men quitting work in the steel mills. At the end of a week 
the total number of strikers exceeded 300,ooo. 2 There¬ 
after the strike continued, accompanied by the persecution 
of strikers and their families, suppression by the Pennsyl¬ 
vania State Troopers and local officials of the right of free 
speech and free assembly, villification of the Strike leaders, 
dissemination of propaganda fostered by the companies and 
handed out in great quantities to the effect that the strike 
was the result of Bolshevik conspiracies, that the workers 
received very high pay, etc., etc. 3 

Federal troops were sent to Gary, Indiana, where the 
Steel Corporation had a large plant, on October 6, and 
were not finally withdrawn until January 1, 1920. 4 The 
best account available concerning the occasion for the use 
of troops at Gary and their activities seems to be that given 

1 Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 5. 

2 Public Opinion and the Steel Strike, Commission on Inquiry of the 
Interchurch World Movement, N. Y., 1921, p. 132. 

3 For a good account of the strike and its issues, never effectively 
answered by the Steel Corporation, see the Report on the Steel Strike, 
1920, and Public Opinion and the Street Strike, 1921, published by the 
Commission on Inquiry of the Interchurch World Movement. 

4 Report of the Secretary of War, 1920, p. 71. 


172 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [420 

in the Interchurch Report on the Steel Strike, which is here 
quoted at some length: 

The walkout on September 22 at Gary was almost complete. 
Agreements, subject to various disputes over interpretation, 
were reached with city authorities concerning picket line rules. 
Huge mass-meetings were held in the open air. The strikers 
made frequent complaints of violent raids carried out by bands 
of citizens calling themselves ‘ Loyal American Leaguers ’, who 
were charged with clubbing groups of strikers on street comers 
at night. A crowd of strikers leaving a mass-meeting tried 
to pull a negro strikebreaker off a street car: the negro was 
slightly injured and a number of strikers were clubbed. [Oct¬ 
ober 4.] On this case of 4 mob violence ’, the only one alleged, 
Indiana state guards were sent in. Parades were forbidden. 
Ex-service men among the strikers, independently of the strike 
leadership, put on their old army uniforms and started a march 
to exhibit the uniforms to the guardsmen. There were about 
200 of these ex-soldiers and about 10,000 strikers in the streets 
fell in behind the procession which wound through the town 
in disregard of the guardsmen and quietly disbanded in the 
park where meetings were held. On this second case of ‘ moh 
violence known as the * outlaw parade \ the United States 
regulars occupied Gary, with General Wood in personal 
charge. . . . [October 6.] The regulars were equipped with 
bayonets and steel helmets and the force included many trucks 
mounting machine guns and bringing field artillery. 

General Wood declared that ‘ the army would be neutral \ 
He established rules in regard to picketing. These rules were 
so interpreted and carried out as to result in breaking up the 
picket line. One picket, for example, would be permitted at a 
certain spot; if the striker who came up to relieve the picket 
stopped to converse with him and to receive reports and 
instructions, both strikers would be arrested. Delays and dif¬ 
ficulties would attend the release of these men from jail or 
‘ bull pen \ The picket line thus dwindled and its disappear¬ 
ance signalled to the Gary workers that the strike was break- 


173 


421 ] PRESIDENT WILSON, /p/p-jp^J 

ing. Army officers sent soldiers to arrest union officers in 
other trades, for example for threatening to call a strike on 
a local building operation. Workers throughout the city be¬ 
lieved that the Federal Government opposed them and that 
the regulars would stay as long as the steel workers remained 
on strike. 1 

From time to time during the strike unsuccessful at¬ 
tempts were made to have the strike issues arbitrated. The 
most important of these efforts, and the most significant, 
in view of the President’s suggestion of September io that 
the strike be postponed until after the Industrial Conference 
had met, was that made by the labor group in the Confer¬ 
ence, which began its sessions as scheduled on October 6, 
1919. On October 9 Mr. Gompers, on behalf of the labor 
members, presented the following resolution: 

Resolved, That each group comprising this conference select 
two persons . . . , and these six so selected .... constitute 
a committee to which shall be referred existing differences 
between the workers and the employers in the steel industry 
for adjudication and settlement. 

Pending the findings of this committee this conference re¬ 
quests the workers involved in this strike to return to work 
and the employers to reinstate them in their former positions. 2 

On October 21 this resolution was rejected by the confer¬ 
ence, a majority of the public group and the employers’ 
group voting against it. 3 

1 Report on the Steel Strike, Interchurch etc., op. cit., pp. 240-242, 
see also N. Y. Times, N. Y. World, Oct. 7, 1919. 

2 Proceedings of the First Ind. Conf., op. cit., p. 58. 

* Ibid., p. 240. The conference broke up on October 22, when the 
labor group withdrew, the employer’s group having refused to agree 
to a resolution recognizing the “ right of wage earners to organize 
without discrimination, to bargain collectively, to be represented by 
representatives of their own choosing in negotiations and adjustments 
with employers. . . /’ Ibid., p. 269. 


!j 4 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [422 

On December 5, having received the agreement of the 
National Committee to abide by any plan of settlement 
which the Interchurch Commission on Inquiry might pro¬ 
pose, the Commission conferred with Mr. Gary. He re¬ 
fused to confer with them as mediators in behalf of the 
strikers, and declared that there was “ absolutely no issue ” 
to discuss. 1 

The strike finally ended on January 8, 1920, after the 
National Committee had ascertained that the steel companies 
had recruited working forces to about three fourths of 
normal, and that steel production was 60 per cent to 70 per 
cent of normal. 2 The tremendous size of the U. S. Steel 
Corporation and the energy and methods with which it 
fought the strike, the suppression of strike activities in the 
steel districts, the hostile attitude of the press, and the lack 
of wholehearted support from the labor movement in gen¬ 
eral were probably the most important factors in the defeat 
of the strikers. 3 

One matter in connection with the President’s attitude to¬ 
ward the strike deserves special consideration. Reference 
has been made to his attempt to get Mr. Gary to confer with 
representatives of the unions, and to the President’s lack of 
success. It will be recalled that on September 10, hearing 
that the international presidents had set the strike date for 
September 22, the President instructed*his secretary to re¬ 
quest that the strike be postponed until after the Industrial 
Conference had met. This request quickly reached the press 
and was given wide publicity. The publication of the 
telegram at once placed the responsibility for the strike, as 
far as the public was concerned, upon the shoulders of the 

1 Public Opinion and the Steel Strike, op. cit., p. 339. 

1 Foster, op. cit., p. 192. 

1 Interchurch Report on the Steel Strike, op. cit., p. 15. 


423] PRESIDENT WILSON, 175 

unions, who were placed before the nation in the position 
of refusing the President’s request and thus of bringing on 
the strike. But to one who reads of the events preceding 
the setting of the strike date, it is apparent that the respon¬ 
sibility for the strike rests also upon the shoulders of Mr. 
Gary, because of his persistent refusal, even at the Presi¬ 
dent’s request, to meet the representatives of the unions. 

Since the President’s telegram requesting a postponement 
was published in the newspapers, his failure to make a 
public statement telling of Mr. Gary’s refusal to confer 
seems to have been unfair and unjust to the cause of the 
strikers. Such a public statement would have placed the re¬ 
sponsibility where it to a considerable degree belonged, and 
might have done more than any other method the President 
could have used to bring concessions from Mr. Gary and 
thus prevent the strike. 

In criticizing President Wilson it is only fair, however, 
to remember his position at this time. He had returned 
from Europe worn out by his prolonged labors at the Peace 
Conference, and now, with rapidly lessening vigor, he was 
face to face with the danger of being repudiated by his own 
country. To him the most important task was to win over 
Congress and the nation to an acceptance of the Treaty of 
Versailles and the League of Nations Covenant. Upon this 
the President concentrated his powers. Even though he ap¬ 
peared to take an active part in the settlement of the shop¬ 
men’s dispute in August, 1919, it is probable that most of 
the work in that case was done by Director General Hines, 
During the western trip, undertaken in September, Mr. 
Wilson’s mind was almost wholly occupied by the question 
of foreign affairs, and the collapse which ended the trip 
necessitated his complete withdrawal from public affairs for 
a long period. Under these circumstances the attempts of 
the administration to bring about a conference with Mr. 


! 7 6 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [424 

Gary must have been largely in the hands of Mr. Tumulty, 
and the latter was probably chiefly responsible for the re¬ 
quest to the strike committee to postpone the strike and the 
failure to make public Mr. Gary’s refusal to confer with the 
union leaders. 

There is reason for asserting that the President used 
poor judgment when he agreed to use his influence with Mr. 
Gary to bring about a meeting. The well known anti-union 
policy of the Steel Corporation, and its persistent refusal for 
many years to deal with unions in any way, made even the 
possibility of success on the President’s part very doubtful. 
Furthermore, except during war-time, a President has al¬ 
most never attempted to interfere in disputes other than 
those concerned with the coal or the transportation indus¬ 
tries, in which a suspension of production might involve 
serious public hardship. The steel industry has no such di¬ 
rect influence on public welfare. Under these conditions it 
would have been the part of wisdom to avoid interference 
until public opinion was further roused to support the 
move. However, had Mr. Wilson possessed his oldtime 
thoroughness and vigor he might have been successful even 
under such heavy odds. As it was, nothing but failure for 
the administration could be expected. 1 

1 One other matter regarding the administration’s part in the strike 
should be mentioned briefly. It is concerned with the confusion of the 
Department of Justice with regard to the real purpose of the strike. 
The Department, aided in Gary by federal soldiers, raided strikers’ 
headquarters and arrested strikers and other workers for radical 
activities, evidently on the assumption that the strike was part of a 
Bolshevik plot. The arrests were very often made on alleged in¬ 
formation furnished to the Department by detective agencies working 
for the steel companies. In Gary the attorney for the strikers was 
seized by the troops as a dangerous radical. For these activities see 
the N. Y. Times, the N. Y. World, the Chicago Tribune, October 8, 
9, 10, and subsequent dates; also the Interchurch Report on the Steel 
Strike, p. 225. 


i77 


425] PRESIDENT WILSON, jpjp-jp^I 

4. THE BITUMINOUS COAL STRIKE OF I9I9 

On September 22, 1919, a convention of the United Mine 
Workers approved a set of demands to be presented to the 
bituminous operators, and to be embodied in a new contract 
to be effective from and after November 1, 1919, for a period 
of two years. Most important among the demands were 
those asking for a 60 per cent increase in wages and the 
introduction of the six hour day—five day week schedule. 1 
The next day the program of the miners was presented to 
a joint conference of miners and operators of the central 
competitive field. Thereafter various conferences were 
held, but on October it the meetings came to an end without 
an agreement having been reached. 2 . 

The miners’ convention of September 22 had instructed 
Acting President John L. Lewis to issue a strike order ef¬ 
fective November 1 in case no agreement with the operators 
could be secured. On October 14, having heard that the 
strike order was about to be issued, Secretary of Labor 
Wilson wrote to Mr. Lewis, asking that the order be with¬ 
held until he had conferred with him. A request was also 
sent to T. T. Brewster, representing the operators, asking 
for a conference. On the next day Mr. Lewis wired the 
Secretary that the order had already been issued in accord¬ 
ance with the instructions of the convention. 3 On the 16th 
the Secretary met Messrs. Brewster and Lewis. The 
former refused to enter into negotiations for a new wage 

1 Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1920, p. 104. The demand for the 
six hour day was made because of the miners’ desire for steady and con¬ 
tinuous work throughout the year, in place of the prevailing conditions 
of long hours part of the year and little or no work the remainder. 
The demand, instead of being one for less work, as the newspapers 
interpreted it, was one for steady work. 

2 Ibid., p. 104. 

2 Ibid., p. 104. 


lyg LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [426 

scale until the strike order was recalled. President Lewis, 
on the other hand, was equally firm in his contention that he 
had no authority to call off the proposed strike. 1 

Thereupon Secretary Wilson called the joint scale com¬ 
mittees of the operators and the miners to meet him. The 
conference met at the Department of Labor headquarters 
on October 211, and continued in session for four days. 
While it was in progress President Wilson wrote to the 
Secretary of Labor: 

Whatever their differences may be, no matter how widely 
divergent their viewpoints may be from each other, it is a 
duty that they owe to society to make an earnest effort to 
negotiate those differences and to keep the mines of our 
country in operation. After all, the public interest in this 
matter is the paramount consideration of the Government.... 
If for any reason the miners and operators fail to come to a 
mutual understanding, the interests of the public are of such 
vital importance in connection with the production of coal that 
it is incumbent upon them to refer the matters in dispute to a 
board of arbitration for determination, and to continue the 
operation of the mines pending the decision of the board. 2 

This letter, however, was without effect on the contending 
parties, for on the 24th the conferees adjourned without 
reaching an agreement, the difficulty still being the refusal 
of the miners to withdraw the strike order before wage 
negotiations took place. 8 

In the meantime, on October 2>i, Attorney General Palmer 
had petitioned tihe United States District Court in Indian¬ 
apolis for an injunction restraining the officers and members 
of the United Mine Workers from carrying on the pro¬ 
posed strike. The petition was based on the Lever Act of 

1 Monthly Labor Review, December, 1919, p. 1730. 

* Congressional Record, vol. lviii, p. 7845. 

3 Rep. Sec. Labor, op. cit., p. 104. 


179 


4 2;] PRESIDENT WILSON, jp/p-ip^i 

August io, 1917, providing for federal war-time control 
of food and fuel, particularly on Section 4, which made it 
unlawful “ ,to conspire, combine, agree, or arrange with any 
other person (a) to limit the facilities for transporting, pro¬ 
ducing, harvesting, manufacturing, supplying, storing, or 
dealing in any necessaries, (b) to restrict the supply of any 
necessaries, (c) to restrict the distribution of any neces¬ 
saries, (d) to prevent, limit, or lessen the manufacture or 
production of any necessaries in order to enhance the price 
thereof ” 1 

On October 24, after the second conference with the 
Secretary of Labor had come to an unsuccessful conclusion, 
President Wilson issued a public statement from which 
the following excerpts are given: 

The strike is one of the gravest steps ever proposed in this 
country, affecting the economic welfare and the domestic com¬ 
fort and health of the people. 

It is proposed to abrogate an agreement as to wages which 
was made with the sanction of the United States Fuel Ad¬ 
ministration, 2 and which was to run during the continuance 
of the war, but not beyond April 1, 1920. This strike is pro¬ 
posed at a time when the Government is making the most ear¬ 
nest effort to reduce the cost of living and has appealed with 
success to other classes of workers to postpone similar disputes 
until a reasonable opportunity has been afforded for dealing 
with the cost of living. 

It is recognized that the strike would practically shut off 
the country’s supply of its principal fuel at a time when in¬ 
terference with that supply is calculated to create a disastrous 
fuel famine. . . . 

The country is confronted with the prospect at a time when 
the war itself is still a fact, when the world is still in suspense 
as to negotiations for peace, when our troops are still being 

1 Chap. 53, sec. 4, 4° Stat. 277. 

2 Cf. supra., p. 129. 


iSo LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [428 

transported, and when their means of transport is in urgent 
need of fuel. 

From whatever angle the subject may be viewed, it is ap¬ 
parent that such a strike in such circumstances would be the 
most far-reaching plan ever presented in this country to limit 
the facilities of production and distribution of a necessity of 
life and thus indirectly to restrict the production and distribu¬ 
tion of all the necessaries of life. A strike under these cir¬ 
cumstances is not only unjustifiable, it is unlawful. 

The action proposed has apparently been taken without any 
vote upon the specific proposition by the individual members 
of the United Mine Workers of America, throughout the 
United States, an almost unprecedented proceeding. . . . 

In these circumstances I solemnly request both the national 
and the local officers and also individual members of the* 
United Mine Workers of America to recall all orders looking 
to a strike on November 1, and to take whatever steps may be 
necessary to prevent any stoppage of work. . . . 

I can do nothing else than to say that the law will be en¬ 
forced, and the means will be found to protect the interests 
of the nation in any emeregncy that may arise out of this un¬ 
happy business. 

I express no opinion on the merits of the controversy. I 
have already suggested a plan by which a settlement may be 
reached, and I hold myself in readiness at the request of 
either or both sides to appoint at once a tribunal to investigate 
all the facts with a view to aiding in the earliest possible 
orderly settlement of the questions at issue between the coal 
operators and the coal miners, to the end that the just rights, 
not only of those interests, but also of the general public may 
be fully protected. 1 

On October 29 the Attorney General, who had been in¬ 
structed by the President to take whatever steps were neces¬ 
sary to protect the public interest, issued a statement setting 

1 Monthly Labor Review, December, 1919, p. 1731. 


429] PRESIDENT WILSON, ipip-ip2I 181 

forth the government’s position. He maintained that the 
government had the right to prevent the strike because of 
its illegality, without impairing the general right to strike; 
that the armistice did not end the war and that the courts 
had in many cases held that the war-emergency statutes were 
still in force; that Congress had recognized the existence of 
a war emergency as late as October 22, 1919, in the passage 
of an act making the food and fuel control act more effec¬ 
tive ; that the proposed strike would be a concerted arrange¬ 
ment to restrict the production and distribution of the neces¬ 
saries of life, which Congress, by the enactment of the 
Lever Act, had intended to prevent; that the government 
would give protection to any men desiring to work; and 
that the facts presented a situation which challenged the 
supremacy of the law, and every resource of the govern¬ 
ment would be brought to bear to prevent the national dis¬ 
aster which would inevitably result from the cessation of 
mining operations. 1 

The representatives of the miners met at Indianapolis on 
the same day to consider the situation, particularly the sug¬ 
gestion of the President that negotiations be resumed and 
that a hoard of arbitration be appointed. After voting not 
to rescind the strike order they gave out a statement of their 
position. They maintained that the order came from the 
regularly constituted convention of the miners, the highest 
authority in their organization; that their wages had not 
been increased for two years, while the cost of living had 
mounted rapidly; that their contract had legally expired, 
since the war had ended; and that they would meet the mine 
operators at any time for the purpose of resuming negotia¬ 
tions. “ Such action alone,” they stated, “ will put the 
mines in operation and guarantee the nation an adequate 
supply of coal.” 2 

1 Monthly Labor Review, op. cit., p. 1733. 

1 Ibid., p. 1735. 


1S2 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [430 

Two days later Judge A. B. Anderson, of the federal 
court at Indianapolis, handed down a temporary restrain¬ 
ing order presumably based on the Lever Act, and operative 
until November 8, when a hearing on a temporary injunc¬ 
tion was scheduled to take place. The order commanded 
84 national and district officers of the United Mine Workers 
and “ all other persons whomsoever,” not to issue any mes¬ 
sage that the strike was to be enforced as previously an¬ 
nounced, “ and to desist and refrain from doing any further 
act whatsoever to bring about or continue in effect the above 
described strike, . . . from issuing any further strike orders 
to local unions and members of local unions or to district 
unions for the purpose of supporting such strike by bringing 
about or maintaining any other strikes; from issuing any 
instructions, written or oral, covering or arranging for the 
details of enforcing such strike, . . , from issuing any mes¬ 
sages of encouragement or exhortation to striking miners 
or mine workers or unions thereof to abstain from work 
or not to return to the mines, . . . and from issuing and dis¬ 
tributing, or taking any steps to procure the issuance or 
distribution, to miners and mine workers striking and ab¬ 
staining from work in pursuance of such strike, of so- 
called strike benefits, . . . and from conspiring, combining, 
agreeing, or arranging with each other or any other person 
to limit the facilities for the production of coal, or to re¬ 
strict the supply or distribution of coal, or from aiding or 
abetting the doing of any such act or thing.” 1 

On the same day the Attorney General said, “ No strike 
can go on without being directed, and if this injunction is 
obeyed this strike of the coal miners cannot continue, for 
this restraining order acts to make it leaderless so far as 
the national scope of it is concerned.” 2 

1 Monthly Labor Review, p. 1737. 

2 N. Y. Times, November i, 1919. 


43 I] PRESIDENT WILSON , 183 

However, strike orders had gone, out, strike prepara¬ 
tions had already been made, and on November 1 approx¬ 
imately 425,000 bituminous miners quit work, tying up 
75 per cent of the bituminous industry. The walkout af¬ 
fected not only the central competitive held, consisting of 
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and western Pennsylvania, but ex¬ 
tended to seventeen other states. 1 

The hearing on the government’s motion for a temporary 
injunction took place on November 8. The miners’ lawyers 
being unsuccessful in their attempt to convince Judge Ander¬ 
son that such action was unwarranted, the injunction was 
granted. Since the restraining order had been up to that 
time without apparent effect in preventing the strike, the 
new order contained a mandate from the court ordering the 
defendants to issue a withdrawal and cancellation of the 
strike order, “ and communicate the same to district or 
local unions, committees and members of said . . . United 
Mine Workers of America, as fully and completely as the 
said strike order has been heretofore distributed and cir¬ 
culated ... and the said defendants are allowed until 
six o’clock, P.M., on the nth day of November, 1919, 
within which to withdraw and cancel said strike order . . . , 
said notice of withdrawal and cancellation to be submitted 
to the Court for his approval ” by November 11. 2 

This order of the court was obeyed by the United Mine 
Workers’ officials, 'but no resumption of mining took place 
in the affected areas, and the hardships resulting from the 
strike became more severe. On November 18 the Secretary 
of Labor once more invited the miners and operators to 
meet him in Washington. The conference, representing all 
the bituminous miners and operators, decided to take up 
negotiations for the central competitive field first. On 

1 Monthly Labor Review, op. cit., p. 1725. 

* Sayre, Cases on Labor Law, Cambridge, 1922, p. 757. 


!8 4 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [432 

November 20 the operators of that field offered to increase 
wages 15 cents per ton or 20 per cent for day work, on con¬ 
dition that Fuel Administrator Garfield, whom the Presi¬ 
dent, on October 30, had recalled to his war-time duties of 
controlling the prices of fuel, would permit an increase in 
the selling price of coal. This offer the miners rejected, 
reasserting their original demands. The next day they 
modified the wage demands by offering to accept a 40 per 
cent increase, which the operators in turn rejected. 

With conditions thus at a deadlock the Secretary of Labor 
submitted a proposal that a general increase of 31.61 per cent 
should be granted by the operators as a basis of settlement. 
Thi9 amount, which the Secretary had arrived at by deter¬ 
mining the increase necessary to bring the wages of tonnage 
workers up to the increased cost of living, and extending 
that increase to day workers, was accepted by the miners, 
and approved by the operators on condition that the Fuel 
Administrator would permit an increase in prices high 
enough to yield them a profit. 1 

The conference thereupon adjourned and the proposition 
of Secretary Wilson was referred to Mr. Garfield. On 
November 26 the latter stated his conclusions to the opera¬ 
tors and miners. He refused to approve the 31.61 per cent 
increase and instead offered his own proposal of a 14 per 
cent increase, based on the same Bureau of Labor figures 
used by the Secretary of Labor, but arrived at by determin¬ 
ing the weighted average increase to all mine workers and 
adding to this an amount, 14 per cent, sufficient to bring 
the average wage of all miners up to the increase in the 
cost of living. This increase the miners rejected, again 
expressing their willingness to accept the offer of the Secre¬ 
tary of Labor. The operators, on the other hand, im- 

1 Report of the Secretary of Labor, op. cit., pp. 105-106; Final Report 
of the Fuel Adminstration, 1917-1919, Washington, 1921, p. 18. 


433] PRESIDENT WILSON, 185 

mediately accepted the Garfield proposition. 1. Upon this the 
conferences ended. 

On December 3 government attorneys brought informa¬ 
tion against 84 representatives of the United Mine Workers, 
charging them with contempt of court for disobeying the 
injunction. Many of them were arrested and placed under 
bonds of $5,000 and $10,000 each. 1 2 Meanwhile the War 
Department had given orders that troops be sent at the re¬ 
quest of the executives of the coal-mining states to protect 
all men who desired to work in the mines. 3 Federal troops . 
were accordingly sent into West Virginia, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Kan¬ 
sas, and Washington. 4 The presence of the troops, the 
arrest of the union officials, and the inability of the latter to 
continue to pay strike benefits under the terms of the injunc¬ 
tion, gradually weakened the strikers, 5 6 

On December 6 President Wilson issued a public state¬ 
ment again urging a settlement of the strike. He said: 

I understand the operators have generally agreed to absorb 
an increase of 14 per cent in wages, so that the public would 
pay not to exceed the present price fixed by the Fuel Admin¬ 
istrator, and thus a way is opened to secure the coal of which 
the people stand in need, if the miners will resume work on 
these terms pending a thorough investigation by an impartial 
commission, which may readjust both wages and prices. 

By the acceptance of such a plan the miners are assured 
immediate steady employment at a substantial increase in 

1 Rep. Sec. Labor, op. cit., p. 107; Final Rep. Fuel Adm., op. cit., p. 18. 

2 Report of President Lewis to the 28th Convention of the U. M. W 

of A , 1921, p. 23. 

*N. Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1919. 

*Ibid., Nov. 1, 3, 4, 29, 30, 1919; Report of the Secretary of War r 
1920, pp. 71-72. 

6 Rep. of Lewis to Convention, op. cit., p. 23. 


X86 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [434 

wages and are further assured prompt investigation and ac¬ 
tion upon questions which are not now settled to their satis¬ 
faction. I must believe that with a clear understanding of 
these points they will promptly return to work. If, never¬ 
theless, they persist in remaining on strike, they will put 
themselves in an attitude of striking in order to force the 
Government to increase the price of coal to the public. . . . 
No group of our people can justify such a position. . . . 
Immediately upon a general resumption of mining I shall 
be glad to aid in the prompt formation of such a tribunal as 
I have indicated to make further inquiries into this whole 
matter, and to review not only the reasonableness of the wages 
at which the miners start to work, but also the reasonableness 
of the Government prices for coal. 1 

On the publication of this statement President Lewis and 
Secretary-Treasurer Green of the miners went to Wash¬ 
ington and conferred with the Attorney General and the 
President’s secretary, Mr. Tumulty. The miners’ leaders 
being convinced that it was desirable to end the strike, 2 the 
following memorandum, which had been approved by the 
President, was accepted by Messrs. Lewis and Green, and 
on December 10 was approved by the representatives of the 
miners in meeting at Indianapolis: 

In accordance with the request of the President, as contained 
in his statement of December 6, the miners will immediately 
return to work with the 14 per cent increase in wages. . . . 
Immediately upon a general resumption of operations . . . . 
the President will appoint a commission of three persons. . . . 
[to] consider further questions of wages and working con- 

1 Award and Recommendations of the U. S. Bituminous Coal Com¬ 
mission, Washington, 1920, pp. 9-10. 

3 Concerning this President Lewis, in his report to the 1921 conven¬ 
tion, op. cit., p. 24, said, “ While protesting in our hearts against what 
we believed to be the unjust attitude of the government, we decided 
to submit to the inevitable.” 


435] PRESIDENT WILSON, 187 

ditions as well as profits of operators and proper prices for 
coal. ... Its report will be made within 60 days, if possible, 
and will be accepted as the basis of a new wage agreement, 
the effective date and duration of which shall be determined 
by the commission. 1 

As a result of the agreement the government had the 
contempt charges against all but one of the miners’ leaders 
dropped. 2 

On December 19, the miners having in the meantime 
returned to work, President Wilson appointed Henry M. 
Robinson, chairman, J. P. White, representing the miners, 
and Rembrandt Peak, representing the operators, as mem¬ 
bers of the United States Bituminous Coal Commission, 
and urged upon them the importance of reaching unani¬ 
mous conclusions. 3 The commission spent most of the 
winter hearing testimony, and on March 10, 1920, it pre¬ 
sented majority and minority awards to the President. The 
majority award granted increases of 31 per cent to tonnage 
miners, and 20 per cent to day workers, the average increases 
for all miners over 1919 rates being 27 per cent. It re¬ 
fused to grant the six-hour day, recommended the setting 
up of bipartite commissions in the various districts to make 
further study of disputed points and <to adjust wages on the 
basis of the award, and decided that the contracts based on 

1 Award of the Bit. Com., op. cit., p. 10. Mr. Garfield resigned as Fuel 
Administrator on the adoption of the agreement, being opposed to the 
plan of settlement as contrary to “ sound principle ”. See the Final 
Rep. of the Fuel Adm., op. cit., p. 19. 

2 The exception was Alexander Howat, leader of the Kansas miners, 
who, in the opinion of Judge Anderson, had been too defiant in his 
continued direction of the strike after the injunction had been issued. 
The case against him was continued indefinitely on December 29, fol¬ 
lowing the return of the Kansas miners to work. See N. Y. Times, 
Dec. 8, 17, 23, 24, and 30, 1919; United Mine Workers Journal, Dec. 
15, 1919, and Jan. 1, 1920. 

s Award of the Bit. Com., op. cit., pp. 7-9. 


jgg LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [436 

the award should remain in effect for two years, beginning 
April 1, 1920. The minority report, signed by the miners’ 
representative, dissented principally from the low increase 
given day workers. 1 

On March 19 President Wilson transmitted a copy of 
the report to the miners and operators, and suggested the 
convening of the necessary joint conferences for the pur¬ 
pose of drawing up agreements based on the award. “ I 
regret,” he wrote, “ that the members of the commission 
were not unanimous on all points as I had expressed the hope 
they would be, but the report of the majority is none the 
less the report of the commission and binding as such.” He 
announced also that on and after April 1, it no longer being 
expedient to continue the control of prices, no government 
maximum prices would be enforced. 2 

The officials of the United Mine Workers remained in 
Washington for some days longer, and held numerous con¬ 
ferences with the President, trying to get him to accept 
the minority report of the commission, but were unsuccess^ 
ful. 3 Finally, on March 29, a joint conference of operators 
and miners representing the central competitive field met 
in New York. The operators having refused to grant wage 
increases larger than those awarded by the commission, a 
joint agreement embodying the terms of the award was 
signed on March 31. Shortly afterwards the’ outlying dis¬ 
tricts held joint conferences and signed agreements based on 
the New York one, as the commission had suggested. 4 

To what extent the responsibility for the administration’s 
handling of the bituminous strike can be charged to the 

1 Award of the Bit. Com., op. cit., pp. 38-65. 

2 Ibid., p. v. 

3 Rep. of Lewis to 1921 Convention, op. cit., p. 27. 

'Ibid., p. 38. 


437 ] PRESIDENT WILSON, ipip-ipzi 189 

President is a question of considerable uncertainty. It 
will be remembered that in September, 1919, he suddenly 
returned from a trip through the West because of a serious 
failure of health. No cabinet meetings at which Mr. Wil¬ 
son was present are known to have been held during the 
period when the administration was handling the strike. 
The acts of his cabinet officers are of course ultimately 
chargeable to him, and the public statements and letters 
sent out in his name during the period, in the absence of 
proof to the contrary, must be assumed to have come from 
him directly. Although President Wilson, in his letters 
of December 19, 1919, appointing the bituminous commis¬ 
sion, and written when his health had improved somewhat, 
assumed responsibility for the injunction and the other activ¬ 
ities of the administration, 1 one is led to believe, from a 
study of the administration’s part in the strike, that the 
policies followed were determined and carried out by the 
cabinet, without the active direction of the President, and 
usually under the leadership of his secretary, Mr. Tumulty, 
Attorney General Palmer and Fuel Administrator Garfield. 
It does not seem possible that the President, were he di¬ 
recting the administration’s policies, would have permitted 
the making of two such contradictory offers of settlement 
within five days of each other as the 31.61 per cent of Sec¬ 
retary Wilson and the 14 per cent offer of the Fuel Admin¬ 
istrator. Further evidence that the cabinet, and not the 
President, handled the strike is shown by the general tenor 
of the letters exchanged between Director General Hines, of 
the Railway Administration, Mr. Garfield, and Mr. Tumulty, 
with regard to the need of government fuel control, 2 and 
by the nature of the despatches to the newspapers, especially 
to the New York Times, from Washington during the strike. 

1 Award of the Bit. Coal Com., op. cit. pp. 7-9. 

* Final Rep. of the Fuel A dm., op. cit., pp. 15, 16, 19. 


I9 0 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [438 

Regardless of the question of immediate responsibility, 
however, certain phases of the government’s treatment of 
the strike are deservng of thorough consideration. First, 
was the government justified in seeking to prevent the strike 
by obtaining an injunction, and, secondly, was it justified 
in using the provisions of the Lever Act for this purpose? 
Some criticism of the use of the injunctive method in deal¬ 
ing with strikes has been offered in the treatment of the 
Pullman Strike, and this matter will be further discussed in 
the following chapters, so that the question at issue here 
largely resolves itself into one of the government’s right to 
seek an injunction based on the violation of the Lever Act. 

The American Federation of Labor claimed, on No¬ 
vember 9, 1919, that the administration had promised, when 
the Lever bill was in Congress, that it would not be used 
against strikers. 1 If this assertion is true the administra¬ 
tion can properly be charged with a breach of faith. The 
matter is therefore worth investigating. 

When the bill was under consideration in the United 
States Senate in the summer of 1917, Senator Hollis of New* 
Hampshire introduced an amendment providing that noth¬ 
ing in the act should be construed to prohibit labor unions 
from carrying on their ordinary functions. The Senate 
conference committee, when it reported the bill back to the 
Senate, struck out the amendment. Some senators thought 
this should be done 'because strikes should be prohibited in 
war-time; others, because they thought the provisions of 
the act in question, particularly Section 4, were directed only 
against hoarding and monopolizing, and could not be used 
against strikers. 2 

On August 6, 1917, Senator Husting of Wisconsin made 
the following statement on the floor of the Senate: 

l N. Y. Times, Nov. 10, 12, 1919. 

2 Congressional Record, vol. lv, pp. 5828-5837. 


439] PRESIDENT WILSON, jp/p-jp,?/ 191 

I was sufficiently interested .... in the argument made by 
the Senator from New Hampshire, and by arguments already 
made upon the legal effect of striking out the Hollis amend¬ 
ment, to inquire from those who will have the administration 
of this law in their hands as to what construction would be 
placed upon it by them in case it became a law in its present 
form. 

I am authorized by the Secretary of Labor, Mr. Wilson, to 
say that the administration does not construe this bill as pro¬ 
hibiting strikes and peaceful picketing, and will not so con¬ 
strue the bill, and that the Department of Justice does not so 
construe the bill and will not so construe the bill. . . . 

[The] Secretary of Labor advised me that this was the opinion 
of the administration and the Department of Justice. He did 
not give it merely as a matter of belief on his part, but said 
that he was authorized to so state. 1 

Further evidence of the promise of the administration not 
to use the Lever Act against labor was given by Samuel 
Gompers in a speech delivered at Washington on November 
22, 1919. 2 On August 7, 1917, Secretary of Labor Wilson 
told Mr. Gompers that he talked over the matter with the 
President, who promised that instructions would be for¬ 
warded to the U. S. District Attorneys directing them not 
to bring cases against workmen in contravention of the 
Clayton Act of 1914, which legalized strikes, unions, etc. 
The Secretary further said that in the opinion of the Pres¬ 
ident it would be wise to pass the Hollis amendment after 
the Lever bill was passed. He further promised that the 
President would assist in the passage of a bill embodying the 
amendment. 

At a conference held soon after between Mr. Gompers, 
Secretary Morrison of the A. F. of L., and Attorney General 

1 Congressional Record, op. cit. f p. 5904. 

*N. Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1919. 


I9 2 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [440 

Gregory, the latter promised to instruct the U. S. District 
Attorneys not to construe Section 4 of the Lever Act as 
in any way interfering with the normal activities of labor. 1 

One cannot avoid the conclusion that the administration 
was not justified in using an act the purpose of which was 
to prevent hoarding and profiteering in war-time against 
striking miners almost a year after hostilities had ceased, 
especially after it had promised not to use it for such a 
purpose. 

To go into the courts and obtain an injunction based on 
such a measure was still more unjustifiable. Judge Ander¬ 
son, who issued the injunction, gave no opinion in support 
of his action, except to say, just before signing the order 
of November 8, “ I think it [the strike] is about the most 
lawless thing in this country. If the strike conspiracy to 
reduce the coal output could be carried out it would be re¬ 
bellion.” 2 There may be some citizens in the United States 
who believe that a strike in an essential industry constitutes 
rebellion, but it is fair to suppose that if such persons were 
in the majority laws forbidding such strikes would have 
been enacted by Congress. The failure of Congress to do 
so does not seem a sufficient excuse f or the Attorney Gen¬ 
eral’s action in asking a federal judge to issue an order, 
having the power of the law, commanding “ all . . . per¬ 
sons whomsoever ” not to carry on a strike. , 

The principal ground for the injunction in the govern¬ 
ment’s petition was the violation of the Lever Act. Yet 
that measure said specifically that violations of it were 
crimes, subject to criminal penalties. Nowhere did it make 
such violations a ground for relief in equity, by injunction. 
According to the general principles of law crimes are not 


1 N. Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1919. 

2 Ibid., Nov. 9, 1919. 


193 


441 ] PRESIDENT WILSON , ip/p-ipi?r 

to be enjoined merely because they are crimes. 1 Injunctions 
are granted presumably only to prevent irreparable injury 
to the property of the petitioner. In this case the only] 
property rights of the government affected by the strike 
were its rights in the railroads. It seems a considerable ex¬ 
pansion of the conception to assume such property rights 
were injured by failure to produce coal. Furthermore, 
even if this had been a proper ground for injunctive relief, 
the restraining order should have applied only to the mining 
of coal for the use of government-controlled railways, not 
to all bituminous coal mining. 2 

A final objection, perhaps the most important to the prac¬ 
tically minded, may be given against the 1919 injunction. It 
really failed to accomplish its purpose. The strike con¬ 
tinued in spite of the court’s order, and though the pro¬ 
hibition of the payment of strike benefits was beginning to 
be felt by the miners, the strike came to an end not through 
the use of the injunction, but principally as a result of more 
satisfactory and commendable efforts of the administra¬ 
tion in conference with the miners’ leaders. 

5. THE RAILWAY LABOR TROUBLES OF I92O 

It has already been mentioned that in the summer of 1919 
the various unions of railway employees had presented de¬ 
mands for higher wages, and that the President and the 
Director General of the railways had refused any general 
increases on the ground that the government’s campaign to 
reduce the cost of living would make them unnecessary. 

1 Lord Eldon, called by Professor Z. Chafee “ the greatest of chan¬ 
cellors ”, said, “ I have no jurisdiction to prevent the commission of 
crimes.” Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans, 402, 1818. Mr. Chafee, in 341 
Harvard Law Review 405, says, “Judge A. B. Anderson differs from 
him, but felt unable to give the reasons therefor.” 

* See discussion by Professor Chafee, 34 Harvard Law Review 401- 
407. 


I94 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [442 

But prices had continued to rise in spite of the government’s 
efforts. As a result of this increase dissatisfaction among 
the railway employees became more and more serious. 

In January and February of 1920 practically all the rail¬ 
way unions presented demands for increases in pay to Di¬ 
rector General Hines. 1 On January 23 W. G. Lee, presi¬ 
dent of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, informed Mr. 
Hines that his union intended to invalidate its wage agree¬ 
ment in thirty days, unless some answer to the wage de¬ 
mands were received. Later it developed that the main¬ 
tenance of way men had ordered a strike for February 17. 2 
With the situation threatening continued operation of the 
railways, the Director General, on February 3, began a 
series of conferences on wages with the representatives of 
the railway unions. On February 11 he announced that 
he was unable to come to an agreement wiith the men. 3 

He thereupon wrote to the President, indicating the great 
cost involved in increasing wages, and the difficulty of grant¬ 
ing such increases when the control of the roads was soon 
to be returned to the private owners. 4 On the 13th the 
President met the representatives of the unions in confer¬ 
ence and presented a plan of settlement to them. He pro¬ 
posed : (1) in case a board were set up by the new transpor¬ 
tation law, to use his influence to obtain prompt considera¬ 
tion by it of the wage demands; (2) in case no board were 
set up by law, to use his influence with the railway managers 
in having them join the men in setting up such a board;' 
(3) to constitute at once a board of experts which would 
gather and consider ail wage data in order to get the facts 
ready for a hearing. He admitted that, though the govern- 

1 Monthly Labor Review, May, 1920, p. 1123. 

2 N. Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1920. 

* Ibid., Feb. 12, 1920. 

4 Monthly Labor Review, May, 1920, p. 1124. 


195 


443] PRESIDENT WILSON, I pip- I p2l 

merit’s campaign to reduce the cost of living would have an 
increasingly beneficial effect, “ preparation, consideration, 
and disposition of these important wage matters ought not, 
in my opinion, to be postponed for a further indefinite 
period, and I believe the matters involved ought to be taken 
up and disposed of on their merits at the earliest practicable 
time.” Urging the acceptance of his proposal, he said, “ I 
am sure that it will be apparent to all reasonable men and 
women in railroad service that these momentous matters 
must be handled by an agency which can continue to func¬ 
tion after March i, and, therefore, cannot at the present 
stage be handled to a conclusion by the Railroad Adminis¬ 
tration.” On February 14 the union heads accepted the 
President’s plan. 1 

On the same day the President and the Director General 
wired to the head of the maintenance of way employees’ 
union, asking him to call off the strike set for February 
17, and pointing out that the union had not even given the 
Railway Administration the required thirty day’s notice 
of the proposed discontinuance of its contract. On the re¬ 
ceipt of these messages the strike was called off. 2 

Meanwhile the Esch-Cummins bill, providing for the re¬ 
turn of the railroads to their owners, was rapidly nearing 
enactment. It was passed by the House on February 21, 
and by the Senate two days later. The labor provisions 
of the act set up an arbitration board of nine members, three 
to represent railway labor, three to represent railway man¬ 
agement, and three the public, all to be appointed by the 
President with the consent of the Senate. 3 In addition to 
creating this board, the act 4 provided that employers and 

1 N. Y. Times, Feb. 14 and 15, 1920. 

'Ibid., Feb. 15, 1920; N. Y. Call, Feb. 15, 1920. 

* Section 304. 

4 Sections 301, 302, 303. 


I9 6 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [444 

employees try to settle their disputes in conference without 
bringing them to the board unless settlement was impos¬ 
sible, and also made possible the setting-up of district 
" boards of labor adjustment ” for the same purpose. 

The heads of the railway unions, still filled with their 
old distrust for arbitration by " so-called impartial ” arbi¬ 
trators, protested against the passage of the act and wrote 
to the President asking him not to approve it. On Feb¬ 
ruary 28, however, Mr. Wilson attached his signature to 
the measure, 1 and wrote a letter in answer to the unions. 
He pointed out that the bill contemplated the setting up of 
bipartite boards by the employers and the employees: 

I shall at once request the carriers and the employes to join 
in this action. I believe such a step will go far toward clari¬ 
fying and maturing the subject for final disposition. In fact 
the sort of board thus contemplated .... appears to be an 
appropriate substitute for the committee of experts which I 
have heretofore suggested, and, indeed, such a board will be 
authorized to go further than such a committee could have 
gone. . . . 

My hopes are that the putting into effect of [the labor] pro¬ 
visions with a carefully selected Labor Board, whose public 
representatives can be relied upon to be fair to labor and to 
appreciate the point of view of labor that it is no longer to 
be considered as a mere commodity, will mark the beginning 
of a new era of better understanding between the railroad 
managements and their employes and will furnish additional 
safeguards to the just interests of railroad labor. 

.... [The] wage demands are entitled to the earliest pos¬ 
sible consideration and disposition, and therefore I do not 
anticipate delay in the appointment and organization of the* 
Labor Board or in the other necessary steps. 2 

1 U. S. Stat. 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., Chap. 91, Title III. 

*N. Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1920. 


197 


445] PRESIDENT WILSON, jpjp-jp^J 

In accordance with the suggestions of the President, the 
wage requests previously made to the Director General were 
submitted to a joint conference of the managers and the 
men on March io. 1 From that time negotiations continued 
until the conference broke up on April i, the railway man¬ 
agers refusing to consider increases in wages unless the 
matter were handled by a tribunal on which the public was 
represented. The President, however, had not yet ap¬ 
pointed the Railroad Labor Board provided by the Trans¬ 
portation Act, and on April 2 the railway unions appealed 
to him to do so. 2 

In the meantime unrest among the employees, whose de¬ 
mands had been hanging fire for months, became serious. 
This was especially true among the switchmen and other 
yardmen, who were members of the Brotherhood of Rail¬ 
way Trainmen. In January John Grunau had formed the 
Chicago Yardmen’s Association, rallying to his organiza¬ 
tion many of the discontented Brotherhood members. Some 
time later he formed similar organizations breaking into the 
ranks of the other unions. Late in March he was dis¬ 
charged as yard foreman by the Chicago, Milwaukee, and 
St. Paul, at the behest of the trainmen’s Brotherhood. The 
trouble arose over jurisdictional disputes between the organ¬ 
izations, but the discharge, coming as it did when dissatis¬ 
faction was rife among the men, aroused many of the yard¬ 
men in the Chicago district. On the night of April 1 about 
700 switchmen left their work, demanding wage increases 
and the reinstatement of Grunau. 3 In a few days the 
strike had spread over many sections of the country from 
Los Angeles to New York. By April 9 every railroad in 
New York was effected, the strike involving not only yard- 

1 Monthly Labor Review, September, 1920, p. 504. 

*N. Y. Times, April 13, 1920. 

*Ibid., April 3, 1920; Survey, April 24, 1920, p. 135. 


igg LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [446 

men, but also other employees. On the same day the rail¬ 
way Brotherhoods denounced the strikers and threatened 
to punish their members for going out illegally. 1 

The seriousness of the situation evidently hastened the 
appointment of the Railroad Labor Board, which the Pres¬ 
ident named on April 13. 2 On the next day he met the 
cabinet and it was decided to summon the new board to con¬ 
sider wage questions as soon as the Senate confirmed the 
appointment of its members. The strike now began to 
weaken, and though some strikers, especially in Chicago, 
stayed out for several weeks longer, transportation soon re¬ 
sumed its normal condition. 

In the meantime government attorneys secured the arrest 
of strike leaders in various places, John Grunau having been 
arrested on April 15. The charges against the strikers 
varied in the different places, but the usual ones were in¬ 
terference with interstate commerce, interference with the 
mails, and violation of the Lever Act. 3 (Technically the 
war was not yet ended.) 

On April 15 the Senate confirmed the appointment of all 
of the members of the Railroad Labor Board, which at once 
organized for business. Its first decision, rendered on April 
20, was one announcing the board's refusal to hear the wage 
questions brought before it by the striking switchmen until 
the men returned to work. It thereupon went on to a con¬ 
sideration of the general wage demands of the unions, a 
consideration which took several months to finish. On 
June 23, labor unrest on the roads again having become 
serious, the President wrote to the board, asking it to hasten 
its decision on the wage question. Finally, on July 20, 
1920, the board handed down an award granting wage in- 

l N. Y. Times, April 9, 10, 11, 1920. 

* Ibid v April 14, 1920. 

3 Ibid., April 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, and May 12, 1920. 


PRESIDENT WILSON, 


> 1919-1921 


199 


447] 

creases retroactive to May 1, and affecting practically all 
railway employees. The increases, granted eighteen 
months after the first demands had been presented, though 
considered inadequate, were accepted by all but one of the 
sixteen railway unions. 1 

6 . THE ANTHRACITE WAGE DISPUTE OF I 92 O 

In May, 1916, representatives of the anthracite operators 
and miners had signed a four-year agreement, to terminate 
March 31, 1920, providing for wage increases, changes in 
working conditions, etc. Changes necessitated by war con¬ 
ditions were made in this agreement several times in 1917 
and 1918. At a convention of the anthracite miners in 
August, 1919, demands were adopted for substantial wage 
increases and further changes in working conditions, par¬ 
ticularly the recognition of the union. 2 3 On March 9, 1920, 
these demands were presented to the operators at a joint 
conference, which referred them to the joint scale com¬ 
mittee for consideration and report. For the next few 
weeks this committee attempted to reach an agreement. 
On March 24 it agreed, in order to avoid a strike, that work 
should continue under the existing terms until a new con¬ 
tract, retroactive to April 1, was made. 8 

Finally, on April 29, it having become evident that the 
miners and operators could not come to an agreement in 
joint conference, Secretary of Labor Wilson requested the 
scale committee to meet him in Washington. 4 He held con- 

1 Ibid., June 24, 1920; Monthly Labor Review, September, 1920, pp. 
504-505; Decisions of the U. S. Railroad Labor Board, vol. i, 1920, 
PP- 13-25. 

2 Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1920, p. mi; Award of the U. S . 
Anthracite Coal Commission, Washington, 1920, pp. 9-11. 

3 Rep. Sec. Labor, op. cit., p. in. 

4 United Mine Workers Journal, Oct. 1, iQ2ti. 


200 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [448 

ferences with the disputants for the next few weeks. Both 
sides agreed on a 65 per cent increase over 1916 rates for 
contract miners, but were deadlocked on the closed shop 
question and on the amount of increase to day men. The 
miners insisted on a 20 per cent increase, while the operators 
refused to give more than 17 per cent, a rate approved by 
Secretary Wilson. 1 

On May 19 the Secretary of Labor, convinced that it 
would be impossible to reach an agreement, referred the 
matter to the President. “ If the miners persist in their 
position,” he wrote, “ I fear it will mean a strike of the 
entire anthracite field by June 1. I would like to know if I 
may say to the miners’ scale committee that it is your desire 
that there should be no interruption of ... . production 
and that the miners should either accept the terms that have 
been presented by me as a compromise and accepted by the 
operators, or submit the matters in dispute to a commission 
to be appointed by you and continue at work pending its 
decision.” 2 

In answer to this letter President Wilson, on May 21, 
wrote to the joint scale committee, pointing out the im¬ 
portance of continued production of anthracite to the main¬ 
tenance of our own economic standards and to the rehabil¬ 
itation of Europe. His letter went on: 

If for any reason you are unable to [effect an agreement] I 
shall insist that the matters in dispute be submitted to the 
determination of a commission to be appointed by me, [its] 
award .... to be retroactive to the 1st of April .... and 
that work be continued at the mines pending [its] decision.... 
I shall hold myself in readiness to appoint a commission 
similarly constituted to the one which I recently appointed in 
connection with the bituminous coal mining industry as soon 

1 Anthracite Com. Award, op. cit., pp. 13-15. 

1 Rep. Sec. Labor, op cit., p. nr. 


201 


449 ] PRESIDENT WILSON, 

as I learn that both sides have signified their willingness to con¬ 
tinue at work and abide by its decision. 1 

This proposal was accepted by a convention of the miners 
on May 27, and by the operators five days later. On June 
3 the President issued a proclamation appointing the U. S. 
Anthracite Coal Commission, consisting of W. O. Thomp¬ 
son, president of Ohio State University, chairman, W. L. 
Connell, representing the operators, and N. J. Ferry, rep¬ 
resenting the miners. 2 The commission considered the de¬ 
mands of the men during the summer, and submitted an 
award which the President approved on August 30, with 
the exception of one section in which the commission had 
exceeded the terms of submission. 

This award, which was signed by the chairman and the 
operator member, provided among other things that a 65 
per cent increase over May, 1916, rates be granted to con¬ 
tract miners, that a 17 per cent increase over the rates then 
in effect be granted to day men, that the United Mine 
Workers be recognized to the extent that agreements be 
made with the presidents of the district unions, and that 
the agreement extend for two years from April 1, 1920. 
Mr. Ferry, the miners’ representative, presented a minority 
report dissenting from the 17 per cent increase for day men 
as entirely inadequate, and from the majority’s refusal to 
grant full recognition to the union. 3 

The President at once forwarded the award of the major¬ 
ity to the miners and operators and suggested that it be 
written into an agreement as provided by the commission, 
requesting the joint scale committees to meet at Scranton on 
September 2 for that purpose. In accordance with this re- 

1 Rep. Sec. Labor, op. cit., p. 112. 

2 Anthracite Com. Award, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 

3 Ibid., pp. 16-48. 


202 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [450 

quest the miners met the operators and signed an agreement 
embodying the award on September 3. 

Strong opposition, however, had developed against the 
award, particularly on the part of the day workers. On the 
same day, therefore, the district presidents of the unions 
wrote to the President and asked that the wage question be 
reopened, asserting that the decision was inadequate, and that 
since the bituminous award had also recently come up for 
reconsideration, the same policy should be followed in the 
anthracite field. Meanwhile many of the anthracite miners, 
being dissatisfied with the award, decided “ito take a vaca¬ 
tion ”, as they called it. In a few days the disaffection 
spread throughout the whole anthracite field until practically 
all the miners were idle. 1 

On September 9 the President replied to the request of 
the district presidents that the wage question be reopened. 
When the award was first published several miners had 
wired the President threatening a strike if he approved it. 
In answer he had telegraphed: 

If your communication .... is intended as a threat, you 
can rest assured that your challenge will be accepted and that 
the people of the United States will find some substitute fuel 
to tide them over until the real sentiment of the anthracite 
mine workers can find expression and they are ready to abide 
by the obligation they have entered into. 

After quoting this, the President, in his letter of September 
9, continued: 

Notwithstanding the plain warning contained in that telegram, 
which was given wide publicity, the majority of the anthracite 
coal miners, following the leadership of these men, have re¬ 
frained from work under the guise of taking a vacation. . . . 


Rep. Sec. Labor, op. cit., p. 113. 


203 


45 1 ] PRESIDENT WILSON, jpjp-ip;?/ 

Our people have fought a great war and made untold sacrifices 
to insure, among other things, that a solemn agreement shall 
not be considered as a mere scrap of paper. . . . 

.... [We] could not look the world in the face or justify 
our action to our own people and our own conscience if we 
yielded one iota to the men in the anthracite coal fields who* 
are violating the contract so recently entered into between 
themselves, the coal operators, and the Government of thel 
United States. 

I appreciate the earnestness of your efforts to get the mem 
to return to work and commend your stand in support of the 
obligations in your contracts . . . , but for reasons stated 
above I regret that I can not grant your request to reconvene 
the joint scale committee of operators and miners. 1 

The President’s letter was interpreted by the miners to 
mean that he would not ask the joint committee to recon¬ 
vene until the men resumed work. Accordingly, on Sep¬ 
tember 13, the officials of the union ordered all men back. 2 
On October 5 the Secretary of Labor met a committee of 
miners, and on ascertaining that practically all the men had 
returned to work, he communicated that fact to the Presi¬ 
dent. The latter, on October 12, invited representatives of 
the operators and miners to meet at Scranton three days 
later. 3 In accordance with this request a conference was 
held and subsequent meetings took place from time to time. 
The operators, however, persistently maintained their re¬ 
fusal to make any changes in the terms of the agreement, 4 
and during the two years for which it provided none were 
made. 

1 United Mine Workers Journal, Sept. 15, 1920. 

'Ibid., Oct. 1, 1920. 

3 Ibid., Oct. 15, 1920. 

'Ibid., Jan. I, Feb. 1, 1921. 


204 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [452: 


7. THE ILLINOIS BITUMINOUS STRIKE OF I92O 

It will be recalled that the award of the U. S. Bituminous 
Coal Commission, which was handed down on March 10, 
1920, and provided but a 20 per cent increase in the wages 
of day miners, was accepted by the men only after con¬ 
siderable protest. The dissatisfaction with the increase con¬ 
tinued, and much unrest developed among the men, espe¬ 
cially in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. At a joint conference 
between the miners and operators of Illinois, held at Chicago 
in July, 1920, the former presented demands for a $2 per 
day increase for the day men. The operators refused to 
yield to these demands, and their refusal was followed by 
strikes in many Illinois mines, 1 

On July 21 representatives of the Illinois operators came 
to Washington and asked the President to take action to¬ 
wards checking the strike. They expressed a fear that the 
strike might spread over the entire central competitive 
field, and pointed out that they did not feel able to depart 
from the existing wage scale, which was based on the com¬ 
mission’s award, “ except through some governmental ac¬ 
tion.” The President referred the matter to the Secretary 
of Labor, who, on July 23, appointed three conciliators to 
go to Illinois to attempt to end the strike. Three days 
later they reported to the Secretary that the miners refused 
to return to work unless they first had some assurance from 
the government that the question of wages for day men 
would be reopened. On the next day they reported that 
60,000 miners were idle and that meanwhile many had also 
gone out in Indiana and Ohio. 2 

On July 30 President Wilson issued a statement ad¬ 
dressed to the members of the United Mine Workers of 

1 Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1920, p. 108. 

2 Ibid., p. 109. 


205 


453 ] PRESIDENT WILSON, jpip-jp*j 

America. He expressed his regret at learning of the strike, 
not only because the action might result in great suffering 
and might interfere with industry, “ but also, and what is 
of far more importance to you, because the violation of the 
terms of your solemn obligation impairs your own good 
name, destroys the confidence which is the basis of all mutual 
agreements, and threatens the very foundation of fair in¬ 
dustrial relations.” The statement continued: 

In the consideration of the Nation-wide scale, involving many 
different classes of labor, by the Bituminous Coal Commission 
in the limited time at its disposal, some inequalities may have 
developed in the award that ought to be corrected. I can not, 
however, recommend any consideration of such inequalities 
as long as the mine workers continue on strike in violation of 
the terms of the award which they had accepted .... I must, 
therefore, insist that the striking mine workers return to work, 
thereby demonstrating their good faith in keeping their con¬ 
tract. When I have learned that they have thus returned to 
work, I will invite the scale committees of the operators and 
miners to reconvene for the purpose of adjusting any such 
inequalities as they may mutually agree should be adjusted. 1 

Immediately on receipt of this statement the officers of 
the union ordered the men to return to work at once. 2 By 
August 3, 50 per cent of the Illinois mines were in operation, 
and six days later practically all those in Illinois and Indiana 
had resumed. 3 On August 10 the President asked the joint 
scale committees of the operators and miners to meet in 
Cleveland three days later for the purpose of adjusting in¬ 
equalities arising out of the award of the Bituminous Com¬ 
mission. 

1 United Mine Workers Journal, Aug. 15, 1920. 

* Ibid. 

* Rep. Sec. Labor, op. cit., p. no. 


206 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [454 

The conferences took place as the President had requested, 
but the two sides found themselves unable to come to an 
agreement with the whole field as a unit. Accordingly the 
conference adjourned on August 18. Thereupon the 
miners’ representatives were authorized to> make separate 
district agreements. The miners and operators of Indiana 
soon agreed on an increase of $1.50 per day for day work¬ 
ers, and additional settlements on a similar basis, though 
with some modifications, were made in the other three states 
in the central competitive field. 1 

1 Report of President J. L. Lewis to the 28th Convention of the U. M a . 
W. of A., 1921, pp. 43-46. 


APPENDIX 


THE USE OF FEDERAL TROOPS IN LABOR DISPUTES, 1917-1921 

As has been pointed out, the usual peacetime procedure 
under which federal troops are used to quell domestic dis¬ 
turbances involves a request from the governor or the state 
legislature to the President, indicating that a condition of 
insurrection against the state has arisen with which the 
state authorities are powerless to cope. The President, even 
though no request for troops is made by state authorities, 
may send them if he thinks it impossible to enforce federal 
laws or the orders of the federal courts by means of the 
usual judicial proceedings. 3 

Early in the war with Germany the National Guard of 
the various states was made a part of the regular army of 
the United States, and the state authorities were thus, in 
many cases, left without state military forces to aid in pre¬ 
venting disturbances. Accordingly the War Department, 
in order to prevent delays in case of emergency, relaxed the 
usual rules which required that a request for troops be first 
forwarded to the President, and troops were sent directly to 
the scene of disorder in numerous instances during the war 
although no prior request for their use had been sent to the 
President. i 

After hostilities ceased, in November, 1918, the emer¬ 
gency which had occasioned a relaxation of the rules was 
still in effect, for on the discharge of the members of the 
former militia from the United States Army they did not 
automatically become part of the National Guard again, and 
the states required time to reorganize their forces. In con¬ 
sequence, no attempt was made to enforce peace time regu¬ 
lations until December 7, 1920, when the Secretary of War 


455 ] 


1 Revised Statutes 1989, 5297 , 5298, 5299 - 


207 


208 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [456 

decided that the time had come to put them into effect again. 
Instructions directing that this be done were then sent to 
the corps commanders. 1 

During the war and for some time afterwards, therefore, 
President Wilson had little to do with the sending of troops 
to the scene of strike disorders. Nevertheless brief men¬ 
tion should be made of several important strikes in which 
they were employed, because the ultimate responsibility for 
their use rests on the President. 

Probably the most significant of these instances was the 
Seattle General Strike, which lasted from February 6 to 
February 11, 1919, and involved about 60,000 workers, of 
whom about 40,000 struck in sympathy with shipyard 
workers who had been out for several weeks on a strike for 
higher wages. The Governor of Washington advised the 
Secretary of War of the proposed general strike, and the 
latter ordered troops to Seattle to be ready for an emer¬ 
gency. Though for several days the city was in practical 
control of the strike committee, no violence of any kind 
occurred, and the federal troops had nothing to do, re¬ 
maining in camp their entire stay. 2 

Federal troops were also used in two strikes of copper 
miners in Butte, Montana, engineered by I. W. W. unions, 
and occurring in February, 1919, and in April, 1920. In 
the second instance the soldiers were stationed in the district 
from April, 1920, to January, 1921. 3 

On August 1, 1920, the street car workers in Denver, Col- 

1 Report of the Chief of Staff, 1921, p. 39; Wilson 1 , Federal Aid in 
Domestic Disturbances, p. 317; Letter of June 8, 1922, to chiefs of 
branches, etc., of the War Department, entitled Employment of Military 
Forces to Maintain Civil Order and Obedience to Law. 

*N. Y. Times, Feb. 7-11, 1919; Survey, vol. xxxxi, p. 281, vol. 
xxxxiii, p. 5; The Unpartizan Review, vol. xii, p. 35. 

1 Report of the Adjutant General, 1921, p. 58; N. Y. Times, Feb. 
8, 9, 11, 18, 1919, and April 22, 1920; Anaconda Standard, April 19, 
22, 23, 1920. 


APPENDIX 


209 


4571 

orado, went on strike for wage increases. The system was 
soon tied up, and the company’s efforts to run cars with 
strikebreakers resulted in much violence. Accordingly the 
Governor asked for federal troops on August 7, and 700 
men were sent. The officers in charge ordered the disarm¬ 
ing of strikebreakers and posted soldiers on the top of each 
car. Order was quickly restored and the strike ended when 
the company deported the strikebreakers and re-employed 
the old men. The troops returned to camp on September 9. 1 

Federal troops were used in West Virginia during Pres¬ 
ident Wilson’s administration, although the more impor¬ 
tant use of troops in connection with the coa'l strike in that 
state occurred during the Harding administration. The 
hostilities between union miners and company guards and 
detectives in the non-union districts of the state came to such 
a pass in August, 1920, that the Governor appealed to the 
general commanding the Central Department for federal 
soldiers. About 4^0 men were accordingly sent to William¬ 
son, and remained until matters appeared to be more peace¬ 
ful, early in November. Their departure, however, seemed 
a signal for renewed hostilities, and a second request for 
their presence was made. On November 28 a battalion was 
again sent to Williamson. Colonel Hall, in charge of the 
troops, succeeded in having large quantities of arms and 
ammunition surrendered. When the operators attempted 
to run some of the mines with new men, he permitted peace¬ 
ful picketing by the strikers, but forbade intimidation, and 
posted soldiers to protect the mines. The troops left the 
district in January and February, 19211. 2 

1 Rep. Adj. Gen., op. cit., p. 58; N. Y. Times, Aug. 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
and 22, 1920; Rocky Mountain News, August 2-23, 1920. 

* United Mine Workers Journal, June 1, July 15, Oct. 1, Oct, 15, Dec. 
1, 1920, and Jan. 1, 1921; Rep. Adj. Gen., op. cit.,, p. 58: N. Y. Times, 
Aug. 29, 30, Sept. 2, 25, 29, Nov. 27, 28, 29, 30, Dec. 1, 3, 5, 1920, Jan. 
15, 17, and Feb. 12, 1921. 


CHAPTER VII 


President Harding, 1921-1923 

I. THE WEST VIRGINIA MINE DISTURBANCES OF I92I 

The non-union coal fields of West Virginia, centering 
in Mingo County, had been the scene of desperate attempts 
at organization on the part of the United Mine Workers 
for many years. The employment of Baldwin-Felts detec¬ 
tives by the operators, and the eviction of striking miners 
from houses owned by the companies, had particularly in¬ 
tensified hostilities between the miners and the companies 
in 1921. 

On May 12 of that year a fusillade of shots was fired 
from the mountains in the direction of some of the mines 
in Mingo County. One person was killed and several 
wounded. The Governor of West Virginia thereupon 
asked the War Department for federal troops to restore 
order. A similar request was made by the Governor of 
Kentucky, the shots having been fired across the boundary 
of that state. For the next few days agents of the War 
Department investigated the situation, and though shooting 
continued and the governors renewed their requests for 
federal troops, none were sent. On May 17, the War De¬ 
partment having received a report on the situation, Presi¬ 
dent Harding instructed his Secretary to- write Governor 
Morgan of West Virginia that he did not feel justified in 
sending federal troops until he was assured that the state 
had exhausted its own resources, or until the situation men- 
210 [458 


211 


459] PRESIDENT HARDING, 1921-1$23 

aced the federal government. Thus far he was not con¬ 
vinced that West Virginia had done all it could to bring 
about order. He explained that the army could not be used 
as a police force. Thereupon the state governors took fur¬ 
ther steps to end the disorder, and in a short time conditions 
became relatively peaceful. 1 

Nevertheless the occasion for hostilities in the district 
still existed in the continuance of the strike and the pres¬ 
ence of detectives, and in June several men were killed. 2 ' 
On August 1 Hatfield and 'Chambers, two of the leaders 
among the miners, were killed in a quarrel with a Baldwin- 
Felts detective. 3 Thereafter the feeling against the oper¬ 
ators and the mine guards was even more intense. About 
August 20 hundreds of union miners began to assemble at 
Marmet, West Virginia, with the intention of marching on 
Mingo County, eighty miles away across the mountains. 
On August 23 the march commenced, other groups joining 
in as it proceeded. On the 25th it was reported that 4000 
men were approaching Mingo County, and that Sheriff 
Chapin of Logan County, much hated by the miners, was 
preparing to oppose their advance with hundreds of depu¬ 
ties. On the same day Governor Morgan appealed to the 
War Department for federal troops. 

The administration at once sent General Bandholtz to 
investigate the situation. On arriving in West Virginia 
he interviewed District President Keeney and Secretary 
Treasurer Mooney of the mine workers, and prevailed upon 
them to try to stop the advance of the marchers. The two 
leaders at once attempted to head off the miners, and pre¬ 
vailed on most of them to turn back on August 26. Gen- 

1 N. Y. Times, May 13-18, 21, 30, 1921. 

* Ibid., June 15, 29, 1921. 

8 United Mine Workers Journal, Aug. 15, 1921. 


212 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [460 

eral Bandholtz thereupon reported to the War Department 
that there was then no need for federal troops. 

On August 28, however, a band of state troopers, claim¬ 
ing to have been fired upon by armed miners, shot into the 
town of Sharpies. When the miners heard of this they 
started to reassemble and resumed their march on Mingo. 
On the next day the Governor sent in another request for 
troops. President Harding and Secretary of War Weeks, 
to whom General Bandholtz had reported in Washington 
that the state was making only a weak attempt to suppress 
the insurrection, decided not to accede to the request at 
once. On the 30th the President issued a proclamation 
commanding the insurgents to disperse, and ordered the gen¬ 
eral back to West Virginia to observe its effects. In the 
meantime another excited appeal for soldiers came from the 
Governor and was repeated the next day. 

Early on the morning of September 2, General Bandholtz, 
satisfied that the men were not obeying the President's proc¬ 
lamation, advised the sending of troops. About 2000 of 
them arrived on the 2nd and the 3rd. Governor Morgan 
at once issued a proclamation putting the district under the 
control of the U. S. Army. During the next few days many 
of the miners, who were glad of the presence of the troops 
and later spoke of them as having “ brought the Constitu¬ 
tion back to West Virginia,” surrendered their arms. The 
army authorities had 400 of them returned to their homes 
by train. Conditions soon quieted down to such an extent 
that on September 8 some of the troops Were withdrawn. 
By December 6, 1921, all of them had left the strike zone. 
Thereafter, though many miners continued out on strike 
for months, violence was much less common. 1 

1 Report of the Secretary of War, 1922, p. 204; United Mine Workers 
Journal, Sept. 1, Sept. 15, Nov. 1, Dec. 1, 1921; N. Y. Times, August 
21-Sept. 6, 19211. 


213 


461] PRESIDENT HARDING, 1921-1923 

The care which President Harding exerted to make sure 
of the facts, through an investigation, and to force the 
state authorities to do as much as possible to put down the 
disorders themselves, 'before he permitted federal troops to 
be sent into West Virginia, is deserving of commendation. 
The same may be said of the enlightened and impartial 
policy of General Bandholtz in his attempts to get the miners 
to return home and in his handling of the troops when they 
finally arrived. The situation was in all respects a difficult 
one, and the manner in which the administration played its 
part brought about a relatively early cessation of hostilities 
without adding to the antagonism, which might easily have 
led to prolonged industrial warfare in the disturbed areas. 
Such an unfortunate result might well have followed had 
the troops been sent in at once and carried out a high-handed 
policy of suppressing the demonstrations of the miners. 1 

2 . THE THREATENED RAILWAY STRIKE OF I921I 

What was perhaps the first attempt on the part of Presi¬ 
dent Harding to avert a strike occurred on October, 19211. 
In June of that year the Railroad Labor Board announced 
a wage cut averaging 12 per cent and applying to nearly all 
railway employees, to take effect on July 1. 2 In July, fear¬ 
ing that the railway managers were about to make requests 

1 It is not intended to leave the impression that real industrial peace 
exists in West Virginia. As long as the operators continue their 
bitter fight against the union, and the United Mine Workers continue 
their attempts to organize, hostilities of a violent nature are likely 
to arise without great provocation. For more complete information 
about the labor troubles in the district see Suffern, Conciliation and 
Arbitration in the Coal Industry of America, 1915, pp. 63-107; Lane, 
Civil War in West Virginia, 1921; Hinrichs, The United Mine Work¬ 
ers in West Virginia, 1923; Senate Report 457, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess.,^ 
being the Report of the Senate Committee Investigating the West 
Virginia Coal Fields', and the published report of the hearings held 
before the same committee, Washington, 1921. 

* Decisions of the U. S. Railroad Labor Board, vol. ii, 1921, p. 136. 


214 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [462 

for further wage reductions, the railway unions met and 
directed that a strike vote be taken before September 1, 
ostensibly on the question of the acceptance of the board’s 
decision, but in reality to determine whether the employees 
would strike should further reductions be made. 1 

Conferences between the managers and the men took place 
in August, but the railroads refused to promise that they 
would not request the board to make further wage reduc¬ 
tions and changes in working rules. Instead they adopted 
a program calling for a reduction of 10 per cent, to be passed 
on to the public in the form of lower freight rates. Ac¬ 
cordingly the unions ordered a strike vote to be taken at 
once. It showed that 94 per cent of the men were in favor 
of quitting. 2 

On October 15 the union heads set the strike date for the 
30th of that month. On the same day President Harding, 
who had kept in touch with the situation through confer¬ 
ences, asked the public representatives on the Labor Board 
to take action to prevent a strike. Thereupon the board 
held meetings with the disputants. On October 25 it an¬ 
nounced that it was then engaged in considering the ques¬ 
tion of working rules, a matter which was so involved and 
would take so long to decide, that no requests by the roads 
for further wage reductions could be handled by the board 
until a considerable period had elapsed. On being assured 
of this, the unions, on October 27, called off the proposed 
strike. 3 

3. THE COAL STRIKE OF 1922 

The agreements between the anthracite and bituminous 
operators and miners, based on the awards of the coal com- 

1 Monthly Labor Review, December, 1921, pp. 1328-1329. 

*Ibid., pp. 1329-1330. 

z Ibid., pp. 13311-1340; N. Y. Times, Oct. 9, 16, 19, 21, 22, 26, 28, 1922. 


215 


463] PRESIDENT HARDING , 

missions of 1920, were scheduled to expire on March 31, 
1922. In October of the previous year, President Har¬ 
ding, fearing the possibility of a suspension of work starting* 
April 1, attempted to get President Lewis and other officers 
of the miners to arrange a conference with the operators in 
the bituminous fields at an early date, for the purpose of 
reaching an agreement to continue work after March 31 
while a new contract was being drawn up. The miners re¬ 
fused to enter into any agreement to this effect, claiming 
that their recent convention had decided to defer action on 
the matter until it reconvened in February. 1 

On December 16, 1921, however, President Lewis in¬ 
vited the operators and miners in the central competitive 
field to attend a joint conference to be held in Pittsburgh 
early the next month. He referred to a clause in the bitu¬ 
minous agreement of 1920 which provided that such a con¬ 
ference meet some time prior to April 1, 1922, and asked 
that representatives be sent in accordance with the agree¬ 
ment. The operators of Indiana and Illinois accepted the 
invitation, but those of western Pennsylvania and some 
from Ohio refused to participate, asserting that they did 
not feel that anything could be accomplished by such a 
meeting. Because of the inadequate representation in a 
conference from which the Pennsylvania and Ohio operators 
were to be absent, President Lewis notified the parties that 
the meeting would not be held. 2 

During the week of January 16 the tri-district conven¬ 
tion of the anthracite miners, meeting at Shamokin, Penn¬ 
sylvania, adopted demands to be embodied in the new agree¬ 
ment, the most important being those for a 20 per cent in¬ 
crease in pay for contract miners, a $1 per day increase for 
day men, and the introduction of the check-off system. The 

1 N. Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1921; Coal Age, Oct. 13, 1921. 

*Coal Age, Jan. 5, 1922; United Mine Workers Journal, Jan. 15, 1922. 


216 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [464 

convention also instructed its officers to arrange for the sus¬ 
pension of work on April 1 if no satisfactory agreement 
were reached by that date. The keynote of the miners’ 
position was sounded in the speech of President Lewis be¬ 
fore the convention, in which he took a firm stand against 
any reductions in wages. 1 

Toward the end of January bituminous operators in 
southern Ohio and in the Pittsburgh district posted an¬ 
nouncements of wage reductions of from 35 to 40 per cent 
and of the abolition of the check-off, to take effect on the 
expiration of the existing contract. At the same time the 
Indiana operators adopted a resolution favoring “ radical 
and sweeping reduction ” in wages. 2 

In the middle of February the reconvened convention of 
the miners met, and on the 18th it adopted a program op¬ 
posing any reduction in wages and favoring a general sus¬ 
pension of work on April 1, subject to a referendum vote 
of the members, unless a satisfactory agreement with opera¬ 
tors in the central competitive field were reached before 
that date. In accordance with the instructions of the con¬ 
vention Mr. Lewis, on February 21, sent another invita¬ 
tion to the bituminous operators to attend a joint confer¬ 
ence to be held March 2 in Cleveland. In reply, some of the 
operators promised to attend, as before, but others declined 
to meet in a four-state conference and offered to meet the 
miners in district conferences to draw up district agree¬ 
ments. Many of the operators maintained that they could 
no longer make an agreement which placed them on a par 
with the operators of better mines and forced them to pay 
wages which such operators could afford. They felt that 
the time had come to introduce agreements with the men 
based on the conditions of their respective districts. 

1 United Mine Workers Journal, Feb. 1 and 15, 1922. 

2 Ibid., Feb. 15, 1922; Coal Age, Feb. 2 and 9, 1922. 

* United Mine Workers Journal, March 1, 1922; Coal Age, March 2, 
1922. 


217 


465] PRESIDENT HARDING, ^21-1^2^ 

Meanwhile, about February 24, President Harding had 
instructed Secretary of Labor Davis to use his efforts to 
bring about a conference between the bituminous operators 
and miners. In their answers to the Secretary’s requests 
that they meet the miners the operators took positions 
similar to those taken in response to President Lewis’ in¬ 
vitations. The Illinois and Indiana operators consented 
to attend, but most of the others refused to meet in a four- 
state conference and proposed district conferences instead. 
On March 9 the Department of Labor issued a statement 
referring to the Secretary’s efforts to obtain a joint con¬ 
ference. The statement said, in part: 

The Secretary’s action is heartily approved by President 
Harding. None of the Government officials in touch with the 
threatened coal situation can see any objection to a council 
table gathering of those directly interested in the bituminous 
coal industry, and particularly in the present situation, when 
it is a part of the last agreement and in line with longtime 
practice in the coal industry. . . . 

Secretary Davis cannot see why, in the interests of common 
sense, the two sides to the coal controversy cannot get together 
and adjust their differences and save the country from the 
costly results of a strike. 

The answers of the operators having indicated the im¬ 
possibility of a four-state agreement, the Secretary, in an 
interview on March 16, stated his position as follows: “I 
say to both of them, ‘ You made the agreement and you 
should stand by it.’ ” In answer to the assertion of some 
of the operators that they feared a four-state agreement 
would be in violation of the Sherman Act, in view of Judge 
Anderson’s statement to that effect in November, 1921, Sec¬ 
retary Davis pointed out that the Attorney General had 


21 8 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [466 

stated his opinion that a joint meeting to discuss a new 
scale was not unlawful. 1 

In the meantime, on March 15, the anthracite operators 
and miners met in joint conference to negotiate a new wage 
scale. Most of the bituminous operators, however, still 
persisted in their refusal to meet in a four-state con¬ 
ference, and the miners were equally firm against district 
agreements. The union officials, since the men had voted 
overwhelmingly in favor of suspension, issued directions to 
all miners to stop work on March 31 unless satisfactory 
agreements were made. 2 In the meantime Secretary Davis 
continued his efforts with the bituminous operators, but to 
no avail. The anthracite joint conference, though still con¬ 
tinuing its sessions, found it impossible to come to an agree¬ 
ment before April 1, and on that day about 600,000 miners, 
both anthracite and bituminous, suspended work. 3 

During the next few months the anthracite conferences 
continued, proposals and counter proposal's for arbitration, 
for wage reductions, for investigation of prices, etc., being 
made, but without any agreement being reached. 4 

Early in April the Governor of New Mexico appealed 
to the Secretary of War for federal troops. He admitted 
that the strike had not as yet caused any violence, but he 
feared it if federal troops were not sent. On April 8, after 
conferring with President Harding, the Secretary wired the 
Governor that troops could not be sent “ unless disorders 
[developed] to a point where the State authorities [were] 
unable to preserve order within the limits of the State.” 5 

1 United Mine Workers Journal, March 15, April 1, 1922. 

7 Ibid., April 1, 1922. 

3 Ibid., April 15, 1922; N. Y. Times, April 1, 1922; Coal Age, April 
<s, 1922. 

4 United Mine Workers Journal, May 1, June 1 and 15, 1922. 

*N. Y. Times, April 9, 1922. 


PRESIDENT HARDING, 


1921-1923 


219 


46 7] 

Meanwhile the strike, or, as the miners insisted on calling 
it, “ the suspension,” continued. Since comparatively little 
fuel was required in the spring, and since miners had pre¬ 
pared themselves in advance for a strike, little hardship was 
incurred. On June 21, however, the nation was roused by 
the report of the killing of a number of men in Herrin, 
Illinois, when an operator attempted to run a mine in a 
strong union district with imported strikebreakers. 

The administration at once resumed its efforts to settle 
the strike. On June 23, Secretary Davis, referring to the 
Herrin affair, said, “ Surely no better argument can be 
advanced for the settlement of these disputes around the 
conference table, than the dead bodies of a score or more 
of American workmen, who met a futile death in this out¬ 
break.” 1 During the next few days President Harding 
conferred with President Lewis, and with A. M. Ogle, of 
the National Coal Association. On June 28 he invited the 
representatives of all the miners and operators to meet him 
at the White House on July 1, for the purpose of arrang¬ 
ing plans to end the strike. 2 

The President met the disputants on the date set, and ad¬ 
dressed them, in part, as follows : 

The government has no desire to intrude itself into the field 
of your activities. It does feel an obligation to see that the 
common American interest shall not be menaced by a pro¬ 
tracted lack of fuel. It prefers that the two great and as^ 
sociated interests—mine workers and employers—should settle 
this matter in a frank recognition of the mutuality of their 
interests. 

If you can not do that, then the larger public interest must 
be asserted in the name of the people, when the common good 
is the first and highest concern. 

1 N. Y. Times, June 24, 1922. 

a Ibid., June 29, 1922; United Mine Workers Journal, July 1, 1922. 


220 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [468 

You are admonished to arrive at such understanding with 
measurable promptness among yourselves. If the adjustment 
can not be reached by you alone, government aid will be 
available at your joint call. We wish you who best know the 
way to a solution to reach it among yourselves in a manner 
to command the sanction of American public opinion. Fail¬ 
ing in that, the servants of the American people will be called 
to the task in the name of American safety, and for the 
greatest good of all the people. 

Immediately after the address the anthracite and bitu¬ 
minous representatives of both sides held separate meetings, 
with members of the cabinet to aid them in arriving at an 
agreement. These joint conferences continued for a few 
days, but without reaching an understanding. 1 

Thereupon the President, on July 10, called the operators 
and miners to meet him again and proposed the following 
basis of settlement: 

1. The miners shall return to work at the wages of March 
31, this scale to be effective until August 10, 1922. 

2. A coal commission shall be created at once, consisting 
of three representatives of the mine workers, three of the 
operators, and five members to be named by the President; 
all of the decisions of the commission to be accepted as final. 

3. The commission shall determine, if possible within 
thirty days from July 10, a temporary basic wage scale, to 
be effective until March 1, 1923. In case the matter cannot 
be determined within that time, the commission shall have 
power to continue the 1922 scale until the new one is ready. 

4. The commission shall investigate exhaustively every 
phase of the coal industry. The President shall ask Con¬ 
gress to confer the necessary authority and appropriations. 
The Commission shall make recommendations looking to 

1 United Mine Workers Journal, July 15, 1922; Coal Age, July 16,. 
1922. 


469] PRESIDENT HARDING, 1921-1923 221 

the establishment and maintenance of industrial peace in the 
coal industry, the elimination of waste due to intermittency 
and instability, and suggest plans for a dependable fuel sup- 
ply. 

The President then urged the miners and operators to 
take his proposal to separate conferences for consideration. 
“ With due regard for all concerned,” he said, “ it ought to 
be easy to find a way to resume activities and command the 
approval of the American public.” 1 

The miners and operators soon replied to the President’s 
proposal. The former indicated their willingness to ac¬ 
cept the proposition for an investigation into the industry, 
but withheld their acceptance of arbitration. 2 The opera¬ 
tors, not having been able to come to a uniform decision, 
answered by groups. The anthracite operators accepted the 
plan, but asked for a separate anthracite commission, which 
the President was willing to appoint. A majority of the 
bituminous operators accepted the proposal " without res¬ 
ervation and qualification.” The Pittsburgh managers, 
however, suggested separate arbitration for the Pittsburgh 
district, with the wage scale of 1917 and elimination of the 
check-off to be in effect in the meantime. 3 

Having received answers from all concerned, the Pres¬ 
ident met the operators and miners again, on July 17. 
After expressing his regret at the outcome he said to them: 

I cannot permit you to depart without reminding you that 
coal is a national necessity, the ample supply of which is 
essential likewise to common welfare and interstate commerce. 
The freedom of action on the part of workers and on the 
part of employers does not measure in importance with that 

1 United Mine Workers Journal, July 13, 1922. 

2 Ibid., j^ug. 1, 1922. 

3 Coal Age, July 20, 1922. 


222 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [47a 

of public welfare and national security. I, therefore, invite 
you to return to your mine properties and resume operation. 1 

It was understood that the President implied 'by this in¬ 
vitation that the government would afford military protec¬ 
tion for all operators who would undertake to run their 
mines with strikebreakers. This was confirmed the next 
day, when Mr. Harding sent telegrams to the governors of 
twenty coal-producing states, asking them to second his in¬ 
vitation to the operators to resume activities. “ I want to 
convey to you in this message/’ he said, “ the assurance of 
the prompt and full support of the Federal Government 
whenever and wherever you find your own agencies of law 
and order inadequate to meet the situation. ... To the 
task of lawful protection and the maintenance of order the 
Federal Government pledges you every assistance at its 
command.” At the same time the War Department issued 
instructions to the corps commanders to be ready to move 
troops for strike duty at any moment. 2 

In response to the President’s message all but two of the 
governors promised him their cooperation. Governor 
Ritchie of Maryland replied that he did not think it best 
to use troops as their presence might lead to serious trouble. 
Governor Morrison of North Carolina likewise refused to 
use troops, and indicated his general opposition to govern¬ 
ment interference in labor disputes. 3 The Pennsylvania 
operators attempted to run the mines, and the Governor im¬ 
mediately sent troops to the coal fields, but not enough 
workers could be obtained to resume operation. In other 
states no attempts were made. 4 

l N. Y. Times, July 18, 1922. 

1 Ibid., July 19, 1922. 

z Ibid., July 20, 1922. 

4 United Mine Workers Journal, Aug. 1, 1922. 


22 ^ 


471 ] PRESIDENT HARDING, 1921-1923 

President Harding, describing the situation in an address 
before Congress on August 18, said, “ But little or no new 
production followed the [message to the governors]. The 
simple but significant truth was revealed that, except for 
such coal as comes from the districts worked by non-organ- 
ized miners, the country is at the mercy of the United Mine 
Workers.” 1 

Finally, on August 1, President Lewis sent out another 
invitation to the bituminous operators of the central com¬ 
petitive field, asking them to meet the miners at Cleveland 
on August 7. The Illinois operators refused to attend the 
conference, insisting on the arbitration of the issues, a posi¬ 
tion which President Harding upheld in a letter sent to their 
secretary, in which he said, “ I am frank to say I do not see 
how your workmen can refuse such a proposal. If terms 
cannot be settled on so liberal an offer it is manifest that 
the mining situation is very badly tied up, and the govern¬ 
ment must find for itself some way of extraction.” In ad¬ 
dition to the Illinois operators those in some other fields re¬ 
fused to send representatives. The conference, however, 
started as scheduled, though only a small proportion of 
the bituminous tonnage, most of it from Ohio, was repre¬ 
sented. 2 

After a few meetings it was decided to admit into the 
conference operators from districts outside the central com¬ 
petitive field, thus breaking up the old alignment of dis¬ 
tricts. An agreement was finally signed on August 15, 
providing that on the execution of supplementary contracts 
with the various operators based on the agreement, work 
should be resumed under the terms of the old contracts until 
March 31, 1923. The conferees also agreed to send rep- 

1 Congressional Record, vol. lxii, p. 11537. 

5 United Mine Workers Journal, Aug. 15, 1922. 


224 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [472 

resentatives to a joint conference in Cleveland on October 
2, 1922, which would formulate a method for negotiating 
a new agreement effective the following April. Finally, it 
was decided to select a committee of inquiry to investigate 
the coal industry, the personnel of the committee to be ap¬ 
proved by the President. 1 

With the signing of the supplementary contracts bitumi¬ 
nous mining was resumed in many districts. Gradually 
operators not represented at the joint conference accepted 
the terms of the Cleveland agreement. When the Pitts¬ 
burgh Coal Company signed it on August 30 the operators’ 
organ, “ Coal Age ”, admitted that the “ last of the opposi¬ 
tion to the union in this strike [had] crumbled.” 2 

In the meantime the operators and miners of the anthra¬ 
cite field met on August 17 for the purpose of reaching an 
agreement. The conference was brought about through the 
efforts of Senator Pepper of Pennsylvania, in response to 
the request of President Harding that he act in the matter. 
On August 22, however, the conference adjourned, having 
been unable to come to an agreement. 3 But Senators Reed 
and Pepper of Pennsylvania, assisted by Secretary Davis, 
continued their efforts to bring about a settlement. They 
submitted a proposal to the disputants which had been ap¬ 
proved by President Harding, and which provided that a 
contract be made between the three anthracite districts of 
the union and the operators, extending the wages and con¬ 
ditions of March 31, 1922, to August 31, 1923, and that 
both sides ask the President to appoint a fact-finding com¬ 
mission to investigate the coal industry. 

On September 1 the President wrote to the operators and 

1 United Mine Workers Journal, Aug. 15, 1922. 

2 Coal Age, Sept. 7, 1922. 

* United Mine Workers Journal, Sept. 1, 1922. 


225 


473 ] PRESIDENT HARDING, 

miners, “ The public interest transcends any partisan ad¬ 
vantage that you might gain by further resistance. I urge 
you in the name of public welfare to accede to the proposal 
that has been advanced by Senators Pepper and Reed.” 1 
On the next day the plan was accepted by the operators and 
the heads of the union, and a week later was ratified by a 
convention of the anthracite miners. 2 

During the strike it became more and more apparent that 
an essential preliminary to industrial peace in the coal in¬ 
dustry was a thorough investigation of its basic difficulties 
and conditions. The necessity for such an inquiry was rec¬ 
ognized by the operators and miners, as well as by the public 
at large. In his address to Congress on August 18 President 
Harding asked for the enactment of a law providing for a 
commission of investigation. 3 On September 22 he ap¬ 
proved an act of Congress providing for such a commission, 
and on October 10 he named its members. About a week 
later the new commission organized with John Hays Ham¬ 
mond, famous mining engineeer, as chairman, and com¬ 
menced its work. 4 

It is evident from the description of the events of the 
strike that President Harding played a very active part, first 
in attempting to avert the suspension of mining, and after¬ 
wards in seeking to end it. Perhaps in the case of no other 
strike, with the exception of President Wilson’s attempts 
in the Colorado Strike of 1914, did a President play such 
a lively and persistent part in trying to settle a great strike. 
He displayed not only a creditable activity in striving to end 
the disagreement, but also excellent judgment in handling 

1 N. Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1922. 

2 United Mine Workers Journal, Sept. 15, 1922. 

3 Congressional Record, vol. lxii, p. 11537. 

*N. Y. Times, Oct. 11, 19, 1922. 


226 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [474 

one other phase of it, i. e., in refusing to send troops to 
New Mexico in April when no real cause for their pres¬ 
ence existed. 

He cannot, however, be said to have shown the same 
good judgment when he invited the operators to resume 
operations in July under the protection of federal troops, 
if necessary. Had the operators really desired to accept the 
invitation, and had the miners been less strongly organized, 
so that resumption of mining would have been generally 
attempted, such a wholesale invitation to import strikebreak¬ 
ers might have resulted in serious consequences to domestic 
peace and industrial good-feeling. Fortunately attempts 
to break the strike with the aid of federal troops were not 
made. In reviewing the case, one is forced to the conclu¬ 
sion that hopeless as it seemed to rely on friendly interven¬ 
tion to bring the bituminous miners and operators to an 
agreement, this was the better course to pursue. A further'"' 
effort through intermediaries might have proved as suc¬ 
cessful as in the case of the anthracite men. Even had 
this failed, the wisdom of attempting to break the strike 
by the use of troops may be seriously questioned. 

4. THE RAILWAY SHOPMEN'S STRIKE OF 1922 

While the administration was engaged in attempting to 
end the coal strike, it was at the same time faced with a 
problem even more serious, from the viewpoint of public 
welfare, the strike of the railway shopmen, which began 
on July 1. The Railroad Labor Board, which had just be¬ 
fore announced an important reduction in the wages of 
maintenance of way employees, on the ground that the cost 
of living had decreased, rendered a decision on June 6, the 
labor members dissenting, cutting the pay of the shopmen 
7 cents an hour. The cut, which averaged about 12 per cent, 


227 


475] PRESIDENT HARDING, 1921-1923 

was to go into effect on July i. 1 The decision had the 
result of still further arousing the shopmen, who had for 
some time ibeen complaining against the practice of impor¬ 
tant railroads, such as the Pennsylvania, in having their 
shop work done by outside concerns employing non-union 
men, Which was contrary to the orders of the Labor Board. 

At a convention of the Railway Employees’ Department 
of the American Federation of Labor, made up largely of 
shop employees, the men had, in the previous April, directed 
the issuance of a strike vote if no satisfactory settlement 
of the difficulty were reached. In compliance with this reso¬ 
lution the executive council of the shopcraft unions con¬ 
ferred with the Railroad Labor Board late in May, and in¬ 
formed it of the intention to issue a strike vote unless there 
were some guarantee that the contracting-out practice would 
be ended. On June 7 the Board replied that it had no power 
to enforce its decisions and could give no such guarantee. 
This situation, made more serious still by the wage reduc¬ 
tion, resulted in the taking of a strike vote on both issues, 
which showed an overwhelming readiness to strike on the 
part of the shopmen. 2 

On June 27, B. M. Jewell, leader of the shopcrafts, noti¬ 
fied T. DeWitt Cuyler, chairman of the railway executives 
committee, that a strike would commence on July 1 if the 
railroads did not meet the following demands of the unions: 
(1) that an immediate conference be held; (2) that the 
roads ignore the wage-cut order of the board; (3) that the 
roads restore certain working rules ordered changed by the 
board; and (4) that the roads stop the practice of contract¬ 
ing-out. 3 Two days later the executives flatly refused to 
grant the demands and implied that a strike, if it took place, 

1 Monthly Labor Review, July, 1922, pp. 93-94. 

2 Machinists’ Monthly Journal, Aug. 1922, pp. 563-566. 

3 N. Y. Times, June 28, 1922. 


228 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [476 

would not be against the railroads, but against the govern¬ 
ment. 1 

On being notified that the shopmen were planning to 
strike, the Labor Board, on June 29, ordered the representa¬ 
tives of the unions and the railways to appear before it the 
next day. The Board, however, found it impossible to get 
word to the union men, the latter having purposely dis¬ 
appeared to avoid just such a contingency, and its attempt 
to prevent the strike therefore proved of no avail. 2 

When July 1 came nearly 400,000 shopmen obeyed the 
strike order. Chairman Hooper, of the Labor Board, is¬ 
sued a statement pointing out that the new men who took 
the places of the strikers could not justly be called “ scabs” 
and “ strikebreakers ”, and that they would be “ merely ac¬ 
cepting what is equivalent to an open position, the wages 
and working conditions of which have been established by 
a government tribunal.” “ Under these circumstances,” he 
said, “ it is a f oregone conclusion that both public sentiment 
and governmental power will protect the men who remain 
in the service of the carriers and the new men who take 
the service.” 3 

The Board, on July 3, adopted a resolution to the effect 
that the shopmen, by striking, had placed themselves outside 
its jurisdiction, and invited the recruits taking the places 
of the strikers to organize into unions at once and come in 
under the shelter of the Transportation Act. 4 At the same 
time a conference of the roads entering New York decided 
that all strikers would be dropped from the payrolls and 
would lose their seniority rights. 5 These announcements 

1 N. Y. Times, June 30, 1922. 

2 Machinists’ Monthly Journal, August, 1922, p. 566. 

2 AT. Y. Times, July 2, 1922. 

4 Monthly Labor Review, Dec., 1922, p. 1173. 

*N. Y. Times, July 4, 1922. 


229 


477 ] PRESIDENT HARDING, 1921-1923 

laid down a policy which was so readily adopted by nearly 
all of the roads that before long the sole issue of the strike 
was whether the strikers, on returning to work, would have 
their seniority rights restored. 1 

In a few days reports came to the Postoffice Department 
from several points in the South that the strikers were in¬ 
terfering with the mails. On the 8th Attorney General 
Daugherty authorized the district attorney and the U. S. 
Marshal to use force if necessary in order to prevent any 
interruption of interstate commerce and the movement of the 
mails. Two days later he announced that he had authorized 
the appointment of a number of deputy marshals in various 
sections of the country. “ This policy will be continued,” 
he said, “ wherever justified and required. Law and order 
must be preserved and property and life protected. Trans¬ 
portation of the mails must not be interfered with and in¬ 
terstate commerce must not be interrupted. The President 
has 'been fully advised and has the situation fully in hand.” 2 

The President, on July 11, issued a proclamation in 
which, after referring to the decisions of the Board, he con¬ 
tinued : 

Whereas, The shopcraft employees have elected to discontinue 
their work, rather than abide by the decision rendered, and 
certain operators have ignored the decision ordering the aban¬ 
donment of the contract shop practice; and 
Whereas, The maintained operation of the railways in inter¬ 
state commerce and the transportation of the United States 
mails have necessitated the employment of men who choose 
to accept employment under the terms of the decision, and 

1 The seniority rights, which are highly prized by railway men, have 
to do with pension privileges and preferences concerning type of work, 
tenure of jobs, etc., which accrue to the men in order of length of 
service. 

*N. Y. Times, July 8, 9, 11, 1922. 


230 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [478 

who have the same indisputable right to work as others have 
to decline to work; and 

Whereas, The peaceful settlement of controversies in accord¬ 
ance with law and due respect for the established agencies of 
such settlement are essential to the security and well being 
of our people; 

Now, Therefore, I, Warren G. Harding, President of the 
United States, do hereby make proclamation, directing all 
persons to refrain from all interference with the lawful ef¬ 
forts to maintain interstate transportation and the carrying of 
the United States mails. These activities and the mainten¬ 
ance of the supremacy of the law are the first obligations of 
the Government and all the citizenship of our country. There¬ 
fore I invite the cooperation of all good citizens to uphold the 
laws and to preserve the public peace, and to facilitate [the 
operation of the railroads]. . . - 1 

The War Department, which had received a message 
from the receiver of the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas lines 
reporting violence and the capture of a train by strikers, and 
requesting federal troops, answered the request by directing 
the receiver to apply first to the Governor of Texas for 
militia. In case the state authorities did not act the De¬ 
partment was willing to afford the necessary protection. 
The Governor, to whom application was then made, refused 
to send state troops on the ground that they were not needed. 
Thereupon the Secretary of War sent an inspectorrgeneral 
to investigate conditions and to determine the need for 
troops. As far as is known the investigator decided they 
were unnecessary, for there does not seem to be any record 
of troops having been sent to the district. On July 20 Post¬ 
master General Work announced that any menace endanger¬ 
ing the delivery of mails arising out of the strike had passed. 2 

1 Monthly Labor Review, December, 1922, p. 1174. 

*N. Y. Times, July 14, 15, 21, 1922. 


231 


479 ] PRESIDENT HARDING, I p 2 i-ip23 

Meanwhile Chairman Hooper of the Labor Board suc¬ 
ceeded in bringing the strike leaders and some of the rail¬ 
way executives into a conference on July 14. Though mosit 
of the roads agreed to drop the practice of contracting-out, 
they refused to restore the strikers to their seniority rights, 
and the men being firm on this point, the conference came 
to an unsuccessful conclusion. On the 19th Mr. Hooper an¬ 
nounced that since there did not seem to be any possibility 
of reconciling the men and the executives, the Labor Board 
had ceased its efforts to end the strike. 1 

During the next few days President Harding conferred 
with Mr. Hooper concerning a settlement. On the 26th 
and the 27th of July he had separate conferences with 
Messrs. Cuyler and Atterbury, of the railway executives, 
and with Mr. Jewell, of the shopcrafts. On the 29th he sent 
a plan of settlement to both sides for their consideration. 2 

The President’s proposal, as given in his letter to Mr. 
Cuyler, was as follows: 

First—Railway managers and workmen are to agree to rec¬ 
ognize the validity of all decisions of the Railroad Labor 
Board, and to faithfully carry out such decisions as contem¬ 
plated by law. 

Second—The carriers will withdraw all lawsuits growing out 
of the strike, and Railroad Labor Board decisions which have 
been involved in the strike may be taken, in the exercise of 
recognized rights by either party, to the Railroad Labor Board 
for rehearing. 

Third—All employes now on strike to be returned to work 
and to their former positions with seniority and other rights 
unimpaired. The representatives of the carriers and the repre¬ 
sentatives of the organizations especially agree that there 
will be no discrimination by either party against the employees 
who did or did not strike. 

l N. V. Times, July 15, 20, 1922. 

* Ibid., July 28, 29, 30, 1922. 


232 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [480 

After urging the advantages of such a settlement, espe¬ 
cially because it upheld the Labor Board, the President con¬ 
cluded his letter: “ I need hardly add that I have reason to 
believe that these terms will be accepted by the workers. 
If there is good reason why the managers cannot accept, 
they will be obligated to open direct negotiations or assume 
full responsibility for the situation.” 

Secretary of Commerce Hoover was sent by the Presi¬ 
dent to act as his personal representative at a meeting of the 
executives held in New York on August 1 to consider the 
proposal. 1 The executives, however, rejected the seniority 
proposal, though willing to accept the first two parts of the 
plan. They called attention to Chairman Hooper’s state¬ 
ment early in the month to the effect that the rights of the 
new men could not be ignored by the Board. They asserted 
that they could not fail those to whom they had promised 
protection “ without doing violence to every principle of right 
and justice involved in this matter and without the grossest 
breach of faith on the part of the railroads to the men at 
present in their service.” 2 The shopmen accepted the 
President’s plan of settlement on the next day. 3 

Meanwhile considerable complaint was being made to the 
leaders of the railway Brotherhoods that the men operating 
the roads were subjected to much danger because of the de¬ 
fective condition of the rolling stock due to the strike. They 
complained also that the danger was increased by the pres¬ 
ence of armed guards on railroad property. The Brother- 

1 A week later it was reported that Mr. Hoover had met a group 
of New York bankers in the headquarters of the Federal Reserve 
Bank and had urged them to use their influence with the executives 
to get the latter to accept the proposal of the President. N. Y. Times, 
August 8, 1922. 

2 N. Y. Times, Aug. 1, 2, 1922. 

• Ibid., Aug. 3, 1922. 


2 33 


481] PRESIDENT HARDING, 1921-1923 

hoods, on August 5, presented the situation to the President 
and expressed fear that their members might go out on 
strike if the conditions were not remedied. 1 

On August 7 the President made a new proposal for the 
settlement of the strike. After pointing out that the only 
remaining issue between the railroads and the shopmen was 
the question of seniority, he asked the men to return to 
work, the carriers to assign them to work, and both to take 
the question in dispute to the Railroad Labor Board for 
decision. Alt the same time the Board announced its readi¬ 
ness to hear the seniority question. 2 

'In the meantime the presence of armed guards and the 
poor condition of the rolling stock had caused a strike of 
members of the Brotherhoods at Joliet, Illinois. On Au¬ 
gust 10 the Brotherhood men on the Santa Fe notified the 
management that they would refuse to run trains through 
any points where armed guards were employed. Within a 
short time trains were tied up at several places in Arizona 
and California, and the strikes soon spread to other points. 3 

The executives replied to the second proposal of President 
Harding on August 12, most of them accepting it, but a 
number of others, representing about one quarter of the 
mileage concerned, reserved the right to carry the decisions 
of the Board to the courts if they affected the agreements 
already in existence between the roads and their employees. 
On the same day the shopmen informed the President of 
their rejection of his proposal. 4 

Thereafter, for a few weeks, the strike continued without 
further attempts at settlement by the administration. The 
Brotherhoods tried to get the President to make further ef- 

1 N. Y. Times, Aug. 5, 6, 1922. 

• Monthly Labor Review, December, 1922, p. 1177. 

*N. Y. Times, Aug. 10, 11, 12, 1922. 

*Ibid., Aug. 14, 1922. 


2 3 4 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [482 

forts to mediate, 'but he declined to do so. Chairman Mc- 
Chord, of the Interstate Commerce Commission, reported 
to him that railway equipment was failing, that motive 
power was progressively deteriorating, and that safety legis¬ 
lation was being violated. Mr. Harding, in reply, recom¬ 
mended that the Commission insist on the full enforcement 
of the safety laws; a matter much easier to recommend than 
to carry out, with many thousands of shopmen continuing 
the strike. 1 The Brotherhood chiefs and the railway execu¬ 
tives conferred a number of times on a settlement of the 
shopmen’s strike, but on August 25 their meetings ended 
without an agreement being reached. 2 

Meanwhile, on August 18, the President addressed Con¬ 
gress on the coal and railroad strikes. He defended his 
proposals for settlement, pointed out the necessity of en¬ 
abling the Railroad Labor Board to enforce its decisions, 
denounced the lawlessness and violence of the strikers, up¬ 
held the rights of workers to remain at work or to take 
employment if they wished, accused the strikers of a con¬ 
spiracy to paralyze transportation by deserting transcon¬ 
tinental trains in the desert regions of the Southwest, and 
concluded his discussion of the shopmen’s strike thus: 

It is not my thought to ask Congress to deal with these fun¬ 
damental problems at this time. No hasty action would con¬ 
tribute to the solution of the present critical situation. There 
is an existing law by which to settle the prevailing disputes. 
There are statutes forbidding conspiracy to hinder interstate 
commerce. There are laws to assure the highest possible 
safety in railway service. It is my purpose to invoke these 
laws, civil and criminal, against all offenders alike. 3 

1 N. Y. Times, Aug. 15, 16, 1922. 

1 Ibid., Aug. 26, 1922. 

3 Congressional Record, vol. lxii, p. 11537. 


2 35 


483] PRESIDENT HARDING, 1921-1923 

During the last week of August numerous cabinet meet¬ 
ings were held, and the reports of violence and interference 
with interstate commerce were discussed at length. Probably 
as a result of these meetings Attorney General Daugherty 
appeared before Judge Wilkerson, of the U. S. Dis¬ 
trict Court in Chicago, on September 1, and obtained what 
was perhaps the most sweeping and thoroughgoing re¬ 
straining order ever issued. In the government’s bill ask¬ 
ing for the order attention of the court was called to alleged 
acts of destruction, violence, assaults on those remaining 
at work, and interference with interstate commerce and the 
passage of the mails. The government further maintained 
that the issue of the strike orders, as well of the orders 
arranging for pickets and counselling against violence, was 
evidence of an illegal conspiracy in violation of the Sher¬ 
man Act and the Transportation Act of 1920, the serious¬ 
ness of which violation was intensified by the deterioration 
of rolling stock, the lack of cars to carry coal, the conse¬ 
quent hardships to the public and industry, etc. The bill 
for the injunction further charged that the defendants, the 
Railway Employees’ Department of the A. F. of L., “ con¬ 
spired, combined and confederated together and agreed with 
each other and among themselves to repudiate, ignore, 
violate, disobey and refuse to accept the decision of the 
[Railroad Labor Board] and to quit in a body and abandon 
the service of the railway companies at one and the same 
time, all as an objection to or protest against and as con¬ 
tempt for Decision 1036 [the shopmen’s wage decision] and 
as a protest against and as contempt for the Railroad Labor 
Board and as contempt for the United States and the Gov¬ 
ernment thereof.” 1 

In his request for the restraining order the Attorney 
General said to the court: 

1 Government’s Bill of Complaint in U. S. v. Rwy. Employees* Dept, 
of the A. F. of L., Sept. 1, 1922, Washington. 


236 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [484 

No labor leader or capitalistic leader, nor organization or 
association of any kind or kinds, or combination of the same, 
will be permitted by the Government of the United States to 
laugh in the frozen faces of a famishing people without 
prompt prosecution and proper punishment. ... I will use 
the powers of the Government to prevent the labor unions of 
the country from destroying the open shop. . . . 

By refusing to comply with the decisions of the Railroad 
Labor Board in the matter of shopmen’s wages the unions 
held the Government of the United States in contempt. When 
a man in this country is not permitted to engage in lawful toil, 
whether he belongs to a union or not, the death knell to liberty 
will be sounded and anarchy will supersede organized Govern¬ 
ment. . . . 

The Government of the United States is not opposed to labor 
unions if they perform such functions as can be performed 
in lawful America. . . . 

The underlying principle involved in this action is the sur¬ 
vival and the supremacy of the Government of the United 
States. 1 

The restraining order, which was at once issued by the 
court, restrained all the officers of the unions, their em¬ 
ployees, or anyone acting in aid or in conjunction with them, 
from doing any of the following acts: 

(a) in any manner interfering with the railway com¬ 
panies engaged in interstate commerce and the transporta¬ 
tion of the mails, or with their employees, or from prevent¬ 
ing or attempting to prevent the latter from entering or con¬ 
tinuing employment; 

(b) in any manner conspiring to do any of the above 
things; or to injure, interfere with, hinder, or annoy any of 
the employees in connection with their work or in going to 
or from it, “ or at any time or place, by display of force or 


l N. Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1922. 


PRESIDENT HARDING, 


1921-1923 


237 


485 ] 

numbers, the making of threats, intimidation, acts of vio¬ 
lence, opprobious epithets, jeers, suggestion of danger, 
taunts, entreaties, or other unlawful acts or conduct towards 
any employee or employees or officers of said railway com¬ 
panies, or any of them, or towards persons desirous of or 
contemplating entering into such employment; ” 

(c) or loitering or being unnecessarily in the vicinity of 
places of egress or ingress of railroad property; “ or aiding, 
abetting, directing, or encouraging any person or persons, 
organizations, or associations, by letters, telegrams, tele¬ 
phone, word of mouth, or otherwise to do any of the acts 
aforesaid;” or trespassing on the premises of the com¬ 
panies ; 

(d) or “ inducing or attempting to induce by the use of 
threats, violent or abusive language, opprobrious epithets, 
physical violence or threats thereof, intimidation, display of 
numbers or force, jeers, entreaties, argument, persuasion, 
rewards, or otherwise, any person or persons to abandon 
the employment of said railway companies, or any of them, 
or to refrain from entering such employment; ” 

(e) or engaging, directing, or encouraging others to 
picket; 

(f) or congregating about railway property to picket; 

(g) or doing or causing any employee any injury or 
bodily harm, or going to his home to prevent him, by vio¬ 
lence, threats, “ or otherwise ” to induce him not to work 
or not to seek work; 

(h) or in any way hindering the operation of trains in 
interstate commerce or in carrying of the mails, or en¬ 
couraging anyone to do so; 

(i) or “ in any manner by letters, printed or other cir¬ 
culars, telegrams, word of mouth, oral persuasion, or sug¬ 
gestion, or through interviews to be published in newspapers 
or otherwise in any manner whatsoever, encourage, direct, 


238 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [486 

or command any person whether a member of any or either 
of said labor organizations or associations defendants herein, 
or otherwise, to abandon the employment of said railway 
companies, or any of them, or to refrain from entering the 
service of said railway companies.” 

In addition the officers of the Federated Shop Crafts were 
enjoined (a) from issuing any instructions, requests, public 
statements or suggestions in any way to any defendant or 
to any officials or members of the shop crafts unions as to 
what they were to do after quitting employment, or calcu¬ 
lated to get anyone to leave the employment of the roads or 
to refrain from entering it; and (b) from “ using, causing, 
or consenting to the use of any of the funds or monies of 
said labor organizations in aid of or to promote or encour¬ 
age the doing of any of the matter or things hereinbefore 
complained of.” 1 

One of the first steps in the enforcement of the order was 
the arrest of a striker in Chicago alleged to have jeered at 
railroad employees bound for work, who was later released 
because he was drunk when arrested. 2 

The first and perhaps the only important consequence of 
the order was a tremendous protest from citizens of all 
kinds, and from conservative as well as liberal newspapers, 
against the restriction of liberties involved in it. This com¬ 
plaint was so great that Mr. Daugherty, on September 5, 
asserted that “ the Government [had no] intention of 
abridging personal liberty or the constitutional rights of free 
speech and lawful assembly,” and that its only intention 
was to prevent violence and interference with interstate com¬ 
merce. At the same time a statement of a like nature, 
adding that the order was sought by the government in 

1 Restraining Order in U. S. v. Rwy. Employees’ Dept, of the A. F. 
of L., Sept. 1, 1922, Washington. 

2 N. Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1922. 


487] PRESIDENT HARDING, ^21-1923 239 

order to protect the travelling public, was issued at the 
White House. 1 

On September hi D. R. Richberg, counsel for the 
strikers, appeared before Judge Wilkerson, who had issued 
the order, and moved that it be dismissed on the following 
grounds: (1) that the government had erroneously assumed 
that the strikers violated the law when they declined to ac¬ 
cept the Labor Board’s decision; (2) that the open shop issue, 
cited as an important reason for seeking the injunction, was 
not one to be dealt with by the Department of Justice; (3) 
that federal courts had held that strikers have a right to 
attempt to recruit their ranks from non-union men; and 
(4) that the government failed to establish an unlawful 
conspiracy on the part of the strikers, as alleged in the in¬ 
junction bill. The court, however, continued the order 
until the application of the Attorney General for a tempo¬ 
rary injunction might be heard. 2 

In the meantime conferences looking towards a settlement 
of the strike were going on between the shopmen’s leaders 
and a number of railway executives, led by President Wil¬ 
lard of the Baltimore and Ohio and President A. H. Smith 
of the New York Central. The conferees finally drew up 
the following terms of settlement, later known as the Balti¬ 
more agreement, which the Shop Crafts General Conference 
Committee accepted on September 13: All men to return 
to work to positions of the class they held prior to the strike, 
and at the same point; as many men as possible to be put to 
work at present pay at once, and all strikers except those 
guilty of proven violence to be put to work or under pay 
within 30 days; any dispute arising as to the relative stand¬ 
ing of employees, or any other controversy arising from the 

1 N. Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1922. 

2 Ibid., Sept. 12, 1922. 


240 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [488 

sitrike that cannot be adjusted locally, to be referred for 
final decision to a bipartite commission of 12, a majority 
vote to be sufficient to decide; both parties to pledge no 
intimidation or oppression against strikers or non-strikers; 
all suits at law brought as a result of the strike to be with¬ 
drawn. 1 

On September 15 the Baltimore and Ohio, the Chicago 
and Northwestern, and the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. 
Paul signed the agreement. Four days later the New York 
Central did likewise. By September 27 it was reported that 
78 roads had settled with the strikers. Gradually more and 
more roads came in, until by October 30 over one hundred 
roads, 50 of them in Class I had signed up. Meanwhile the 
strike continued on the other roads, though it gradually 
weakened even on them. On March 6, 1923, government 
agencies reported that 120,000 men were still out. 2 As late 
as August, 1923, the Locomotive Engineer’s Journal re¬ 
ported that the strike was still continuing on those roads 
which had not yet signed the Baltimore agreement. 

To return to the injunction proceedings, the government 
attorneys, during the middle of September, 1922, presented 
further evidence of violence and alleged conspiracy. On 
September 23 Judge Wilkerson handed down his decision 
supporting the government’s suit, and on the 25th he issued 
a temporary injunction the terms of which were practically 
the same of those of the restraining order of September i. 3 

In his decision the judge said: 

The law is clear, in my opinion, that if the dominating, pri¬ 
mary purpose of the combination is to restrain trade or to 

1 Monthly Labor Review, December, 1922, p. 1181. 

* N. Y. Times, Sept. 14, 16, 20, Oct. 12, 31, 1922, March 7, 1923. 

• Injunction Writ in U. S. v. Rwy. Employees' Dept, of the A. F. of 
L., Sept. 25, 1922, Washington. 


PRESIDENT HARDING , 


1921-1923 


489] 


241' 


do things unlawful in themselves, and which by reason of 
their inherent nature operate to restrain trade, the purpose 
of the combination is unlawful, and that purpose may not be 
carried out even by means that otherwise would be legal. . . . 
These unlawful acts are shown to have been on such a large 
scale and in point of time and place so connected with the 
admitted conduct of the strike that it is impossible on the 
record here to view them in any other light than as done in 
furtherance of a common purpose and part of a common 
plan. . . . 

These defendants will not be permitted, upon the record here, 
to deny responsibility for these unlawful acts. They wilt 
not be permitted to continue acts which, even though they 
may be peaceable and lawful in themselves, it has been dem¬ 
onstrated are only part of a program of unlawful conduct 
and are done for the accomplishment of an unlawful pur¬ 
pose. . . . 

It is asserted by the defendants that to prohibit some of the 
acts against which the complainant seeks an injunction is to de¬ 
prive them of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Con¬ 
stitution. This contention has been answered by what has 
been said with reference to the unlawful purpose of the con¬ 
spiracy. . . - 1 

The record in this case shows that the so-called peaceable and 
lawful acts are so interwoven with the whole plan of intim¬ 
idation and obstruction that to go through the formality 
of enjoining the commission of assaults and other acts of 
violence and leave the defendants free to pursue the open and 
ostensibly peaceful part of their program would be an idle 
ceremony. 2 

On September i<i Representative Keller of Minnesota 
presented impeachment charges against the Attorney Gen- 

1 It is evidently the thought of the court that the Constitution does 
not legalize acts illegal under the common law. 

2 Statement and Opinion of the Court, in U. S. v. Rwy. Employees* 
Dept, of the A. F. of L., Sept. 23, 1922, Washington. 


242 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [490 

eral in the House, asserting that Mr. Daugherty had used 
his office to violate the Constitution. A week later the 
House Judiciary Committee, to whom the matter had been 
referred, decided to postpone hearings on the impeachment 
charges until Congress reconvened in December. Nothing 
ever came of this matter. In a speech at Canton, Ohio, de¬ 
livered on October 21, the Attorney General said that the 
strike had put the nation in the grip of civil war, and as¬ 
serted that if he had not taken the action he did take he 
could have been and should have been impeached. 1 

Later on the government sought to have the injunction 
made permanent, and proceedings for that purpose con¬ 
tinued for many months. Finally, in June, 1923, Judge 
Wilkerson granted the government’s plea, the shop' crafts 
having withdrawn from the case some time earlier when the 
U. S. Supreme Court had rendered a decision maintaining 
the right to disobey the orders of the Railroad Labor 
Board. 2 Attorney General Daugherty, commenting on the 
action of Judge Wilkerson, said, “ No extensive strike tying 
up interstate commerce will ever again take place in this 
country.” Nevertheless, as the Locomotive Engineer's 
Journal pointed out, the shopmen were still on strike on 
some roads. 5 

There are .two phases of the President’s handling of this 
strike on which it is worth while centering discussion. The 
first involves the justice of his proposals for a settlement, 
and the other one the question of the injunction. The shop" 
men, it will be recalled, struck on July 1 for two principal 
reasons: (1) against the contracting-out policy of some 
roads in violation of the Board’s decision, and (2) against 

N. Y. Times, Sept. 12, 20, Oct. 22, 1922. 

2 43 Sup. Ct. 278. 

3 Locomotive Engineer’s Journal, August, 1923. 


243 


491 ] PRESIDENT HARDING, 1921-1$23 

•the wage reduction ordered by the Board. It was not long 
before the strikers evidently realized that the strike had been 
a hasty and ill-judged one. The public stand against them 
for violating the Board’s decision practically doomed them 
to defeat from the beginning. They found themselves in 
the position of being unable to disobey the decisions with 
the same impunity as some roads had been able to do in con¬ 
tracting out their shop work. Disobedience on their part 
meant piiblic inconvenience. Disobedience on the part of 
the roads harmed only the unions and the Labor Board. The 
situation was perhaps unjust to them, but it existed never¬ 
theless. 

The strike had scarcely begun, however, when the issue 
became, because of the stand of the Board and of the rail¬ 
way executives, not that of the shopmen’s original demands, 
but that of seniority, a much more fundamental matter as 
far as they were concerned. President Harding, in his pro¬ 
posal of July 29, made an offer which was apparently just 
to both sides. The men were asked to give up their most 
important demand, that concerning wages, for there was 
little likelihood that the Board would rescind the wage de¬ 
cision when the question came up before it under the Presi¬ 
dent’s plan. The roads were asked to give up the contract¬ 
ing-out practice, which, since only a few of them had a 
part in it, was no sacrifice for most of them. Seniority, 
it is believed, should of right have been restored to the men, 
as President Harding first asked. If such an issue were to 
arise in strikes generally no strike could be fought on its 
merits. If strikers, in addition to failing to obtain that 
for which they strike, are also to lose their places and be 
treated as newcomers when they seek to return to work, the 
right to strike itself is impaired, for under such circumstances 
no strike could be undertaken unless the chances of winning 
it were overwhelmingly in favor of the strikers. Not until 


244 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [492 

the right to strike is generally denied by public opin¬ 
ion, should the denial of seniority have a right of its own to 
be considered in such cases. 

When President Harding, on the executives’ refusal to 
accept his first plan, proposed that the seniority question 
should be decided by the Railroad Labor Board, he was ask¬ 
ing something which was unjust to the men. The Board, 
in its announcements following the commencement of the 
strike, had practically placed itself in the position of pro¬ 
tecting the men who took the places of the strikers. It 
seems justifiable, under the circumstances, for the shopmen 
not to have permitted a body which had taken such a posi¬ 
tion to decide on so fundamental a question as seniority. 
The President’s second offer is a further illustration of 
what appears to be the leitmotif of executive activity in 
labor disputes, the principle of expediency, or, to put it dif¬ 
ferently, to get a settlement in any way possible. 

The restraining order obtained by the Attorney General, 
presumably with the approval of the President, may be 
characterized as unjustifiable, unfair, and ineffective for 
the following reasons : 

1. One of the grounds on which it was Obtained was 
that the strike violated the antitrust laws, prohibiting con¬ 
spiracies in restraint of trade and commerce among the States. 
It has elsewhere been pointed that those laws were not in¬ 
tended to prevent labor unions from carrying out their 
ordinary activities. A strike is such an activity. Though 
lawyers may find loopholes in the anti-trust laws making 
labor unions unlawful conspiracies, ordinary citizens are 
aware that such laws were enacted for an entirely different 
reason. 

2. Another ground on which the order was obtained was 
that the strike violated the provisions of the Transportation 
Act of 1920, and that thereby the strikers showed “ con- 


PRESIDENT HARDING , 


1921-1923 


245 


493 ] 

tempt for the United States and the Government thereof.” 
Anyone who has read the act knows that it compels no one 
to accept the decisions of the Railroad Labor Board. Such 
decisions may be accepted or rejected, as the parties con¬ 
cerned desire. It is difficult to comprehend how the re¬ 
fusal to accept a decision when the laws of the United 
States plainly permit its rejection can be construed as “ con¬ 
tempt for the United States and the Government thereof.” 

3. Another basis for the order was the general doctrine 
of conspiracy, which, as applied to this case, may be put as 
follows : Acts, which, though lawful and peaceful in them¬ 
selves, are done in pursuance of an unlawful purpose, are 
in themselves unlawful, and those responsible for such 
acts are guilty of an unlawful conspiracy. Courts have, 
under this rather expansive principle, prohibited nearly 
everything which a labor union can possibly do, as is evident 
from the terms of the 1922 injunction. But if, as is in¬ 
dicated in the last two paragraphs, the purpose of the strike 
was not really unlawful, the doctrine of conspiracy does 
not seem to fit the case. It would excuse the restraining 
only of acts of violence, which are distinctly unlawful. 
There is no intention here of defending such acts. 

4. The injunction was unjustifiable because it declared 
the calling of a strike an unlawful act. No state except 
Kansas has ever taken such a position. Congress has never 
been willing to accept it. The people of the country do 
not believe a strike is an unlawful act. For the Attorney 
General, under such conditions, to obtain an order mak¬ 
ing it unlawful and for a federal court to grant such an 
order was an abuse of authority. 

5. The Attorney General, in asking for the restraining 
order, said, “ I will use the powers of the Government to 
prevent the labor unions of the country from destroying 
the open shop.” The order was presumably granted with 


246 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [494 

that as one of its grounds. But the question of the open 
shop is one with which the xA.ttorney General properly has 
nothing to do. It is a question to 'be decided in fair struggle 
between labor and capital. The Attorney General had no 
more right to try to prevent labor unions from trying to 
destroy the open shop, even had that been their purpose in 
the strike, than he had to attempt to force employers to ac¬ 
cept the closed shop. His position in this instance was 
woefully biased in favor of labor’s opponents. 

6. The injunction was unjustifiable because, on the plea 
of the conspiracy doctrine, it tried to prohibit acts which 
always have been thoroughly recognized as within the con¬ 
stitutional rights of freedom of speech, of press, and of 
assembly. An injunction which makes illegal such things 
as jeers, taunts, entreaties, argument, persuasion, reward, 
encouragement, letters, telegrams, requests, instructions, 
public interviews, public statements, and suggestions the 
purpose of which is to get men to go on strike, or to keep 
them on strike, or to prevail on others not to take the 
striker’s places—such an injunction is so obviously extreme 
that to say it does not violate constitutional rights is like 
denying that there is a Constitution. 

7. The injunction was furthermore harmful in that, 
through the excess of its prohibitions, it tended to make 
both the office of the Attorney General and the f ederal courts 
appear ridiculous, biased, and unreasonable. 

8. Perhaps the most important argument of all against 
the injunction was that it was not of any great use in end¬ 
ing the strike. When the strike ended on certain of the 
roads the cause was not the restraining order, but the more 
normal method of peaceful, voluntary conference. The 
strike continued on some roads for many months, despite 
the injunction. It served no purpose in the apprehension 
of those guilty of violence which could not as well have 
been served by ordinary arrest and indictment. 


495] PRESIDENT HARDING, 247 

When one considers all the valid objections to the 1922 
injunction in particular, and the injunctive method of end¬ 
ing strikes in general, and then is faced with the realiza¬ 
tion that such an instrument has proved of little value in 
effecting its principal purpose, one wonders how much 
longer Presidents of the United States will seek to exercise 
their influence towards a settlement of labor disputes by 
a resort to such means. 


CHAPTER VIII 


Conclusion 

A study of presidential intervention in labor disputes 
during the past thirty years makes it apparent that the 
reason above all others which has caused the executive to 
exert his influence has been the pressure of public opinion. 
In the earlier troubles, such as the Pullman and the Coeur 
d’Alene cases, he was, of course, impelled by the desire to 
perform his duty as the head of the nation by helping to 
keep order and by protecting the interests of the public. 
But, since the establishment of the precedent by President 
Roosevelt in 1902, whenever a great industrial crisis threat¬ 
ens, the people turn naturally to the White House for help. 
However little encouragement the President may receive 
from the parties to the dispute, public opinion alone vir¬ 
tually forces him to intervene. 

The public considers that its national executive is the one 
to represent its interests in such a case, and it has added this 
to the numberless other tasks it places upon its chosen 
leader. Failure to save the country from the misfortune of 
industrial conflict is visited upon his head as surely as 
failure to prevent any other thing which affects the pros¬ 
perity of the nation. His party realizes the truth of 
this statement in the next election if he has no worthy record 
to show. 

Despite the ever-increasing pressure on the President to 
intervene in labor disputes, he has usually been somewhat 
slow to act, and wisely so. Numerous agencies exist whose 
248 [496 


CONCLUSION 


249 


497] 

principal purpose it is to settle industrial disagreements. 
By immediate action the President would not only need¬ 
lessly add to his already heavy burdens, but he would also 
be infringing on the rightful province of such bodies as 
the Department of Labor and the Railroad Labor Board. 

By reserving his influence to be used as a last resort, he 
adds greatly to the effectiveness of his efforts when action 
is finally taken. If the President made attempts to end 
strikes frequently, and with only slight cause, it would be 
easier for the disputants to reject his proposals. The 
public, grown accustomed to his pleas, would not be so 
ready to become indignant at a refusal to heed them. The 
great prestige of the executive office would be lessened and 
the chances of averting serious strikes would be jeop¬ 
ardized. 

When Presidents have finally determined on action in 
labor disputes the records show that they have used many 
different methods to carry out their purpose. The variety 
of activities has been nearly as great as the variety of situa¬ 
tions which gave rise to them. A presentation of these 
activities in outline form, excluding those peculiar to war¬ 
time, shows the extent of this diversity. 1 

presidential activities in connection with labor 

DISPUTES IN TIME OF PEACE 

i. Activities the purpose of which is to avert or end a 
strike. 

A. Friendly intervention: 

1. Investigation of strike issues, 

2. Letters to either or both sides urging settlement. 

1 Consideration of war-time activities has been omitted from this 
conclusion because they are taken up as far as is thought necessary 
in chapter v. 


250 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [498 

3. Letters to federal officials, mediators, or arbitra¬ 
tors urging settlement. 

4. Requesting or appointing federal or state officials 
to act as mediators. 

5. Meeting contestants in conference. 

a. Acting as mediator or conciliator. 

b. Securing agreement to submit to arbitration. 

c. 'Making definite proposals for settlement. 

6. Securing changes in arbitration law to obtain 
arbitration agreement. 

B. Publicity: 1 

1. Publication of results of investigation made under 
President’s direction, in order to influence public 

opinion and thus hasten a settlement. 

2. Publication of President’s efforts at mediation 
and their results, in order to influence public 
opinion and thus hasten a settlement. 

C. Coercion: 

1. Securing the passage of a law making possible 
the end of a strike by enacting some of the de¬ 
mands of a contestant. 

2. Threatening investigation of one of the contest¬ 
ants with regard to prices and profits. 

3. Securing an injunction for the purpose of avert¬ 
ing or ending a strike. 

4. Instituting other court processes for the purpose 
of averting or ending a strike by making pos¬ 
sible the arrest of strike leaders and strikers. 

5. Using federal troops to end a strike. 

1 Publicity would logically come under the heading, “ Coercion,” but 
is so different in its nature, and usually in its results, from the other 
measures enumerated under that heading that it seems to deserve a 
place of its own. 


CONCLUSION 


499 ] 


251' 


II. Activities the purpose of which is not to avert or 
end a strike: 


A. Investigations made for the purpose of deciding 
whether to take action. 

B. Use of troops to prevent domestic violence and ex¬ 
ecute federal laws during a strike. 

C. Securing the arrest and indictment of strikers and 
strike leaders on charges of violating the laws. 

The number of methods employed seems ample to pro¬ 
vide some definite procedure for every condition which may* 
arise, but when it is asked, “ Have the executives had a 
well defined program to follow when a great strike threat¬ 
ened ? ” the answer must be in the negative. There 
is no evidence of the existence of strike programs, ex¬ 
cept in the case of President Wilson during the war. A 
brief inquiry into the facts will show the truth of this 
assertion. In practically no instance other than in war¬ 
time, does an executive appear to have decided in advance 
of a given strike, threatened or actual, what ought to be 
done in such a case. The policy, as far as any has existed, 
has been one of waiting, and in many instances not even 
one of watchful waiting. The executive has as a rule per¬ 
mitted a strike to occur, unless it came at a time when 
serious danger to the public interest was likely to result im¬ 
mediately. When public opinion has become sufficiently 
aroused to clamor for the prevention or the end of a strike, 
when state and local officials have asked that something be 
done, or when one of the contestants has appealed to the 
President to take a hand in the matter, then the President, 
if he has thought it desirable, has acted. There have, of 
course, been cases in which an executive has been fore- 
sighted and has acted a considerable period before danger 
to the public was at hand, but generally a waiting policy 
has been the practice. 


252 


LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [500 


When action has finally been decided upon, the course 
followed has as a rule been guided by a single principle, 
that of expediency. As far as one can judge, the question 
the executive has usually asked himself or his advisers has 
been, “ What is the most effective way to prevent (or to 
end) the strike ?” Some method, usually the invitation 
to a conference, has then been tried. If it has proved un¬ 
successful other methods have followed, until, in some in¬ 
stances, drastic means have been adopted, usually without 
success. It is true that the President, in proposing a certain 
plan of settlement, has been guided by considerations of 
fairness to both sides. But that the principal purpose has 
Ibeen to end the strike, regardless of fairness, is evident from 
those instances when a second plan, radically different from 
the first one and apparently unfair to one of the parties, 
has been proposed because settlement under the first method 
was impossible. An example of this is the case of the 
two proposals for settlement made by President Harding 
in the Shopmen’s Strike of 1922. Another proof of the 
conclusion that expediency is the prime consideration lies 
in the fact that in several instances a course of action which 
has been fair in the 'beginning, has, on the failure to settle 
the dispute, developed into one of coercion with apparently 
little concern for justice, as in the 1919 and 1922 injunc¬ 
tions. 

Expediency has commonly determined the nature of the 
President’s activity, and to some degree the frequency and 
extent of his interference, but undoubtedly his own char¬ 
acter and his theory of presidential powers have often played 
a part in shaping his program. It is interesting to con¬ 
sider how different the course of industrial disputes might 
have been in the last twenty years had not President Roose- 
vdlt been aggressive enough to establish a precedent by call¬ 
ing the anthracite men to a conference in 1902. President 


CONCLUSION 


253 


501 ] 

Taft, with his more restricted theory of executive action, 
would probably not have set such a precedent even had the 
occasion arisen. 1 It is also to be doubted if Mr. Harding 
would have done so. In the case of President Wilson we 
have another example of the aggressive executive with broad 
views of his powers. He thought that a President could 
make his office what he wished, and his administration, in 
relation to strikes as well as otherwise, was evidence of the 
truth of his theory. 2 Mr. Harding found precedents 
already made for him, and he merely followed an already 
well established method in calling conferences, and went only 
a few steps beyond his predecessors in obtaining the most 
sweeping injunction ever recorded. 

Another factor which undoubtedly helps determine the 
nature and extent of the President’s activity is the character 
of his cabinet, particularly of his Secretary of Labor 
and of his Attorney General. It is to be doubted whether 
President Wilson would have taken such an active part in 
the settlement of labor disputes had his Secretary of Labor, 
William B. Wilson, been himself less active in calling the 
President’s attention to such matters. There is also a ques¬ 
tion whether President Harding would have sought for 
an injunction in 1922 had Mr. Daugherty not been his At¬ 
torney General. Again, there seems little ground for doubt¬ 
ing that it was the direct influence of Attorney General 
Palmer, rather than of President Wilson, who was at the 
time seriously ill, which was responsible for the 1919 in¬ 
junction. 

However much the President’s own character, his theory 
of executive power, and the character of his advisers may 
effect the frequency as well as the nature of his intervention 

1 For some idea of Mr. Taft’s theory of executive action see Taft, 
The Presidency, 1916, pp. 128-129. 

2 Wilson, The President of the United States, 1916, p. 42. 


254 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [502 

in labor disputes, the factor which, at least since 1902, has 
largely decided how often he shall use his influence has been 
the condition of the industrial world. Of the recent Pres¬ 
idents, Mr. Wilson has the record for intervening most fre¬ 
quently, but his activity was largely due to the unusual 
number of great strikes that occurred during his eight years 
in office. From 1913 to 1920 was a period of rapidly ris¬ 
ing prices, when labor was fighting strenuously to get 
wages that would keep pace with the mounting cost of 
living. From May, 1920, to the end of the Wilson 
administration, in March, 1921, labor fought just as hard, 
though not as successfully, to prevent wage reductions. 
It carried its struggle into President Harding’s administra¬ 
tion, and Mr. Harding, a man with a reputation for com¬ 
parative mildness and lack of assertiveness, was forced to 
play as active a part in 1922 as the aggressive Mr. Wilson 
was ever called on to take. One may conclude that the ag¬ 
gressive qualities and theories of the executive and his ad¬ 
visers are largely responsible for the setting of precedents, 
but once the precedents are created the degree of executive 
activity depends to a large extent on the frequency of labor 
disputes and their menace to public welfare. 

The experience of the Presidents who have made use of 
the many different methods of dealing with labor disputes 
inclines one to believe, if a broad generalization be permitted, 
that those activities which may be classed under the head of 
friendly intervention and publicity are generally to be pre¬ 
ferred, from the viewpoint of justice, efficacy, and public 
welfare, to those classed under the head of coercion. It 
may be said to the credit of the Presidents that they have 
rarely tried coercive methods first, though President Cleve- 
land did so in the Pullman Strike. It is believed that even 
when friendly methods have failed, the adoption of coer¬ 
cive ones has as a rule been either ineffective, or has been 


CONCLUSION 


255 


5 <> 3 ] 

accompanied by so many disadvantages as to make it most 
undesirable. Except in the case of an extremely serious 
strike, as that threatened by the railway Brotherhoods in 
1916, less damage is likely to be done by actual suspension 
of work than by attempting to end the strike by some com¬ 
pulsory method. As a rule the disputants, who have 
usually been brought to a more complete understanding of 
each other’s position and of their own relation to the public 
welfare through the President’s efforts, will soon come to a 
voluntary settlement on their own account, even if his ef¬ 
forts have proved unsuccessful at the time they were made. 

In general coercive methods are objectionable because 
they rouse antagonism toward the government, its officers, 
and its laws; they increase the ill-feeling between employer 
and employee; and, at best, they provide only a temporary 
solution of the difficulty.J 

Of these coercive methods the use of the injunction has 
undoubtedly given rise to the most bitterness in the ranks 
of labor. Its effect in 1894, in 1919, and in 1922 has 
already been mentioned. There remain only several more 
general points to consider. They are concerned with the 
need for the injunctive process in labor disputes, regardless 
of the particular act which the writ is intended to prohibit. 1 
If an act is unlawful under the statutes it is difficult to see 
what the ends of justice gain by having it enjoined. Pre¬ 
sumably the violators of the law can always be arrested as 
readily on the ground of disobeying the law as of disobey¬ 
ing an injunction. There is no reason to suppose that 
the authorities will arrest more readily in one case than 
in another. If the injunctive method has an advantage in 

1 The injunction according to the recognized principles of law, may 
not be issued to restrain the commission of a crime. It may only be 
issued to prevent acts which, if not restrained, would cause irreparable 
injury to property rights. 


256 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [504 

this respect it is that the performance of the act forbidden 
by it will be punished by the judge for contempt of court, 
without opportunity for trial by jury, and without chance 
for appeal on the facts to a higher tribunal. 1 In other 
words, the restraining by a court of an act already unlawful 
under the statutes does away with the safeguards for the 
accused which Anglo-Saxon law has set up only after cen¬ 
turies of struggle, and subjects the alleged violator to the 
whim of a single judge. Such procedure may be quicker, 
and more effective in rendering punishment, but is not 
likely to be as productive of justice as the process of in¬ 
dictment, arrest, and trial. 

If an act is not unlawful under the statutes, but may be 
so construed under the common law, the injunction is of 
value in that it makes possible the punishment of acts which 
might otherwise remain unpunished. To the lawyer the 
necessity for the injunction in this connection may be un¬ 
questionable, but to the layman the matter is not so clear. 
The common law is so very inclusive, its principles may be 
so easily expanded in accordance with the honest though 
biased beliefs of the court, that there hardly remains a 
trade-union activity which some judge may not attempt to 
prohibit by injunction. It seems reasonable to suppose, as 
has been pointed out elsewhere, that if the people, who are 
generally given credit with being ultimately responsible for 
the making of the laws, had wished to prohibit a certain act 
as contrary to public policy, they would have done so 
through the passage of a law. For a judge, who in most 
cases has no future responsibility to the electorate, to be 
permitted to issue edicts which may be entirely opposed to 

1 Though courts will not hear an appeal on the facts concerning 
disobedience of an injunction, an appeal may be taken on the question 
of the right of the court to issue the injunction in a particular case. 
See the decision in the Debs case, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900. 


CONCLUSION 


257 


505] 

what the electorate considers desirable, is a situation which 
it is difficult for a believer in democratic government to 
reconcile with democratic principles. With the injunctive 
process so liable to criticism and abuse a President of the 
United States should certainly consider long and carefully 
whether it ought to be used. 

Any conclusion with regard to the wisdom of sending 
federal troops into a strike area must be based on the use 
made of those troops. To use or to allow them to be used 
for the purpose of ending a strike or of assisting either dis¬ 
putant to win its case must be regarded as distinctly unjust. 
Troops were put to such a use in the Pullman Strike, when 
they helped to enforce an injunction designed to end the 
strike, and in the Coeur d’Alenes in 1899, when, through 
the negligence of the President, the employers used them to 
break up a union. When a strike has brought violence in 
its wake the use of federal troops to restore and preserve 
order is unquestionably justified. There is perceptible, ever 
since President Roosevelt’s administration, a serious effort 
on the part of the executives to permit the use of troops 
only as a last resort, and then to take care that they are not 
being used to defeat the strikers, or to deny liberties to 
which citizens are entitled. Though there have been a few 
unimportant exceptions to the rule since 1900, in general 
the Presidents have used excellent judgment. This fact 
has even been recognized by the unionists, who have in most 
cases been bitterly opposed to the presence of state militia 
at the scene of a strike. In Colorado in 1914, and in West 
Virginia in 19211, the strikers and their leaders favored the 
presence of United States soldiers, because the state troops 
had proved so hostile to labor. Coeur d’Alenes seems to 
have been the “ horrible example ” which the later Presi¬ 
dents have been anxious not to follow. 

Up to this time a President has never had to decide 


258 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [506 

whether troops should be employed to run an essential in¬ 
dustry taken over temporarily by the government during 
a strike. In view of the fact that most of the railway labor 
and much of that employed in the mines must be skilled, 
such use seems hardly feasible. 

Such a method of coercion as was embodied in the pas¬ 
sage of the Adamson Act, the method of bringing to terms 
either party to a dispute by persuading Congress to pass 
coercive legislation, is not likely to prove a dangerous one. 
Rarely would a President find sufficient support in Congress 
to enable him to force through legislation which was not 
demanded by the country as a whole. Majority opinion 
does not often favor coercive legislation, and without public 
approval the President would be unlikely to ask for it. 

One of the milder measures which might be called coer¬ 
cive is the use of publicity to force an agreement. When 
this applies merely to publicity of all facts underlying the 
dispute, it is a just as well as a most effective weapon in 
the hands of the President. Moreover, since neither party 
can feel that the government has discriminated against it, 
it does not arouse the same resentment as the more aggres¬ 
sive coercive measures. It does, however, give the public 
a basis for a fair decision as to the merits of the contro¬ 
versy. 

When, in addition to making public the facts of the dis¬ 
pute, the executive makes known the proposals which have 
been made by him for a settlement, or his appeals to the 
contestants for a peaceful determination of the question at 
issue and the responses of the disputants to such proposals 
and appeals, he marshals behind him the immense support 
of public opinion. It is a hardy and determined partisan 
who long dares to withstand such a force. The Colorado 
Fuel and Iron Company and other groups of employers 
have done it, as have the strongly organized miners and 


CONCLUSION 


507] 


259 


railroad workers. But nevertheless the support of the 
public is perhaps the most powerful means the President 
has to effect a settlement. Such a support should be called 
forth only after the executive has assured himself beyond 
doubt that his proposal is just since the public is likely to 
support any proposal he makes, regardless of its fairness. 

There have been times when it has been desirable to keep 
the public uninformed. In some delicate cases of mediation 
by the executive, publicity given to the situation would have 
done much to lessen the chance for settlement. As a gen¬ 
eral rule, however, publicity has been wholesome and de¬ 
sirable. In this connection there is another possibility 
against which the President must guard. If there is to be 
any publicity at all it should be shed on both sides. To 
permit a hurried request to a union not to strike to get into 
the newspapers, thus bringing about the opposition of the 
public if the union refuses to accede to the request, and not 
to publish the refusal of the employer to meet the unions 
for the purpose of preventing the strike, is to cause much 
injustice. This occurred just before the Steel Strike of 
1919. 


The experience of the past would suggest the following 
principles as a guide for executive action in labor disputes: 

1. The President should have his advisers keep in close 
touch with impending or existing disputes, with orders to 
keep him informed when the controversy is likely to de¬ 
velop into a severe strike. The officials under him should 
have such information as to enable him to obtain a quick 
grasp of the essential points of the dispute and more de¬ 
tailed information to which he may have reference when 
necessary. In case such information is not at hand the 
President should appoint a representative to make a thor¬ 
ough and impartial investigation for his own use. 


2 6o LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [508 

2. The President should make a personal attempt to pre¬ 
vent a strike, either by sending letters urging a settlement, 
or by inviting the contestants to a conference, only when it 
is apparent that all other agencies of settlement have been 
unsuccessful or are likely to be unsuccessful, and when the 
strike would be likely to cause much suffering and incon¬ 
venience to the public. If a strike is already in effect he 
should attempt to settle it only under the same conditions. 
His influence should not be used in the case of relatively 
unimportant strikes, for to do so is to minimize its effect in 
important ones. In the case of unimportant strikes he 
should instruct whatever agencies exist for the purpose, 
preferably through the Department of Labor, to use their 
efforts to bring about a settlement, if they are not already 
engaged in such efforts. 

3. When the President has determined to make a pro¬ 
posal of settlement he should exercise all the care possible 
in order that his proposal, whether of arbitration or direct 
settlement, may be fair and just to all sides, and that there 
may be a reasonable expectation of its acceptance. To this 
end he should be sure to acquire as complete an understand¬ 
ing as possible of the issues at hand and the points of view 
of the disputants, by means of conferences with each side, 
and through the advice of impartial experts. 

4. Except in those cases where it would minimize the 
chances of settlement, the President should make public full 
accounts of his attempts to obtain a settlement, of his pro¬ 
posals, and of the replies to them. In case his plan is not 
accepted he should be careful to give, in their own words, 
all the reasons offered by both sides for their action. In 
those cases in which the refusal of one side to concede any¬ 
thing toward a settlement seems to him unwarranted he 
should give publicity to the opinions of his advisers and to 
the reports of his investigators, if any have been appointed. 


CONCLUSION 


509] 


26l 


5. If the President’s plan of settlement is not accepted 
he should endeavor to make further efforts, taking care not 
to suggest proposals unfair to either side. If he is con¬ 
vinced that his first plan is the only just basis of settlement 
he should make no others. If, however, it is possible to 
offer a second plan as fair as the first, and there is reason 
to hope that it may be accepted, the President should not 
hesitate to urge it. In many cases it is better for the strike 
to continue than that proposals be made which have no 
other excuse than that the earlier ones were refused and the 
continuance of the strike is harmful. In any case full and 
complete publicity should be given to continued refusals to 
accept the President’s proposals. 

6. The President should permit federal troops to be sent 
to the scene of a strike only when federal laws are being* 
openly violated and ordinary judicial proceedings are un¬ 
availing; or when there exists within a state serious dis¬ 
order and violence which local authorities cannot suppress 
and for the suppression of which the legislature or the 
governor asks the help of federal troops. Before sending 
the troops the President should make certain, by sending an 
impartial and judicious observer to the scene of alleged dis¬ 
order, that there really exists a situation requiring the pres¬ 
ence of federal troops, and that the state authorities have 
exhausted all their efforts to suppress the disorders. He 
should ascertain, before sending troops, that they have not 
been called merely to aid the employers in breaking a strike. 
On directing that troops be sent the President should have 
them carefully instructed so that they will not be used to 
favor either side. They should be continually under the 
direction of the federal government and at no time under 
the control of the local authorities, and they should be in¬ 
structed not to restrict in any way the ordinary rights of 
citizens save as such restriction is absolutely indispensable 


262 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [510 

to suppress disorder. The President should keep con¬ 
tinually informed of the activities of the troops in the strike 
zone, and of the situation with regard to the existence of 
disorder, so that there shall at no time be an abuse of 
their presence, and that they may be withdrawn as 
quickly as possible when there is no longer a need for 
them. If the request for troops has come from the governor 
of a state, because the legislature is not in session and can¬ 
not be convened in time, the President should insist that 
the legislature be convened as soon as possible, in order 
that the people of the State, through their representatives, 
may have an opportunity to express their will with re¬ 
gard to the presence of federal troops. If the legisla¬ 
ture fails, on bring convened, to request that the federal 
troops remain, they should be at once withdrawn, unless 
the President is assured that the enforcement of federal 
laws would be impossible without them. 1 As long as 
strikes are not forbidden by law, federal troops should 
never be used by the government to end a strike. 

7. The President should at no time seek to end a strike 
by having his assistants obtain an injunction. 

8. The President should at no time seek to end a strike 
by having strikers and strike leaders arrested and im¬ 
prisoned. Such arrests should be made only when they 
have been guilty of an actual violation of criminal law. 
They shohld not be made under laws which at the time of 
their passage were never intended to be used for such a 
purpose. 

One more matter in connection with the President’s ac¬ 
tivity in labor disputes which requires attention is the ques¬ 
tion of devising more efficient machinery for lightening 
the heavy burden which is imposed on him with the corn- 


1 See article 4, section 4, of the Federal Constitution. 


CONCLUSION 


511] 


263 


ing of nation-wide strikes in essential industries. Even a 
brief study of the past thirty years convinces one of the in¬ 
creasing frequency with which the executive has been com¬ 
pelled to intervene in order to avert suspension of produc¬ 
tion in such industries. It has often been said that the tre¬ 
mendous burden which the nation places upon its executive is 
more than even a strong man can bear. The breakdown 
of President Wilson and the fatal illness of President 
Harding bear out such an assertion. 

The only possible method of lightening this task lies in 
the improvement of the machinery of administration so 
that the need for personal attention to details in dealing 
with a problem shall be reduced to a minimum. For deal¬ 
ing with industrial disputes of lesser importance or those 
not connected with the so-called essential industries ma¬ 
chinery for mediation already exists in the Department of 
Labor. The disputes in the highly unionized industries in 
which a suspension involves national hardship are the ones 
which force the President to take on himself the respon¬ 
sibility for a settlement. It is for the adjustment of these 
that more efficient machinery is demanded. 

Reference has already been made to the successive acts 
of Congress passed for the purpose of handling railway 
labor disputes. The Erdman and Newlands Acts un¬ 
doubtedly performed a great service in relieving the Presi¬ 
dent of the need of giving his personal attention to the 
settlement of many railway controversies. The strength of 
both these laws was to a large extent in the provision which 
they made for the mediation of industrial disputes by ex¬ 
perienced government officials. Their principal defect was 
in those sections providing for arbitration in case mediation 
failed. As one case after another was decided in a manner 
which they considered unfair to them, the railroad em¬ 
ployees acquired a distrust of arbitration. By the summer 


264 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [512 

of 1916 this distrust had become so great that they pre¬ 
ferred to involve the whole country in a disastrous strike 
rather than arbitrate their demands. 

Their principal objection to arbitration in general was that 
under the law the decision was in the hands of third parties, 
supposedly neutral, who made up the boards along with the 
representatives of the men and the roads. They claimed 
that these so-called “ impartial ” arbitrators were not im¬ 
partial, and that they were usually owners of property who 
had class interests which inclined them to the side of capital 
in a dispute. They did not accuse the “ neutral ” arbitra¬ 
tors of dishonesty, but pointed out that the bias and ways 
of thinking of such individuals would naturally lead them 
to favor the railways. In an endeavor to prove their con¬ 
tentions they pointed to the decisions in a succession of rail¬ 
way arbitration cases in which they considered themselves 
treated unfairly. This criticism of arbitration virtually 
resolves itself into an assertion that there are as a rule no 
representatives of the public who are so entirely unin¬ 
fluenced by their training and interests that they will cast 
their votes in an arbitration case with strict scientific im¬ 
partiality. Moreover, employees, and often employers, ob¬ 
jected to the system of neutral arbitrators on the ground 
that the decision was thus left in the hands of persons with 
no experience in the railroad industry, who found it impos¬ 
sible to understand fully the complicated and intricate work¬ 
ing rules and wage schedules in effect on the roads. An¬ 
other important objection to arbitration which railroad 
labor expressed was that the decisions were always inter¬ 
preted by the railway managers, often in such a way that 
in the end the employees received even less than it was the 
intention of the arbitrators to give them. 1 

1 Fisher, Use of Federal Power in Railway Labor Disputes, passim. 


CONCLUSION 


513] 


265 


Soon after the government took over control of the rail- 
roads for the war period (the Railway Administration set 
up a Board of Railroad Wages and Working Conditions 
to decide matters of labor policy and inequalities in pay. 
In addition a number of boards of adjustment, consisting! 
of an equal number of representatives of the railroads and 
the employees, were organized for the purpose of handling 
controversies growing out of the interpretation of wage 
schedules. As has already been pointed out, this machinery 
maintained peace in the railroad industry during the war 
and for some time afterwards. The two sides, without the 
interference of supposedly impartial outsiders, succeeded in 
settling their controversies with a minimum of friction. 
Undoubtedly the success of the system was to a large extent 
due to the war-time spirit of cooperation and to the favor¬ 
able attitude of the Railway Administration toward labor, 
but it showed the possibilities inherent in bipartisan ma¬ 
chinery for adjustment. 

With the return of the railroads to the private owners a 
new system of adjustment was put into operation. The 
Transportation Act of 1920 provided for a Railroad Labor 
Board of nine members, three representing the roads, three 
the men, and three the public, all of them appointed by the 
President with the approval of the Senate. Provision was 
also made for the setting up of regional boards' of adjust¬ 
ment, made up only of representatives of the railroads and the 
men. It was hoped that the roads would join the men in 
organizing such boards, thus settling disputes at their source, 
and limiting the work of the Railroad Labor Board to the 
very important cases. As a matter of fact only a few ad¬ 
justment boards were constituted, and even those functioned 
to an inconsiderable extent. The burden was placed al¬ 
most entirely on the Railroad Labor Board. 

The Board has been of great importance. It has settled 


266 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [514 

many disputes, which, if ignored, might have developed into 
serious strikes. It has accordingly relieved the President 
of burdensome tasks. Its continuous existence, its powers 
of obtaining information, and its ability to keep the public 
informed of disputes have proved of great value. Despite 
its accomplishments, however, the board and the law estab¬ 
lishing it have been severely criticized, until now large 
classes of the population consider it a failure. 

Many persons believe that a board of arbitration with 
no power of enforcing its decisions must of necessity fail. 
This brings up the question of compulsory arbitration. 
Should there not be a law compelling the acceptance of 
arbitration decisions and prohibiting railway strikes by the 
imposition of adequate penalties in case of violation? Sug¬ 
gestions to this effect have been made from time to time. 
It is obvious that such a law, if enforced, would relieve the 
President of the great share of his burdens in preventing 
interruption of transportation. It would add greatly to the 
prestige of the Railroad Labor Board. If it were enforced 
it would relieve the public from any danger of the hard¬ 
ships which railway strikes involve. Such a solution was 
suggested by President Harding in his message to Congress 
on December 8, 1922. 1 It deserves discussion. 

In the first place it would be extremely difficult to obtain 
the passage of national legislation of this kind, as is evi¬ 
denced by the removal of the compulsory clause of the Tran¬ 
sportation Bill of 1920 before it was made a law. 2 Labor 
unions and many employers are ever ready to fight any at¬ 
tempt to use legal coercion in the settlement of industrial 
disputes. 

To enforce such legislation would be even more difficult 
than to enact it. The experience of Great Britain in war- 

1 Monthly Labor Review, January, 1923, p. 22. 

s Fisher, The Use of Federal Power in Railzvay Labor Disputes. 


CONCLUSION 


515] 


267 


time, of Australia and New Zealand during the past few* 
years, of Kansas, and of Canada merely in the matter of 
compulsory investigation, show how often men strike in de¬ 
fiance of the law. 1 They likewise illustrate how difficult it 
is to enforce a penalty for disobedience of the statute, es¬ 
pecially in the case of labor. Even where it is possible to 
pass an arbitration law carrying with it a penalty clause pro¬ 
viding for imprisonment, its enforcement is found imprac¬ 
ticable either against a mass of strikers or against their 
leaders. Neither has the imposition of a fine proved more 
satisfactory in the case of labor. Placing the burden of the 
fine on the union which calls the strike is likely to develop 
the technique of “ outlaw strikes ”, seemingly against the 
orders of union officials, to a high degree of perfection. 
If the fines were imposed on the individual workers the 
great number of those without property would go unpun- 
ised. Experience with the Canadian law shows that of¬ 
ficials rarely attempt to collect fines from the workers. The 
consensus of opinion seems to be that the compulsory fea¬ 
tures of the act are of little use. Its real value lies in its 
provisions for investigation and settlement. 2 

Is the social advantage to be gained from a prohibition of 
railway strikes, assuming such a prohibition could be en¬ 
forced, as great as the social disadvantage arising there¬ 
from? If the right to strike is taken away from railway 
workers there does not appear to be an adequate guarantee 
that their interests will be properly protected. The workers 

1 Moses, Journal of Political Economy, November, 1918, p. 882; Re¬ 
search Report No. 23, National Industrial Conference Board; Beebe, 
The Survey, June 7, 1919, p. 339; Squires, Operation of the Industrial 
Disputes Investigation Act of Canada, Bulletin 233, U. S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 1918. 

2 Squires, op. cit., p. 139; Maclver, Arbitration and Conciliation in 
Canada, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, May, 1923, p. 297. 


2 68 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [516 

would have no other means of improving their condition 
than to ask that their demands be arbitrated. If arbitra¬ 
tion could be made absolutely scientific and impartial strikes 
might with justice be prohibited. But the people who have 
attained sufficient prominence to be appointed representa¬ 
tives of the public on a board of arbitration are very often 
led by hardly perceptible but none the less effective bias and 
prejudice to favor, in many instances, the side of capital. 
It has been pointed out, moreover, that a dispute is often 
decided in accordance with the economic power of the dis¬ 
putants, rather than strictly on its merits. The great power 
of the employees is the strike threat. To take that away is 
to leave them virtually at the mercy of the stronger party. 
The public, with railway strikes permitted, is without doubt 
subject to possible hardships, but it is believed that less 
social harm is involved in occasional strikes than in the dif¬ 
ficulty which the prohibition of strikes would place in the 
way of a continued maintenance of the railway worker’s 
standard of living or in its gradual improvement. 

Another criticism to which the Transportation Act has 
been subject is that it puts the determination of railway 
rates and of railway wages in the hands of two separate 
bodies. It is asserted that wages should be correlated 
with rates, and that therefore wages should be fixed by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, rather than by an inde¬ 
pendent board. In his message of December 8, 1922, Presi¬ 
dent Harding voiced this idea by suggesting that the In¬ 
terstate Commerce Commission be enlarged by the addition 
of four members, representing each of the rate-making 
territories, and constituting a labor division of the Com¬ 
mission in charge of wage determination. An objection to 
this scheme is that the Commission is already kept so busy 
that it hardly has time to perform its present duties. Even 
were new members added the burden on each member of 


CONCLUSION 


517 ] 


269 


the board would probably be increased if the Commission 
were given authority over wages. What appears to be the 
greatest difficulty, however, would be that the Interstate 
Commerce Commission represents the public alone. To give 
it control over wages would practically make it a court 
hearing the arguments of employers and employees. The 
disadvantages of the determination of wages by public repre¬ 
sentatives would be intensified. 

The most serious criticism to which the Railroad Labor 
Board has been subject is the usual one made by the em¬ 
ployees, that the public representatives are not impartial. 
A long series of decisions reducing wages or opposing wage 
increases has strengthened this feeling. Though there are 
to the credit of the board numerous decisions favoring em¬ 
ployees, those concerning wages have not as a rule done so. 
Even if this feeling of the employees were without founda¬ 
tion in fact, it is manifest that a board which depends on the 
voluntary cooperation of both parties for its sucess can 
hardly continue to function effectively with railroad labor 
strongly opposed to it, and many railroads likewise unwill¬ 
ing to cooperate. 'Such conditions call for the establish¬ 
ment of a more satisfactory method of handling railway 
labor disputes. Before discussing such a method it will 
be well to consider the machinery for the settlement of dis¬ 
putes in the coal industry. 

Congress early took advantage of the interstate commerce 
clause of the Constitution to enact laws providing for the 
settlement of railway disputes. That clause has so far never 
been used to support the enactment of such laws for the 
coal industry. Whatever machinery has existed has been 
in the form of bipartisan boards representing the employers 
and employees equally. In the anthracite industry perma¬ 
nent boards of conciliation and joint scale committees, and in 
the bituminous industry different joint committees have set- 


270 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [518 

tied many questions effectively. But at the time when 
national agreements expire and important changes are de¬ 
manded disputes arise which have often required the in¬ 
tervention of the President. Undoubtedly the steadying in¬ 
fluence of someone who represents the nation at large is 
needed at such a time, but as far as possible the President 
should be spared this duty. 

It has been suggested that a Coal Labor Board, similar in 
composition and powers to the Railway Labor Board, be 
established as a solution of the problem. The objections to 
the latter board, however, would apply with equal validity 
to the former. The objections to compulsory arbitration 
and the prohibition of strikes in the railroad industry would 
also apply with equal force in the coal industry. 

In a report made in July, 1923, the U. S. Coal Commis¬ 
sion suggested that when all other attempts to prevent a strike 
fail and suspension seems certain, the President should have 
the power to declare the existence of a national emergency 
and to take over the mines, fix wages, prices, conpensation 
to owners, etc. 1 Such a proposal has often been mentioned 
as a means of dealing with a nation-wide strike in the coal 
or transportation industries. If Congress should authorize 
the President to take such action, it would give him an ad¬ 
ditional prestige among the disputants. Yet it may be said 
with confidence that a President would hesitate to use such 
a weapon unless virtually forced to do so. It would im¬ 
pose on him a tremendous burden, even if the administra¬ 
tion were prepared to carry it out, and if commissions of 
trained men were at hand to lighten his task. 

It has been generally assumed that such a method would 
prevent suspension of work on the ground that labor would 
not strike against the government. But if the government 


1 Monthly Labor Review, August, 1923, p. 318. 


CONCLUSION 


271 


519] 

asked men to work for it under the same conditions against 
which they were prepared to strike previous to government 
control, it is to be doubted whether a strike would be pre¬ 
vented. In European countries employees of government 
railways have often gone on strike. In 1919 several minor 
strikes occurred on the government-controlled railways in 
this country, and serious ones were only narrowly averted. 
Temporary government control of an industry to prevent or 
end a strike would probably accomplish its purpose only if 
it were put into operation rarely, or if the government 
made some concessions to the men. Whatever the effect 
on the suspension of service it is obvious that temporary 
nationalization would increase rather than lessen the cares 
of the executive. 

American experience with regard to coal and labor dis¬ 
putes indicates that (1) compulsory arbitration and pro¬ 
hibition of strikes seem undesirable; (2) joint conferences 
of employers and employees have, in the great majority of 
cases, been sufficient to bring about amicable agreements; 
(3) permanent joint conferences, such as adjustment boards, 
have been more effective than temporary conferences whose 
membership has changed with each dispute; (4) an active 
public opinion has been of great value in preventing and 
ending strikes; (5) a proposal from the President for arbi¬ 
tration or direct settlement, supported by public opinion, has 
usually been effective; (6) some method of protecting the 
public interest in important adjustments is necessary; (7) 
arbitration by boards with public representatives having the 
power to vote has not met with the approval of labor. 

The evidence is clearly in favor of some form of perma¬ 
nent national joint conference in which the public interest is 
represented, but in which the public representatives have no 
power to determine the issue; and of complete publicity in 
any controversy which may arise. 


272 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [520 

Several proposals of the Coal Commission may well be 
incorporated in a constructive plan of adjustment. These 
are that regular reports of mine accounts on a prescribed 
form be made to some government agency; that a “ continu¬ 
ing umpire ” with the necessary assistants sit at all con¬ 
ciliation meetings but have no vote; that contracts be auto¬ 
matically renewed unless either party gives notice at least 
ninety days before the renewal date; that if such notice is 
given and no agreement is reached sixty days before the 
renewal date, a report shall be made to the President 
specifying clearly the points at issue; that the President 
shall thereupon appoint a person or persons to inquire into 
and make public a report upon all the relevant facts in the 
controversy before the date of renewal. 1 These suggestions 
of the Coal Commission would apply as well to the trans¬ 
portation industry. 

The same general type of machinery may be suggested 
for the railroad, anthracite, and bituminous industries. In 
many cases existing local boards could be incorporated al¬ 
most without change. These local and regional boards 
should represent the employers and the employees equally. 
They should be permanent in character and should settle all 
possible grievances before referring them to the national 
board in the industry, which should be largely free to con¬ 
sider matters pertaining to the industry as a whole, par¬ 
ticularly the wage scales. 

Each national board—there should be three, one for the 
railroads, one for the anthracite, and one for the bituminous 
industry—should, like the local ones, have a permanent ex¬ 
istence, and should consist of an equal number of repre¬ 
sentatives chosen by the employers and the employees. It 
should also include an additional member appointed by the 


1 Monthly Labor Review, August, 1923, p. 318. 


CONCLUSION 


521 ] 


27 3 1 


President to represent the interests of the public. This 
public representative should have no vote, but should sit in 
all the meetings of the national board, should keep a com¬ 
plete record of all proceedings, and should at any time be 
ready to report on the status of the disputes before the 
board. He should be thoroughly familiar with the industry 
and should at any time have complete access to' all available 
information with regard to its management. Such an of¬ 
ficial would not arouse the antagonism of either side; but, 
if capable, he would nevertheless become a factor whose in¬ 
fluence would make itself felt. His knowledge, and, in 
time, his experience would command respect, and the realiza¬ 
tion that he was a representative of the President might 
serve to facilitate the settlement of disputes. 

Regular reports on prescribed forms such as are now made 
by the railroads to the Interstate Commerce Commission 
should be made by the anthracite and bituminous operators 
to the public representative on the appropriate board, and he, 
with the necessary assistance, should keep such records on 
file. The public representative on the railway board should 
have access to the reports in the hands of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. 

If either employers or employees should desire to obtain 
a change in working conditions notice should be sent to the 
national board at least ninety days before the date of the 
proposed change. 

If no agreement has been reached by sixty days before the 
date of the proposed change the public representative should 
so report to the President, who should thereupon appoint as 
his direct representative a trained special investigator, famil¬ 
iar with the industry, to inquire into all the facts relevant 
to the dispute. This investigator should confer with the 
public representative on the national board, attend the board’s 
meetings, and have access to all the information in the hands 


274 LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT [522 

of the public representative. In the case of a railway dis¬ 
pute he should also have access to the necessary information 
in the possession of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 

If the dispute is still unsettled thirty days before the date 
of the proposed change the investigator should report to the 
President on the facts of the controversy, and as far as 
possibile make an estimate of the result of the proposed 
changes on prices or rates. The President should at once 
make the report public. 

After such publicity the weight of public opinion would in 
most cases tend to force an agreement. If it should not do 
so the President has all necessary information long enough 
in advance to insure intelligent intervention on his part, 
should he consider it necessary. Thus adequately prepared, 
and with the support of a well-informed public behind him, 
his efforts would have every promise of success. If such a 
plan, with its adjustment machinery, its protection of the 
public interest, and its provisions for keeping the public 
thoroughly informed, were enacted by Congress, it would do 
much to minimize the number of coal and railroad strikes 
and to lighten the burden of the President. 


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INDEX 


A 

Act of 1888 (Arbitration), 26 
Adamson Act, 113-116, 120-124, 258 
Alger, Secretary of War, 41, 42 
Altgeld, Governor, 21 
American Federation of Labor, 126, 
132, 138, 151, 162, 166, 190, 227 
American Railway Union, 14, 15, 25 
Ammons, Governor, 81-83, 87, 88, 
93 , 97 

Anderson, Judge A. B., 182, 193, 
217 

Anti-trust Act of 1890, 17, 31, 52, 
217, 235, 244 

Anthracite Strike of 1902, 46-59; 
award, 55; demands of miners, 
48; President’s drastic plan, 58; 
strike commission, 54, 55 
Anthracite Wage Dispute of 1920, 
199-203 

B 

Baer, George F., 48 
Baldwin-Felts detectives, 210, 211 
Bandholtz, General, 211, 212, 213 
Bisbee deportations, 126, 127 
Bituminous Strike of 1919, 177-193; 
demands of miners, 177; injunc¬ 
tion, 178, 182, 183, 190; offers of 
settlement, 184; President’s state¬ 
ment of Oct. 24, 179; settlement 
plan, 185; troops, 185 
Board of Railway Wages and 
Working Conditions, 155, 162, 265 
Bowers, L. M., 80-84, 85 
Bridgeport case, 146-148 
Brotherhoods, Railway, 73, 74, 100, 
103, 106, no, 117, 131, 194, 232- 
234 

Burleson, Postmaster General, 145 
Butte miners’ strike, 208 

C 

Carpenters’ strike, Wartime, 134- 
137 


Central Competitive Field, 183, 188, 
206, 215, 216, 223 
Chafee, Zechariah, 193 
Chambers, Judge, 103 
Chicago Yardmen’s Association, 197 
Cleveland, Grover, 21, 26, 28, 34, 
58 , 254 

Coal strikes of 1906, 62-64 
Coal strikes of 1922, 214-226; an¬ 
thracite settlement, 224; bitumin¬ 
ous settlement, 223; causes, 214- 
218; President’s meetings with 
disputants, 219-221 
Coeur d’Alene disturbance, 36-45; 
arrests, 38, 44; dynamiting, 37; 
holding prisoners, 41, 44; permit 
system, 39, 40, 44; troops, 38, 
42 , 43 

Colorado Fuel & Iron Co., 70, 90, 
95, 258 

Colorado Strike of 1903-1904, 60-62 
Colorado Strike of 1913-1914, 76- 
99; causes, 77, 78; House 

of Representatives investigating 
committee, 85; Ludlow massacre, 
86, 87; mediation effort of Davies 
and Fairley, 93; mediation effort 
of Rep. Foster, 88, 89; mediation 
effort of E. M. Stewart, 79-81; 
mediation effort of President 
Wilson, 84-85; mediation effort 
of W. B. Wilson, 81-84; tentative 
basis of adjustment, 94, 96; 
troops, state, 81, 86; troops, fed¬ 
eral, 88-92, 99 

Colorado Strike Commission, 96-98 
Columbian Exposition, 17 
Compulsory arbitration, 266 
Council of National Defense, 126, 
137 

Cuyler, T. De Witt, 227, 231 
D 

Daugherty, Attorney General, 220, 
235, 238, 241, 242, 245, 246, 253 
281 


529] 




282 


INDEX 


[530 


Davis, Secretary of Labor, 217- 
219, 224 

Debs, Eugene V., 18, 24, 27 
Denver street car strike, 208 
Department of Justice, 176 
Department of Labor, 79, 249, 263 

E 

Eastern Ohio coal strike, 105 
Emergency Fleet Corporation, 132, 
134 

Erdman Act, 70, 73, 74, 263 
Expediency, Principle of, 252 

F 

Federated Shop Crafts, 238, 239, 
242 

Fitzpatrick, John, 168, 170 
Foster, Representative, 88, 89 
Foster, W. Z., 166 
Fuel Administration, 129 

G 

Garfield, H. A., 129, 184, 189 
Garrison, Secretary of War, 90 
Gary, E. H., 167-169, 176 
General Managers Association, 15, 
32 

Gompers, Samuel, 126, 151, 166-170, 
173, 191 

Gregory, Attorney General, 192 
Grunau, John, 197. 

H 

Hanna, Mark, 46, 48, 51 
Harding, Warren G., 254, 263, 266, 
268; coal strikes of 1922, 215, 
217-226; railway shopmen’s strike 
of 1922, 229, 231, 233, 234, 242- 
244, 252; threatened railway 

strike of 1921, 213, 214; West 
Virginia mine disturbances, 210, 
212, 213 

Hartford Valley Strike, 99 
Herrin, 219 

High cost of living, 154, 157, 159, 
160 

Hines, Director General of Rail¬ 
ways, IS 5 -I 57 , 161, 165, 175, 194, 
195 

Hooper, Ben, 228, 231, 232 
Hoover, Herbert, 232 
Ho watt, Alexander, 187 
Hurley, Chairman of Shipping 
Board, 133, 134 
Hutcheson, W. L., 134, 135 


I 

Illinois Bituminous Strike of 1920, 
204-206 

Industrial Commission, 40 
Industrial Conference of 1919, 169, 
173 

Injunctions, 255, 256, 262; bitumin¬ 
ous strike of 1919, 178, 182, 183, 

190, 193 ; Pullman strike, 18, 32, 
33; shopmen’s strike of 1922, 235, 
236, 239, 240, 244-246 

Interchurch Commission on In¬ 
quiry, 172, 174 

Interstate Commerce Commission, 
107, 112, 234, 268, 273 

J 

Jewell, B. M., 157, 227, 231 
K 

Knapp, Judge, 72, 103 
L 

League of Nations Covenant, 175 
Lewis, John L., 177, 186, 215, 216, 
219, 223 

Lever Act, 129, 178, 181, 182, 190, 

191, 192, 198 

Louisville and Nashville, 70-72 
M 

McAdoo, Wm. G., 132 
McKinley, Wm., 40, 42, 45 
Merriam, General, 38, 39-41 
Milchrist, U. S. Attorney, 17 
Miners’ strike in Arizona, 59, 60 
Miners’ strike in Goldfield, 64-69 
Miners’ strike penalties, 129 
Miners’ war-time wages, 129 
Mitchell, John, 47, 52, 63 
Mooney case, 128 
Morgan, Governor, 210 
Morgan, J. Pierpont, 52, 53 

N 

Nagel, Charles, 103, 104 
National Civic Federation, 49, 74 
National Committee for Organiz¬ 
ing Iron and Steel Workers, 166, 
167, 170, 174 

National Industrial Conference 
Board, 137, 138 

National War Labor Board, 137- 
151, 152; Bridgeport case, 146- 
148; New York harbor strike, 
January, 1919, 150-151; prin- 



INDEX 


531 ] 

ciples of, 140; proclamation cre¬ 
ating, 139; record of, 141; Smith 
& Wesson case, 148-149; Western 
Union case, 142-145 
Navy Department, 132 
Neill, Commissioner, 72 
New York Times, 189 
Newlands Act, 74, 75, 101, 102, 263 

O 

Ogle, A. M., 219 

Olney, Attorney General, 16, 17, 31 
Ordnance Department, 146 

P 

Palmer, Attorney General, 178, 180, 
182, 186, 189, 253 
Peabody, Governor, 60, 61 
President’s Mediation Commission, 
126-129 

Public opinion, 248 
Pullman Strike, 13-35, 248; at- 
tempted arbitration, 15, 25; boy¬ 
cott, 15; causes, 13; deputy mar¬ 
shals, 18, 30, 31; indictments, 24; 
injunction, 18; strike commission, 
26; troops, 20-23; U. S. Supreme 
Court, 27 

R 

Railroad Administration, 165 
Railroad Labor Board, 162, 195, 
197, 198, 213, 214, 226-228, 231, 
232, 234, 235, 243-245, 249, 265, 
266, 269 

Railroad Shopmen’s Strike of 1919, 

154-164 

Railroad Shopmen’s Strike of 1922, 
226-247, 252; causes, 226, 227; 
injunction, 235; President’s pro¬ 
posals, 231, 233; settlement, 239 
Railroad Wage Commission, 132 
Railway Employees’ Department, 
A. F. of L., 227, 235 
Railway labor disputes, War-time, 
130 

Railway labor troubles of 1920, 

193-199 

Railway Managers, National Con¬ 
ference Committee of, 106, 108 
Rockefeller, John D., 88 
Rockefeller, John D., Jr., 77, 79, 
80, 81-85, 88-90 

Roosevelt, Theodore, 248, 252, 257; 
anthracite strike, 50-56; coal 


283 

strikes of 1906, 62-64; Colorado 
strike of 1903-1904, 60-62; min¬ 
ers’ strike in Arizona, 59, 60; 
miners’ strike in Goldfield, 65-69; 
threatened railway wage reduc- 
tionsj 1908, 70-72 
Root, Elihu, 42, 53, 60 

S 

Seattle General Strike, 208 
Sinclair, State Auditor, 37, 38 
Smith and Wesson case, 148-149 
Sparks, Governor, 64-69 
Steel Strike of 1919, 166-176, 259 ; 
demands of workers, 167; Presi¬ 
dent’s postponement request, 169; 
troops, 171, 172 

Steunenberg, Governor, 37, 38, 42 
Stewart, Ethelbert M., 79-81 
Suggested adjustment machinery, 
272-274 

Suggested program of presidential 
activity, 259-262 

Sympathetic railway strike in 
Southwest, 164-166 

T 

Taft, Wm. H., 72, 138, 143, 144, 
253 

Threatened Railway Strike of 1916, 
106-124; counter proposals of 
managers, 111; demands of men, 
106; mediation attempt by U. S. 
Board, 107; mediation of second 
dispute, 118; President’s address 
to Congress, 113-115; President’s 
proposal, 109 

Threatened Railway Strike of 1921, 
213, 214 

Threatened Strike of Conductors 
and Trainmen, 1913, 73-76 
Threatened Strike of Engineers and 
Firemen, 1914, 100-105 
Transportation Act of 1920, 195, 
228, 235, 244, 265, 268 
Troops, 257, 261; bituminous strike 
of 1919, 185; coal strikes of 
1922, 218, 222, 226; Coeur 

d’Alenes, 38, 42; Colorado strike 
of 1913-1914, 88-92, 99; laws con¬ 
cerning use of, 22, 43, 207; min¬ 
ers’ strike in Arizona, 59, 60; 
miners’ strike in Goldfield, 64-69; 
Pullman strike, 20-23; shopmen’s 
strike of 1922, 230; steel strike of 





284 

1919, 171; war-time disputes, 207- 
209; West Virginia, 209, 210, 212 
Tumulty, Secretary, 169, 186, 189 

U 

United Mine Workers of America, 
46, 77, 97, 177, 178, 182, 183, 188, 
204, 210, 213 

U. S. Anthracite Coal Commission, 
201 

U. S. Bituminous Coal Commission, 
187, 205 

U. S. Board of Mediation and 
Conciliation, 100, 101, 103, 107, 
130 

U. S. Coal Commission, 225, 270, 
272 

U. S. Shipbuilding Labor Adjust¬ 
ment Board, 132-137 
U. S. Shipping Board, 132 
U. S. Supreme Court, 27, 117, 242 

W 

Walker, Edwin, 17, 20, 29, 31 
Walsh, Frank P., 138, 143, 144 
War Department, 146, 148, 149, 207, 
210, 212, 230 

War Labor Conference Board, 138, 
139 . 

War-time activities, 125-153 
Weeks, Secretary of War, 212 
Welborn, J. F., 91 


[532 

West Virginia mine disturbances, 
209, 210-213 

Western Federation of Miners, 36, 
40, 65, 69 

Western Union case, 142-145 
Wilkerson, Judge, 235, 239, 240, 242 
Wilson, Wm. B., 81-84, 93, 105, 
138, 145, 177 - 179 , 184, I 9 L 199 , 
200, 203, 204, 253 
Wilson, Woodrow, 225, 253, 254, 
263; Adamson Act, 107, 108, no- 
116, 118-124; anthracite wage dis¬ 
pute of 1920, 200-203; bitumin¬ 
ous strike of 1919, 178, 179, 185, 
187-189; Colorado strike of 1913- 
1914, 81, 84, 87, 90, 92, 93, 95, 96, 
98; Illinois bituminous strike of 
1920, 204, 205; railroad shop¬ 
men’s strike of 1919, 156, 157, 
159, 160, 161, 163, 164; railway 
labor troubles of 1920, 194-196, 
198; steel strike of 1919, 168, 169, 
174-176; sympathetic railway 
strike of 1919, 165; threatened 
strike of conductors and train¬ 
men, 1913, 74-76; threatened 

strike of engineer and firemen, 
1914, 101-103, 105; troops in war¬ 
time, 208; war-time activities, 
126, 129, 130, 131, 133, 135-139, 
1 42 j M 4 , 147 , 150, I 5 I-I 53 
Wood, General, 172 
Wright, Carroll D., 26, 50, 52, 54 


INDEX 




STUDIES IN HISTORY 
ECONOMICS AND 
PUBLIC LAW 


EDITED BY 

THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 


VOLUME ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVEN 


53'em Pork 

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
LONGMANS, GREEN & CO., AGENTS 
London: P. S. King & Son, Ltd. 

1924 



CONTENTS 


PAGE 

1. The Democratic Machine, 1850-1854— Roy Franklin 

Nichols , Ph.D . 1 

2. Labor Disputes and the President of the United States 

—Edward Berman , Ph.D . 249 





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VOLUME I, 1891-92. 2nd Ed., 1897. 396 pp. Price, cloth, $3.50. 

1. The Divorce Problem. A Study in Statistics. 

By Walter F. Willcox, Ph.D. Price, 75 cents. 

2. The History of Tariff Administration in the United States, from Colonial 

Times to the McKinley Administrative Bill. 

By John Dean Goss, Ph.D. Price, ^1.00. 

3. History of Municipal Land Ownership on Manhattan Island. 

By George Ashton Black, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

4. Financial History of Massachusetts. 

By Charles H. J. Douglas, Ph.D. Price, gi.oo. 

VOLUME II, 1892-93. (See note on last page.) 

1. [5] The Economics of the Russian Village. 

By Isaac A. Hourwich, Ph.D. (Out ofprint), 

2. [6] Bankruptcy. A Study In Comparative Legislation. 

, r By Samuel W. Dunscomb, Jr., Ph.D. (Not sold separately.) 

3. [7] Special Assessments ; A Study in Municipal Finance. 

By Victor Rosewater, Ph.D. Second Edition, 1898. Price, $1.00. 


VOLUME III, 1893. 465 pp. (See note on last page.) 

1. [8] *HIstory of Elections in American Colonies. 

By Coktland F Bishop, Ph.D (Not sold separately.") 

2. [9] The Commercial Policy of England toward the American Colonies. 

By George L. Beer, A. M. (Out of print.) 

VOLUME IV, 1893-94. 438 pp. (See note on last page.) 

1. [10] Financial History of Virginia. 

By William Z. Ripley, Ph.D. (Not sold separately.) 

2 . [1 11 * The Inheritance Tax. ByMAx West.PIi.D. Second Edition.1908 Price.$200. 

3 . [ 12 ] Histo^v of Taxation in Vermont. By Frederick A. Wood, Ph D.(Out of print.) 

VOLUME V, 1895-96. 498 pp. Price, cloth, $3.50. 

1. [13] Double Taxation In the United States. 

By Francis Walker, Ph.D. Price, $i.oo„ 

2, [14] The Separation of Governmental Powers. 

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8. [15] Municipal Government In Michigan and Ohio. 

By Delos F. Wilcox, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

VOLUME VI, 1896. 601 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50; Paper covers, $4.00. 

£16] History of Proprietary Government in Pennsylvania. 

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VOLUME VII, 1896. 512 pp. Price, cloth, $3.50, 

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S a [ 18]*Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchan ges of the United States 

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VOLUME VIII, 1896-98. 551 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [19] The Struggle between President Johnson and Congress over Recon¬ 

struction. By Charles Ernest Chadsey, Ph.D. Price, # 1 . 00 . 

2. [SO] Recent Centralizing Tendencies in State Educational Administra¬ 

tion. By William Clarence Webster, Ph.D. Price, 75 cents. 

3. [SI] The Abolition of Privateering and the Declaration of Paris. 

By Francis R. Stark, LL.B., Ph.D. Price, $1 00. 

4. [22] Public Administration In Massachusetts. The Relation of Central 

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VOLUME IX, 1897-98. 617 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. t23] *English Local Government of To-day. A Study of the Relations of 

Central and Local Governmen t. By Milo Roy Maltbie, Ph.D. Price, *,2.00. 

2. [24] German Wage Theories. A History of their Development. 

„ ^ , By James W. Crook, Ph.D. Price, gi.oa 

Si [25] The Centralization of Administration in New York State. 

By John Archibald Fairlie, Ph.D, Price, $1.00^ 



VOLUMES, 1898-99. 409 pp. Price, cloth, $3.50. 

1. [S6] Sympathetic Strikes and Sympathetic Lockouts. 

« ^ , By Fred S. Hall, Ph.D. Price, li.oo 

S. [2 t J *Rhode Island and the Formation of ihe Union. 

o rooi By Frank Greene Bates, Ph.D. Price, gr. 50. 

o. [~8J. Centralized Administration of Liquor Laws in the American Com, 
monwealths. By Clement Moore Lacey Sites, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

VOLUME XI, 1899. 495 pp. Price, cloth, 4.00; paper covers, $3.50. 

f $9] The Growth of Cities. By Adna Ferrin Weber Ph.D. 

VOLUME XII, 1899-1900. 586 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

[30] History and Functions of Central Labor Unions. 

By William Maxwell Burke, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

[ 31 . J Colonial Immigration Laws. 

By Edward Emerson Proper, A.M. Price, 73 cents. 
S, [32] History of Military Pension Legislation in the United States. 

By William Henry Glasson, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 00. 
4. [33] History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau. 

By Charles K. Merriam, Jr., Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME XIII, 1901. 570 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [34] The Legal Property Relations of Married Parties. 

By Isidor Loeb, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

2. [35] Political Nativlsm in New York State. 

By Louis Dow Scisco, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

3. [ 38 ] The Reconstruction of Georgia. By Edwin C. Woolley, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

VOLUME XIV, 1901-1902. 576 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

J. [371 Loyalism in New York during the American Revolution. 

By Alexander Clarence Flick, Ph.D. Price. $2.00. 

2. [38] The Economic Theory of Risk and Insurance. 

By Allan H. Willett, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

3. [39] The Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy. 

By Stephen P. H. Duggan. Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

VOLUME XV, 1902. 427 pp. Price, cloth, $3.50; Paper covers, $3.00. 

[40] Crime in Its Relation to Social Progress. By Arthur Cleveland Hall, Ph.D. 

VOLUME XVI, 1902-1903. 547 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [41] The Past and Present of Commerce in Japan. 

By Yetaro Kinosita, Ph.D, Price, $1.50. 

2. [42] The Employment of Women in the Clothing Trade. 

By Mabel Hurd Willet, Ph.D. Price, $1.30. 

3. [43] The Centralization of Administration in Ohio. 

By Samuel P. Orth, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME XVII, 1903. 635 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [44] ^Centralizing Tendencies in the Administration of Indiana. 

By William A. Rawles, Ph.D. Price, $2.50. 

2 . T 45 ] Principles of Justice in Taxation. By Stephen F. Weston, Ph D. Price, $2.00. 

VOLUME XVIII, 1903. 753 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [46] The Administration of Iowa. By Harold Martin Bowman, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

2. [47] Turgot and the Six Edicts. By Robert P. Shepherd, Ph.D. Price, gi. 50. 

3 . [48] Hanover and Prussia, 1795 - 1803 . By Guy Stanton Ford, Ph D. Price, $2.00. 

VOLUME XIX, 1903-1905. 588 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [4 9 ] .Josiah Tucker, Economist. By Walter Ernhst Clark Ph D. Price, $1.50. 

2. [50] History and Criticism of the Eabor Theory of Value in English Polit¬ 

ical Economy. By Albert C. Whitaker, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

3. [51] Trade Unions and the Law in New York. _ . ^ 

By George Gorham Groat, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

VOLUME XX, 1904. 514 pp. Price, cloth. $3.50. 

1. [52] The Office of the Justice of the Peace in England. 

L J By Charles Austin Beard, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

2. T53] A History of Military Government in Newly Acquired Territory of 

the United States. By David Y. Thomas, Ph.D. Price,$2.00. 

VOLUME XXI, 1904. 746 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [54] *Treaties, their Making and Enforcement. . 

1 * By Samuel B. Crandall, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

2 . [ 55 ] The Sociology of a New York City Block. 

^ L J By Thomas Jesse Jones, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

3. [56] Pre-Maithusian Doctrines of Population. _ . 

*• J By Charles E. Stangeland, Ph.D. Price, $2.50. 


0 * CO rtf H ©} CO H « CO H« 


VOLUME XXII, 1905. 520 pp. Price, cloth, $3.50; paper covers, $3.00. 

[57] Tlie Historical Development of tlie Poor Daw of Connecticut. 

By Edward W. Cafen, Pb. D,. 

VOLUME XXIII, 1905. 594 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1 . [58] Tlie Economics of Land Tenure in Georgia. 

By Enoch Marvin Banks, Ph.D. Price, gi.oo. 

2. [59] Mistake in Contract. A Study in Comparative Jurisprudence. 

By Edwin C. McKeag, Ph.D. Price, $ i . oo . 

3. [60] Combination in the Mining Industry. _ _ . 

By Henry R. Mussey, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

4. [61] The English Craft Guilds and the Government. ^ „ . 

By Stella Kramer. Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 

VOLUME XXIV, 1905. 521 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00, 


1. [62] The Place of Magic in the Intellectual History of Europe. 

By Lynn Thorndike, Ph.D. Price, #1.00. 

2. [63] The Ecclesiastical Edicts of the Theodosian Code. 

By William K. Boyd, Ph.D. Price, #1.00. 

3. [64] *The International Position of Japan as a Great Power. 

By Seiji G. Hishida, Ph.D. Price, $2.00, 

VOLUME XXV, 1906-07. 600 pp. (Sold only in Sets.) 

1. [65] ^Municipal Control of Public Utilities. 

By O. L. Pond, Ph.D. {Not sold separately.) 

2. [ 66 ] The Budget in the American Commonwealths. 

By Eugene E. Agger, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

3 . [ 67 ] The Finances of Cleveland. By Charles C. Williamson, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

VOLUME XXVI, 1907. 559 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [ 68 ] Trade and Currency in Early Oregon. 

By James H. Gilbert, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 
. [69] Luther’S Table Talk. By Preserved Smith, Ph.D. Price, £1.00. 

. L70J The Tobacco Industry in the United States. 

By Meyer Jagobstkin, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

. [71] Social Democracy and Population. 

By Alvan A. Tenney, Ph.D. Price, 75 cents. 

VOLUME XXVII, 1907. 578 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

. [72] The Economic Policy of Robert Walpole. 

By Norris A. Brisco, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

. [73] The United States Steel Corporation. 

By Abraham Berglund, Ph.D. Price, $1 50. 
. [74] The Taxation of Corporations in Massachusetts. 

By Harry G. Friedman, Ph.D. Price, #1.50. 

VOLUME XXVIII, 1907. 564 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

. [75] DeWitt Clinton and the Origin of the Spoils System in New York. 

By Howard Lee McBain, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 
. [76] The Development of the Legislature of Colonial Virginia. 

By Elmer I. Miller, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

. [77] The Distribution of Ownership. 

By Joseph Harding Underwood, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

VOLUME XXIX, 1908. 703 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

. [78] Early New England Towns. By Anne Bush MacLbar, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 50 . 

. [79J New Hampshire as a Royal Province. 

By William H. Fry, Ph.D. Price, $3.00. 

VOLUME XXX, 1908. 712 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50 ; Paper covers, $4.00, 


[80] The Province of New Jersey, 1664—1738. By Edwin P. Tanner, Ph.D. 

VOLUME XXXI, 1908. 575 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [81] Private Freight Cars and American Railroads. 

By L. D. H. Weld, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

2 . [ 82 ] Ohio before 1850 . By Robert E. Chaddock, Ph.D. Price, #1.50. 

3. [83] Consanguineous Marriages in tbe American Population. 

By George B. Louis Arner, Ph.D. Price, 75 cents. 

4 . [84] Adolphe Quetelet as Statistician. By Frank H. Hankins, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 25 . 

VOLUME XXXII, 1908. 705 pp. Price, cloth, 4.50; paper covers, $4.00. 

85] The Enforcement of the Statutes of Laborers. 

By Bertha Haven Putnam, Ph.D. 

VOLUME XXXIII, 1908-1909. 635 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. T86] Factory Legislation in Maine. By E. Stagg Whitin,A.B. Price, jgi.oo, 

2 . [87] *Psychological Interpretations of Society. 

By Michael M. Davis, Jr., Ph.D. Price, $2.oo„ 

3. [SS] *An Introduction to the Sources relating to the Germanic Invasions. 

By Carlton J. JB. Hayes, Ph.D, Price, $1.50. 


VOLUME XXXIV, 1909. 628 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [89] Transportation and Industrial Development in the Middle West. 

By William F. Gephakt, Ph.D. Price, £ 2 . 0 •. 
*• [90] Social Reform and the Reformation. 

, By Jacob Salwyn Schapiro, Ph.D. Price, £ 1 . 25 . 

S. [91] Responsibility for Crime. By Philip A. Parsons, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 30 . 

VOLUME XXXV, 1909. 568 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [98] The Conflict over the Judicial Powers in the United States to 1870. 

By Charles Grovk Haines, Ph.D. Price, £i. 50 . 
8 . [93] A Study of the Population of Manhattanville. 

By Howard Brown Woolston, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 25 . 
8 . [94] *Divorce: A Study in Social Causation. 

By James P. Lichtenbergbr, Ph.D. Price, $1,50. 

VOLUME XXXVI, 1910. 542 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [95] * Reconstruction In Texas. By Charles William Ramsdell, Ph.D. Price, $ 2 . 30 . 
8 . [961 * The Transition in Virginia from Colony to Commonwealth* 

By Charles Ramsdell Lingley, Ph.D. Price, £ 1 . 50 . 


VOLUME XXXVII, 1910. 606 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [97] Standards of Reasonableness in Local Freight Discriminations. 

By John Maurice Clark, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 25 . 
8 . [98] Legal Development in Colonial Massachusetts. 

By Charles J. Hilkey, Ph.D. Price, $1.25. 
8 . [99] * Social and Mental Traits of the Negro. 

By Howard W. Odum, Ph.D. Price, £ 2 . 00 . 


VOLUME XXXVIII, 1910. 463 pp. Price, cloth, $3.50. 

1. [lOO] The Public Domain and Democracy. 

By Robert Tudor Hill, Ph.D. Price, £ 2 . 00 . 
8 . [101] Organismic Theories of the State. 

By Francis W. Coker, Ph.D. Price, £ 1 . 30 . 


VOLUME XXXIX, 1910-1911. 651 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 


1. [108] The Making of the Balkan States. 

By William Smith Murray, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 50 . 
8 . [103] Political History of New Fork State during the Period of the Civil 
■^yar. By Sidney David Brummer, Ph. D. Price, 3 . 00 . 


VOLUME XL, 1911. 633 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 


1. 


8 . 


[104] A Survey of Constitutional Development in China. 

By Hawkling L. Yen, Ph D. 

[105] Ohio Politics during the Civil War Period. 

1 By George H. Porter, Ph.D. 


Price, £i.oo. 
Price, $ 1 . 75 . 


8 . [106] The Territorial Basis of Government under the State Constitutions. 

By Alfred Zantzinger Reed, Ph.D. Price, £ 1 . 75 . 


VOLUME XLI, 1911. 514 pp. Price, cloth, $3.50; paper covers, $3.00. 

[107] New Jersey as a Royal Province. By Edgar Jacob Fisher, Ph. D. 

VOLUME XLII, 1911. 400 pp. Price, cloth, $3.00; paper covers, $2.50. 


[108] Attitude of American Courts in Labor Cases. 

1 J By George Gorham Groat, Ph.D„ 

VOLUME XLIII, 1911. 633 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1® [109] *Industrial Causes of Congestion of Population in New York City. 

A® £ y Edward Ewing Pratt, Ph.D. Price, $ 2 . 00 . 

8 . [110] Education and the Mores. By F. Stuart Chapin, Ph.D. Price, 75 cents. 

8 . LI 11] The British Consuls in the Confederacy. , . 

J By Milledge L. Bonham, Jr., Ph.D. Price,$ 2 .o*. 


VOLUMES XLIV and XLV, 1911. 745 pp. 

Price for the two volumes, cloth, $6.00 ; paper covers, $5.00. 

fll 8 and 113] The Economic Principles of Confucius and his School. 

I 11 * J By Chen Huan-Chang, Ph.D. 

VOLUME XLVI, 1911-1912.^, 623 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1 . U 14 ] The Ricardian Socialists. ^ By Esther Lowenthal, Ph D. Price.$i.o« 

2 r 115 1 Ibrahim Pasha, Grand Vizier of Suleiman, the Magnificent. 

4 . LlAOj , By Hester Donaldson Jenkins, Ph.D. Price, £i.oo„ 

3 . [ 116 ] ^Syndicalism in France^ Levime> Ph.D. Second edition, 1914. Price, £1.50, 

4 . [ 117 ] A Hoosier Village. By Newell Leroy Sims, Ph.D. Price. £1.50, 


VOLUME XLVII, 1912. 544 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [118] The Politics of Michigan, 1865-1878, ^ _ . 

By Harrietts M. Dilla, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

3 . [119] *Tlie United States Beet Sugar Industry and the Tariff. 

By Roy G. Blakey, Ph.D. Price, $ 2.00. 


VOLUME XLVIII, 1912. 493 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1 . [ISO] Isidor of Seville. By Ernest Brehaut, Ph. D. Price, ga.oo. 

3. [1S1] Progress and Uniformity in Child-Babor Legislation. 

By William Fielding Ogburn, Ph.D. Price, $1.75, 


VOLUME XLIX, 1912. 592 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [12S] British Radicalism 1791-1797. By Walter Phelps Hall. Price,$2.00. 

3. [123] A Comparative Study of the Law of Corporations. 

By Arthur K. Kuhn, Ph.D. Price, £1.30. 
S. [124] *The Negro at Work in New York City. 

By George E. Haynes, Ph.D. Price,$1.25. 


VOLUME L, 1911. 481 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 


1 . [ 125 ] *The Spirit of Chinese Philanthropy. Ty Yai Yue Tsu, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 
3 . [ 126 ] *The Alien in China. ByVi. Kyuin Wellington Koo, Ph.D. Price, $ 2 . 50, 


VOLUME LI, 1912. 4to. Atlas. Price: cloth, $1.50; paper covers, $1.00. 


1. [127] The Sale of Biquor In the South. 


By Leonard S. Blakey, Ph.D„ 


VOLUME LII, 1912, 489 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [128] *Provincial and Bocal Taxation In Canada. 

By Solomon Vinbbbrg, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

2. [129] *The Distribution of Income. 

By Frank Hatch Streightoff, Ph.D. Price, gi.50. 
8 . [130] *The Finances of Vermont. By Frederick A. Wood, Ph.D. Price, £ 1 . 00 , 


VOLUME LIII, 1913. 789 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50; paper, $4.00. 

[131] The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida. By W. W. Davis, Ph.D. 

VOLUME LIV, 1913. 604 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [132] * Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States. 

By Arnold Johnson Lien, Ph.D. Price, 75 cents, 

3. [133] The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Begislation. 

By Blaine Free Moore, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 
8 . [134] ^Indian Slavery in Colonial Times within the Present Bimits of the 
United States. By Almon Wheeler Lauber, Ph.D. Price, $3.00. 

VOLUME LV, 1913. 665 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [135] *A Political History of the State of New York. 

By Homer A. Stbbbins, Ph.D. Price, £4.00. 
3. [136] *The Early Persecutions of the Christians. 

By Leon H. Canfield, Ph.D. Price, £1.50. 

VOLUME LVI, 1913, 406 pp. Price, cloth, $3.50, 

1. [137] Speculation on the New York Stock Exchange, 1904-1907. 

By Algernon Ashburner Osborne. Price, $ 1 . 50 . 

2. [138] The Policy of the United States towards Industrial Monopoly. 

By Oswald Whitman Knauth, Ph.D. Price. '$ 2 . 00 , 

VOLUME LVII, 1914. 670 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [139] *The Civil Service of Great Britain. 

By Robert Moses, Ph.D. Price, #2.00. 

3. [140] The Einancial History of New York State. 

By Don C. Sowers. Price, $2.50. 

VOLUME LVIII, 1914. 684 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50; paper, $4.00. 

[141] Reconstruction in North Carolina. 

By J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton, Ph.D. 

VOLUME LIX, 1914. 625 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [142] The Development of Modern Turkey by means of Its Press. 

By Ahmed Emin, Ph.D. Price, fi.oo. 
3. [143] The System of Taxation in China, 1614-1911. 

By Shao-Kwan Chen, Ph. D. Price, $ t . oo . 

3 . [ 144 ] The Currency Problem in China. By Wen Pin Wei, Ph.D. Price, gi.25, 

4. [145] *Jewish Immigration to the United States. 

By Samuel Joseph, Ph.D. Price, $1.5®. 


VOLUME LX. 1914. 516 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [146] *Constantine the Great and Christianity. 

By Christopher Bush Coleman, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

2. [147] The Establishment of Christianity and the Proscription of Pa¬ 

ganism. By Maud Alins Huttman, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

VOLUME LXI. 1914. 496 pp. Price, cloth, $4 00. 

1. [148] *The Railway Conductors: A Study in Organized Labor. 

By Edwin Clyde Robbins. Price, $1.50. 

3. [149] *The Finances of the City of New York. 

By Yin-Ch’u Ma. Ph D Price, $2. 50. 

VOLUME LXII. 1914. 414 pp. Price, cloth, $3.50. 

[ 150] The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction. 
39th Congress, 1865 — 1867 . By Benjamin B. Kendrick, Ph.D. Price, $3.00. 

VOLUME LXIII. 1914. 561 pp. Price, cloth, $4 00. 

1. [151] Emile Durkheim’s Contribution to Sociological Theory. 

By Charles Elmer Gehlke, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 
3. [153] The Nationalization of Railways in Japan. 

By Toshiharu Watarai, Ph.D. Price, $1.25. 
3. [153] Population: A Study in Malthusianism. 

By Warren S. Thompson, Ph.D. Price, $1.75. 

VOLUME LXIV 1915. 646 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [154] ^Reconstruction in Georgia. By C. Mildred Thompson, Ph.D. Price, 3.00. 
3. 1155J *The Review of American Colonial Legislation by the King In 
Council. By Elmer Beecher Russell, Ph.D. Price, $1.75. 

VOLUME LXV. 1915. 524 pp. Price, cloth, $4 00. 

1. [156] *The Sovereign Council of New France 

By Raymond Du Bois Cahall, Ph.D. Price, $2.25 
3. [157] *Sclentlfic Management (3rd. ed. 1933). 

By Horace: B. Drury, Ph.D. Price, $2.00 


VOLUME LXVI. 1915. 655 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [158] *The Recognition Policy of the United States. 

By Julius Goebel, Jr., Ph.D. Price, $ 2 . 00 . 
3. [159] Railway Problems In China. By Chih Hsu, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 50 . 

3. [l60] *The Boxer Rebellion. By Paul H. Clements, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 


VOLUME LXVII. 1916. 538 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 


1. [1611 ^Russian Sociology. By Julius F. Hecker, Ph.D. Price, $2. 50 . 

3. [163] State Regulation of Railroads in the South. 

By Maxwell Ferguson, A. M., LL.B. Price, $1.75. 

VOLUME LXVIII. 1916. 518 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 


1 . n 63 ] The Origins of the Islamic State. By Philip K. Hitti, Ph.D. Price, g 4 .oo 

2. [163A] Origin* of the Islamic State. By F. C. Murgotten. {In press) 


VOLUME LXIX. 1916. 489 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 


1. [164] Railway Monopoly and Rate Regulation. 

By Robert J. McFall, Ph.D. 

3. [165] The Butter Industry in the United States. 

By Edward Wiest, Ph D. 


Price, $2 oo. 
Price, $2.oo. 


VOLUME LXX. 1916. 540 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 


[166J Mohammedan 


Theories of Finance 

By Nicolas P. Aghnidbs, Ph.D. 


Price, $4.00. 


VOLUME LXXI. 1916. 476 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [1671 The Commerceof Louisiana during the French Regime, 1699—1763. 

By N. M. Miller Surrey, Ph.D. Price, $3.50. 


VOLUME LXXII. 1916. 542 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. r 168] American Men of Letters: Their Nature and Nurture. 

1 By Edwin Leavitt Clarke, Ph.D. 

3. [169] The Tariff Problem in China. By Chin Chu, Ph.D. 

3. 170] The Marketing of Perishable Food Products. 

J By A. B. Adams, Ph.D. {Out of print) 


Price, $1.50. 
Price, $1.50. 


VOLUME LXXIII. 1917. 616 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [171] *The Social and Economic Aspects of tbe Chartist Movement. 

By Frank F. Rosenblatt, Ph.D. Price, #2.00. 
8 . [173] *The Decline of the Chartist Movement. 

By Preston William Slosson, Ph.D. Price, $ 2 . 00 , 
[173] Chartism and the Churches. By H. U. Faulkner, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 25 . 

VOLUME LXXIV. 1917. 546 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [174] The Rise of Ecclesiastical Control in Quebec. 

By Walter A. Riddell, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 75 . 

3. [1751 Political Opinion In Massachusetts during the Civil War and Re¬ 
construction. By Edith Ellen Ware, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 75 . 

3. [176] Collective Bargaining in the Lithographic Industry. 

By H. E. Hoagland, Ph.D. Price, $ 1.00 

VOLUME LXXV. 1917. 410 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

An extra-illustrated and bound volume is published at $5.00. 

1. [177] New York as an Eighteenth Century Municipality. Prior to 1731. 

By Arthur Everett Peterson, Ph.D. Price, $2.00 
3. [178] New Yoi'k as an Eighteenth Century Municipality. 1731-1776. 

By George William Edwards, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 

VOLUME LXXVI. 1917. 439 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [179] ^Economic and Social History of Chowan County, North Carolina, 

By W. Scott Boyce, Ph.D. Price, #2.50. 

3. [180] Separation of State and Local Revenues in the United States. 

By Mabei Newcomer, Ph.D. Price, #1.75. 

VOLUME LXXVII. 1917. 473 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

[181] American Civil Church Law. By Carl Zollmann, LL.B. Price, $ 3 . 50 . 

VOLUME LXXVIII. 1917. 647 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

[183] The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution. 

By Arthur Meier Schlesinger, Ph.D. Price, $4.00. 

VOLUME LXXXX. 1917-1918. 585 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [183] Contemporary Theories of Unemployment and Unemployment 
Relief. By Frederick C. Mills, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

3. [184] The French Assembly of 1848 and American Constitutional Doc¬ 
trine. By Eugene Newton Curtis, Ph.D. Price, $3.00. 

VOLUME LXXX. 1918. 448 pp. Frice, cloth, $4-00. 

1. [185] ^Valuation and Rate Making. By Robert L. Hale, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 50 . 

3. [186] The Enclosure of Open Fields In England. 

By Harriet Bradley, Ph.D. Price, jx. 25 . 
3. [187] The Land Tax in China. By H. L. Huang, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 90 . 

VOLUME LXXXI. 1918. 601pp. Price, cloth $4.50. 

1. [188] Social Life In Rome In the Time of Plautus and Terence. 

By Georgia W. Leffingwell, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 25 . 
3. [189] * Australian Social Development. 

By Clarence H. Northcott, Ph.D. Price, $ 2 . 50 . 
3. [190] *Factory Statistics and Industrial Fatigue. 

By Philip S. Florence, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 25 . 

VOLUME LXXXII. 1918-1919. 576 pp. Frice, cloth, $4.50. 

1. [191] New England and the Bavarian Illuminati. 

By V ernon Stauffer, Ph.D. Price, # 3 . 00 . 
3. [198] Resale Price Maintenance. By Claudius T. Murchison, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 50 . 

VOLUME LXXXIII. 1919. 433 pp. Frice, cloth, $4.00. 

[ 193 J The I. W. W. Second Edition, 1920. By Paul F. Brissenden, Ph.D. Price, # 3 . 50 . 

VOLUME LXXXIV. 1919. 534 pp. Price, cloth, $4.50 

1 . [194| The Royal Government In Virginia, 1634-1775. 

By Percy Scott Flippin, Ph.D. Price, $ 3 . 00 . 
3. [195] Hellenic Conceptions Of Peace. By Wallace E. Caldwell, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 25 . 

VOLUME LXXXV. 1919. 450 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1 . [196] The Religions Policy of the Bavarian Government during the 
Napoleonic Period. By Chester P. Higby, Ph.D. Price, $ 3 . 00 . 

3. [197] Public Debts of China. By F. H. Huang, Ph.D. Price, > 1 . 00 . 


VOLUME LXXXVI. 1919. 460 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

U981 The Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics of New York. 

By Dixon Ryan Fox, Ph.D. Price, $3.50 

VOLUME LXXXVII. 1919. 451pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

f 1991 Foreign Trade of China. By Chong Su See, Ph.D. Price. $ 3.50 


1 . 

2 . 


VOLUME LXXXVI1I. 1919. 444 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00 

[200] The Street Surface Railway Franchises of New York City. 

By Harry J. Carman, Ph.D. Price, $2.00. 
[SOI] Electric Light Franchises in New York City. 

By Leonora Arent, Ph.D. Price, $1.50 


VOLUME LXXXIX. 1919. 558 pp. Price, cloth, $5.00. 

1. [202] Women’s Wages. By Emilie J. Hutchinson, Ph.D. Price, $ 1 . 50 . 

2. [203 1 The Return of the Democratic Party to Power in 1884. 

By Harrison Cook Thomas, Ph.D. Price, $2.25 

S. [204] The Paris Bourse and French Finance. 

By William Parker, Ph.D. Price, $1.00. 


VOLUME XC. 1920. 547 pp. Price, cloth, $5.00. 

1. [205] Prison Methods in New Yoi k State. By Philip Klein, Ph.D. Price, $3 50 

2. |206 India’s Demand for Transportation. 

By William E. Weld, Ph.D. Price, $1.25. 


VOLUME XCI, 1920. 626 pp. Price, cloth, $6.00. 

1. f207 *The Influence of Oversea Expansion on England to 1700. 

By James E Gillespie, Ph.D. Price, #3.00. 

2 . 1208 ] International Labor Legislation. By I. F. Ayusawa, Ph.D. Price, $2.75 


VOLUME XCII. 1920. 433 pp. Price, cloth, $5.00. 

[209] The Public Life of William Shirley. By George A. Wood, Ph.D. Price, ^ 4.50 


VOLUME XCIII. 1920. 460 pp. Price, cloth, $5.50. 

1. [2 101 *The English Reform Bill of 1 867. By Joseph H. Park, Ph.D. Price. $ 3.00 

2. [211] The Policy of the United States as regards Intervention. 

By Charles E. Martin, Ph.D. Price, $ 2.00 


VOLUME XCIV. 1920-1921. 492 pp. Price, cloth, $5.50. 


1 . [ 212 ] ^Catastrophe and Social Change. By S. H. Prince, Ph.D. Price, $1.50 

2. 213] Intermarriage in New York City. By Julius Drachsler, Ph.D. Price, $ 2.25 

3. [2 14] The Ratification of the Federal Constitution by the State of New 

York. By C. E. Miner, Ph.D. Price, £1.50. 


VOLUME XCV. 1920-1921. 654 pp. Price, cloth, $6.00. 

1. [2151 *Railroad Capitalization. By James C. Bonbright, Ph.D. Price, £2.00 

2. i216J * American Apprenticeship and Industrial Education. 

By Paul H. Douglas, Ph.D. Price, $3.50. 

VOLUME XCVI. 1921. 539 pp. Price, cloth, $6.50. 

1. [217] ^Opening a Highway to the Pacific. 1838-1846. 

By James Christy Bell, Jr., Ph.D. Price, #2.25, 

2. [218] Parliamentary Franchise Reform in England from 1885 to 1918. 

By Homer L. Morris, Ph.D. Price, #2.25. 

3. [219] The Peaceable Americans. 1860-61. 

By Mary Scrugham, Ph.D. Price, $1.50 

VOLUME XCVII. 1921. 752 pp. Prico, cloth, $8.50. 

1. T2201 The Working Forces in Japanese Politics. 

1 By Uichi Iwasaki, Ph.D. Price, $i 50. 

2. [221] Social Aspects of the Treatment of the Insane. 

By J. A. Goldberg, Ph.D. Price, $2.50. 

3. [222] The Free Negro in Maryland. By James M. Wright, Ph.D. Price, $ 4 . 00 . 

VOLUME XCVIII. 1921. 338 pp. Price, cloth, $4.00. 

1. [223] Origins of Modern German Colonialism, 1871-1885. 

By Mary E. Townsend, Ph.D. Price, $2.25, 

2. f224] Japan’s Financial Relations with the United States. 

* 1 J v ByG. G Odate. Ph.D. Price, r.25. 


VOLUME XCIX. 1921-22. 649 pp. Price, cloth, $7.00. 

1 . T225] *Tlie Economic History of China : A Study of Soil Exhaustion. 

L By Mabel Peng-hua Lee, Ph.D. Price, $4.50. 

2 . [ 226 ] Central and Local Finance in China. By Chuan Shih Li, Ph.D. Price, $2.00 



VOLUME C. 1921. 553 pp. Price, cloth, $6.00. 

1. [227] *Contemporary British Opinion during the Franco-Prussian War. 

By Dora Neill Raymond, Ph.D. Price, $4.50. 

2. [838] French Contemporary Opinion of the Russian Revolution of 1905. 

By Encarnacion Alzona, Ph.D. Price, 11.25. 

VOLUME CL 1921-22. 517 pp. Price, cloth, $5.50. 

1. [229] State Taxation of Personal Incomes. 

By Alzada Comstock, Ph.D. Price, $2.50. 

2. 1230] The Whig Party in Pennsylvania. By Henry R. Mueller, Ph.D. Price, $ 2 . 75 . 

VOLUME CII. 1922-23. 593 pp. Price, cloth, $6.00. 

1. [231] The Evolution of People’s Banks. By Donald S. Tucker, Ph.D. Price, £ 2 . 75 . 

2. I 232 J The Bank of the State of Missouri. By J. R. Cable, Ph.D. Price, 13.50. 


VOLUME cm. 1922. 606 pp. Price, cloth, $6.50. 

1. [233) The Relation of British Policy to the Declaration of the Monroe 

Doctrine. By Leonard Axel Lawson, Ph.D. Price, $1.50. 

2. [234] Ledru-Rollin and the Second French Republic. 

By Alvin R. Calman, Ph.D. Price, £4. 50. 


VOLUME CIV. 1922. 492 pp. Price, cloth, $5.50. 

1. [335] *The Populist Movement In Georgia. 

By Alex Mathews Arnett, Ph.D. Price,$2.50. 

2. [336] History of the James River and Kanawha Company. 

By W. F. Dunaway, Ph.D. Price, $2.75. 


VOLUME CV. 1923. 509 pp. Price, cloth, $6.00. 

1. [237] The Regime of the International Rivers: Danube and Rhine. 

By J. P. Chamberlain, Ph.D. Price, $3.50. 

2. [238] Imperial Control of the Administration of Justice in the Thirteen 

American Colonies. 1684 - 1776 . By George Adrian Washburne, Ph.D. Price, 2.00. 


VOLUME CVI. 1923. 425 pp. Price, cloth, $5.00. 

1. [ 239 ] Labor and Empire. By T. F. Tsiang, Ph.D. Price, £2.25. 

2 . L 2401 Legislative History of America’s Economic Policy toward the 

Philippines. By Jose S. Reyes, Ph.D. Price, $2.25. 

VOLUME CVII. 1923. 584 pp. Price, cloth, $7.00 

1. [241] Two Portuguese Communities in New England. 

By Donald R. Taft, Ph.D. Price, £4.00. 

2 . [ 343 ] The Penitentials. By Thomas P. Oakley, Ph.D. Price, £2.50. 


VOLUME CVIII. 1923. 416 pp. Price, cloth, $5.00. 

1. [243] The Pre-War Business Cycle. 

By William C. Schluter, Ph.D. Price, £2.00. 

3. [244] Foreign Credit Facilities in the United Kingdom. 

By Leland Rex Robinson, Ph.D. Price, £2.50. 

VOLUME CIX. 1923. 450 pp. Price, cloth, $5.00. 

[ 245 ] Reconstruction In Arkansas. By Thomas S. Staples, Ph.D. Price, £4.50. 

VOLUME CX. 1923. 

1. [246] *The United Mine Workers of America and the Non-Union Coal 

Fields. By A. Ford Hinrichs, Ph.D Price, £2.00. 

2. [247] Business Fluctuations and the American Labor Movement. 1915- 

1922. By V. W. Lanfear. {In press). 

VOLUME CXI. 1923. 

1. 1248] *The Democratic Machine, 1850-1854. 

By Roy Franklin Nichols, Ph.D. Price, $2.50. 

3. [249] Labor Disputes and the President of the U. S. 

By Edward Berman. {Inpress). 

VOLUME CXII. 1923. 

1. 1250] *Catholieism and the Second French Republic. 1848-1852. 

By R. W. Collins, Ph.D. Price, £4.00. 


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